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Abstract 
A review of previous qualitative corporate distress research reveals that non-managerial 
employees appear to have been overlooked as a potential source of information on a 
failed company. Yet assertions by Argenti (1976a) and an analysis of Altman's (1983) 
and McBarnet, Weston and Whelan's (1993) research indicates that employees can 
potentially observe the symptoms of distress. However, Argenti (1976a) reported that 
employees could only observe the non-financial systems of distress, and that they could 
not determine that an organisation was distressed. McBarnet et al's (1993) research and 
a pilot case study indicated otherwise. The pilot study also found that employees had 
access to the informal communication network, or grapevine, and an informal 
accounting information system (IAIS). McBarnet et a] (1993) report that informal 
information may assist employees to detect problems or unusual events within a 
company. 
Consequently, this research sought to clarify the anomaly between Argenti's assertions 
and McBarnet et al's (1993) and the pilot study's findings, determining the problems or 
concerns that employees observed in a company before. it collapsed, and whether these 
observations could cause employees to believe that a company was distressed before it 
failed. The research also examined whether information from an IAIS and/or the 
grapevine contributes to employees' observations and opinions in a distressed company. 
A single case study of a failed organisation was conducted. The subject was Fortex 
Group Limited, a South Island meat-processing company. The findings challenged and 
extended previous beliefs regarding employees' observations in a distressed company, 
indicating that they may not only observe the symptoms of distress, but also observe the 
defects and mistakes which cause, and contribute to, failure. Moreover, from the 
symptoms observed, the employees recognised that the company was distressed. The 
research also established preliminary links between the grapevine, IAISs, employees' 
observations and corporate distress. Each area was identified as an alternative source of 
information which could potentially assist the early detection of corporate distress. 
Despite limitations, this research increases the body of knowledge in these areas, and 
recommends directions for future research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
"I think there was the shock and the realisation to all the workers that 
something they had believed in so vigorously, something they had been so loyal 
to, had run aground. Someone in discussion said that it was akin to the icon of 
the government's ideals of free enterprise .finishing up on the rocks." 
Union Secretary Peter Binnie commenting on Fortex Group Limited's failure 
(Interview 14/8/95) 
The failure of a company impacts on a variety of individuals, ranging from 
employees, to creditors and customers, and ultimately society itself (Milburn, 
Schuler and Watman, 1983). Often these groups only become aware a company is 
distressed in its last few months (Argenti, 1976a). Detecting distress at this stage is 
often too late as a poor financial position combined with a lack of time thwarts most 
turnaround attempts, meaning failure is almost inevitable. Furthermore, by this time 
the groups affected by failure have limited recourse to minimise its effect upon 
themselves. 
To avoid these problems researchers have endeavoured to provide a means to detect 
failing companies in advance. The majority of such research can be categorised as 
following one of two methods, the analytic method and the list method (Argenti, 
1977). The analytic method is derived from, and utilises, publicly available financial 
information in the form of financial ratios. Conversely, the qualitative list approach 
identifies the observable causes, and symptoms, of a failing company. These 
observable factors have been derived from a wide variety of information sources. 
However, a review of the individuals interviewed as part of previous corporate 
distress research reveals that non-managerial employees (henceforth referred to only 
as employees) appear to have been overlooked. 
Admittedly, unlike managers, employees do not determine an organisation's strategy, 
nor may they be in a position to clearly assess an organisation's overall performance. 
However, they are 'insiders' and as such have both the position and the incentive to 
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be aware of their company's performance, for it is an organisation's members who 
are most directly affected by a crisis (Milburn et al, 1983). 
Indeed, prior researchers such as Argenti (1976a), Altman (1983) and McBarnet, 
Weston and Whelan (1993) have indicated that employees may be able to identify 
weaknesses and problems which signify corporate distress. However, McBamet et 
al's finding that employees and union members may detect creative accounting 
opposes Argenti's opinion that employees may observe the non-financial symptoms 
of distress. Moreover, the findings of a preliminary case study which revealed that 
employees were aware of distress four months prior to failure contradicts Argenti's 
statement that employees cannot identify that a company is distressed. 
Consequently, this research sought to clarify the anomaly between previous research 
by examining whether an organisation's employees can identify that their company is 
distressed, or, are able to observe factors which contribute to, cause, or signal an 
organisation's failure. This component of the research was undertaken through a 
comparison of employees' observations with factors proposed in the corporate 
distress literature. 
The preliminary case also revealed that employees from Fortex's Seafield plant also 
received informal information from an informal accounting information system and 
the company grapevine. McBamet et al (1993) state that non-publicly available 
informal information contributes to an employee's and union's ability to detect 
financial and non-financial problems. 
Therefore, this research also had a secondary objective of assessing whether the 
employees' identification of problems was influenced by inside informal information 
from an IAIS and/or the grapevine. This aspect of the research involved examining 
both the extent to which these two systems operated in an organisation and the 
information carried by, or contained within, each. 
By examining these two areas it was hoped to ascertain whether employees 
themselves, or another external party using information from employees and/or 
informal information, could accurately assess whether a company is failing. 
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Therefore, potentially providing alternative information sources for the early 
detection of distress, or, failing that, indicating that employees may assist a post-
failure analysis. 
The research was undertaken using a single case study of employees from Fortex 
Group Limited\ a failed South Island meat-processing company. The case study 
itself added to the previous body of corporate distress literature, many of which are 
individual cases of organisational failure, and provided an initial assessment of the 
previously unresearched area of employees' observations in a distressed organisation. 
Furthermore, this research is believed to be the first to investigate the role of informal 
information in a failed company and to assess whether there was any 
interrelationship between such information and an employee's perceptions of 
distress. By undertaking an initial examination of both areas several potentially 
fruitful areas for future research were raised, previous research was re-examined and 
extended, and the body of corporate distress knowledge increased. 
The remainder of the thesis is structured in the following manner. Chapter 2 
provides background information on the development of the research objectives, and 
outlines the interrelationship between employees, informal information and distress. 
The third and fourth chapters outline the characteristics of the grapevine and informal 
accounting information systems respectively. 
Chapter 5 provides an overview of previous research into corporate distress. The 
chapter presents many of the recurring characteristics which are said to cause, 
contribute to, or be an observable symptom of, company failure. The method used 
for the research is presented, justified and critiqued in Chapter 6. Included in this 
chapter are the precautions utilised to minimise the potential limitations of the case 
study method, and outlines of the site selection and interview processes. 
Chapter 7 presents an overview ofFortex's history, structure and performance in the 
years prior to its collapse. Within this chapter are the post-collapse criticisms of the 
1 
Fr?m this point forward Fortex Group Limited will be referred to as Fortex for the purposes of simplification. 
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company, including opinions proffered to, and offered by, the media as to why the 
company collapsed. 
Chapters 8, 9 and 10 present the results of the case study pertaining to employees' 
observations and perceptions, the grapevine, and the ·IAIS, respectively. Lastly, 
Chapter 11 summarises the thesis, and presents and discusses the potential 
limitations of the findings, opportunities for future research, and the implications 
generated from the research for parties involved in a company's distress. In addition, 
a postscript is provided which details the results to date of the court proceedings 
against Fortex's former managing director, Graeme Thompson, and general manager 
of finance, Michael Mullen. Within the postscript the implications of the verdicts for 
the findings of this research are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter consists of two sections. The first outlines the interrelationship between 
employees, informal information and corporate· distress, the individual aspects of 
which are reviewed in detail in the following chapters. The second defines the terms 
failure, distress and collapse for the purposes of this research, based on the variety of 
terms used previously. 
2. Employees and Distress 
A rev1ew of previous qualitative corporate distress research reveals that non-
managerial employees have seemingly been overlooked as a potential source of 
information on a failed company. Instead, where interviews or opinions are sought, a 
variety of other sources of personal evidence have been used.2 These include the 
opinions of: 
• Receivers or insolvency experts (Argenti, 1976a; Young, 1989; Greatorex, Holden 
Iliffe, and Wauchope, 1994); 
• Accountants (Argenti, 1976a); 
• Stockbrokers/investment analysts (Argenti, 1976a); 
• Company founders (Bruno, Leidecker and Harder, 1987; Bruno and Leidecker, 
1988); and 
• Authors who have personal experience in the field of distress. Such authors are 
typically accountants or receivers (Hartigan, 1973, 1976; McKinlay, 1979; 
McQueen, 1989a, 1989b ). 
2 
This style of research only forms a small portion of all qualitative corporate distress research, most of which is either the 
detailed examination of an individual case or the delineation of common factors from several individual cases of failure. 
In these circumstances, rarely is any mention made of the information used to document the case, or from where, or from 
whom, the information is obtained. However, it is likely that some of this information would be from personal sources. 
8 EMPLOYEES' OBSERVATIONS, INFORMAL INFORMATION AND CORPORATE DISTRESS 
From the sources listed it is evident that, in addition to being a party involved in, or 
exposed to, company failure, a professional level of business and financial expertise 
has also been required before a person's opinion is sought. Employees, who are not 
commonly believed to possess such skills, are ignored. However, this may be a 
disservice, because employees are 'insiders.' From their position they can directly 
observe the operations of a company. Therefore, it is unsurprising that two notable 
distress researchers, Argenti and Altman, have mentioned that employees are 
valuable sources of information in a distressed company. 
2.1. Employees and Non-financial Symptoms 
Argenti (1976a) postulated that, due to their relationship to the company, groups such 
as employees, suppliers and customers are in a position to notice certain non-
financial symptoms of distress. Employees, in particular, were credited with the 
ability to observe a multitude of such factors, the first being low morale: 
"Take low morale for example. This is certainly a symptom of a company that 
is recognized by its employees to not be successful or to be jailing" (Argenti, 
1976a, p 144). 
Within the range of symptoms capable of being observed· by employees, Argenti 
(1976a) proposed that some may be obvious, making them easily noticed by such 
parties as company visitors: 
"Employees and visitors alike may be able to see such obvious symptoms as 
dingy offices, poor maintenance, and a general air of financial stringency" 
(Argenti, 1976a, p 145). 
However, he also distinguished between some of the symptoms which suppliers, 
customers and employees could perceive, thereby indicating that the observation of 
certain symptoms may be restricted to particular individual groups. Symptoms 
mentioned as relating specifically to employees were: 
" ... greater resistance to pay increases, cuts in overtime and less generous 
treatment generally, delays in capital expenditure authorizations, rising stocks, 
the outdated product, the declining market share, the growing volume of 
customer complaints and an increasing desperation among the top, and later 
the middle, management" (Argenti, 1976a, p 145). 
According to Argenti (1976a) there were several other groups who could also 
observe the non-financial symptoms of distress. These groups included: 
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• bank managers-who watch the company's overdraft; 
• the firm's accountants-who observe the financial ratios; and 
• the stock exchange-which gradually marks down the shares. 
However, each group only observes a limited number of symptoms and are not in a 
position to assess the organisation's overall performance (Argenti, 1976a). 
Furthermore, they are not expected to make use of the information. Instead, Argenti 
refers to the 'knowledgeable observer' who, through personal observation and 
gathering information from such individual groups as customers, suppliers, 
employees and managers, assesses the company's overall position. 
Argenti's assertions, while indicating that employees may observe symptoms of 
distress, immediately raise four potential limitations: 
• Firstly, non-financial symptoms occur late in the distress process (Argenti, 
1976a). By this stage the company may have been distressed for a long period of 
time and be financially weak. Identification of distress at an earlier stage would 
allow more time and financial resources for a turnaround to be attempted. 
• Secondly, other than low morale, Argenti (1976a) does not indicate whether 
employees realise they are observing the non-financial symptoms of distress. 
However, his recommendation that a knowledgeable observer is required indicates 
that an employee would be unlikely to report their observations ex-ante as 
symptoms or recognise that the organisation is distressed. 
• Thirdly, because some symptoms can also be found in non-failing companies they 
only provide "some confirmatory value" (Argenti, 1976a, p 144). That is, they 
can not of themselves identify distress but, when viewed in combination with 
other factors which occur earlier in the distress process, can confirm that the 
organisation is failing. Therefore, again this indicates that employees are unlikely 
to recognise that the organisation is distressed. 
• Fourthly, even if employees recognise that their observations are signs of failure, 
because they are not in a position to observe the overall position of the company, 
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the severity of the situation may be underestimated. According to Argenti 
(1976a), this problem could be negated somewhat if the employees contacted 
individuals in other areas of the organisation who hold differing information. 
Unfortunately, Argenti also asserts that this contact does not occur. 
The limitations listed above indicate that, while employees are capable of observing 
symptoms, they would be unlikely to recognise them as such, or if they did so, the 
severity of the organisation's position could be underestimated. Furthermore, 
because they are unable to obtain information on the entire organisation's 
performance, observation is restricted to a limited number of non-financial 
symptoms. 
While employees may not have an overview of the entire company, the turnaround of 
GTI Corporation reported by Altman (1983) indicates that they are likely to have 
detailed knowledge of their area of expertise. The findings also provide an indication 
that employees are more perceptive than Argenti attributed them to be. 
In an attempt to detect under-utilised assets and improve the distressed company's 
profitability 250 employees of GTI's largest plant were asked for their opinions 
through the use of a questionnaire. Altman found that: 
"The employees knew what was wrong. They were specific about how to 
improve the use of their machines. Many ofthe suggestions were implemented, 
and productivity improved (1983, p 201)." 
This ability to identify weaknesses in production process was not an isolated 
instance. Similar questionnaires were given to employees at another of the 
company's plants. In this case: 
"The employee responses resulted in changing the plant's organization from 
functional to product line, another move which more effectively employed the 
company's assets.... After a few weeks, the plant began to return to 
profitability" (Altman, 1983, p 201). 
Altman's findings, like Argenti's (1976a), indicate that employees are aware of 
problems which affect a company. In this case such awareness was only 
demonstrated in the functional area of their employment. Nevertheless, Altman's 
findings also indicate that an employees' awareness may extend to areas which affect 
an organisation's profitability, a financial aspect which Argenti left unmentioned. 
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2.2. Employees, Creative Accounting and Financial Symptoms of Distress 
The claim that employees' observations are restricted to non-financial symptoms 
may have arisen because employees do not commonly have access to financial 
information. Moreover, even where financial hlformation is available, employees 
and unions are not believed to have the expertise, or inclination, to use it (McBarnet 
et al, 1993). However, McBarnet et al (1993), found that both employees and unions 
utilise financial information and that through such usage they could potentially detect 
creative accounting: 
"Those who have rejected the value to employees of financial information may 
have overlooked the fact that workers also have access to a degree of inside 
knowledge with which to prompt and feed adversarial challenge; and indeed, to 
smell a "rat" in "creative" accounts" (McBarnet eta!, 1993, p 93). 
Like the observation of non-financial problems, the employees' detection of creative 
accounting was credited to their position as insiders. McBarnet et al (1993) 
elaborated, reporting that the inside position allowed access to local knowledge and 
informal information which may prompt questions that external parties could not 
identify: 
"Insider knowledge at a shopfloor level and local alerts and suspicions among 
the worliforce itself also played a part in prompting a call for financial 
information and challenging it. Inside information ranged from rumour or 
gossip, reports in the local press, industry or some other grapevine to unusual 
events taking place in the company, often at production level" (McBarnet et al, 
1993,p 93). 
As the preceding quote indicates, the unions and workforces used local knowledge, 
and information from networks, such as the grapevine, which operate inside and 
beyond the plant as the basis for identifying the problems which prompted the call 
for financial information. According to McBarnet et al (1993), these problems 
included changes in stock levels, customers comments, and changes in overtime 
levels, all of which are mentioned by Argenti (1976a, p 145) as non-financial 
symptoms of distress which employees may observe.3 Inside information from this 
range of sources, combined with an understanding of the company, meant that·· 
3 
These symptoms are provided on p 8. 
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employees and union members could make informed judgements of the company's 
performance and were in a better position than external parties to identify 
discrepancies in financial records (McBarnet et al, 1993).4 
McBarnet et al's (1993) findings provide a preliminary link betWeen informal 
information, and an employee's detection of the symptoms of distress. The findings 
also indicate that an employee's observations may also extend to financial 
information and creative accounting. The informal information carried by the 
grapevine, while being one of many sources of insider information, has also been 
linked to distress by Ezzamel and Bourn (1990). 
Ezzamel and Bourn's (1990) examination of a distressed organisation revealed it had 
a defective accounting information system (AIS) which was incapable of scanning 
the environment. Consequently, the AIS did not provide effective early warning of 
cnses. In that organisation, which also suffered from poor communication of 
accounting information, a grapevine system of communication developed. The 
grapevine was used as alternative communication channel and was the only means 
the organisation had for scanning the environment and detecting a crisis. 
2.3. The Preliminary Case Study 
In an attempt to ascertain what, if any, problems or difficulties employees observe in 
a company prior to its failure, a preliminary case study was conducted in late 1994. 
The case study involved interviewing three employees of the then recently failed 
meat marketing and processing company, Fortex. The research revealed that the 
employees, who were representatives of the Meat Workers Union, were aware of the 
company's distressed position up to four months prior to its collapse. During the 
course of an interview one of the former employees stated: 
4 
"From my perspective and from my job, I may have had a better position to 
understand or have concerns that the general public were not aware of" 
These findings raise implications for union members and workers trading shares, a phenomenon customarily associated with 
managers and directors. In New Zealand the relevant legislation for insider trading is the Securities Amendment Act 
1988. A cursory glance reveals that employees would seem to be covered by the legislation. However, a detailed 
examination is outside the scope of this thesis. 
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Hence, this employee recognised that he held a better position than external parties to 
observe the failure of the company. The union delegates also indicated that they 
maintained an informal accounting information system and gained information 
through other informal sources. However, they did not indicate the type or quantity 
of information gained from such sources. 
2.4. Summary 
Previous research indicates that, due to their inside position, employees may 
potentially observe both the financial and non-financial symptoms of corporate 
distress. This ability was partially attributed to inside and informal information from 
such sources as an organisation's grapevine. A preliminary investigation revealed 
that three former Fortex employees believed that the company was distressed some 
time before it failed. They indicated that they maintained an informal accounting 
information system and gained information from the company grapevine. 
3. The Research Objectives 
The preliminary investigation revealed that employees' observations in a distressed 
organisation were an area which required more closer examination. Consequently, 
this thesis sought to examine whether employees who were both union and non-
union delegates can observe the non-financial, or indeed any signs, that an 
organisation is distressed, and whether, from these observations, employees' can 
ascertain that a company is distressed. However, rather than just a replication of the 
earlier research with a larger, more diverse sample, this thesis also sought to examine 
the extent to which the two informal information sources, an informal accounting 
information system and the grapevine, contributed to employees' observations of 
problems, and potentially distress, within the organisation. This objective involved 
establishing what, if any, information the employees received from each system. 
Neither informal information system has previously been researched in a distress 
context. While the grapevine has been found to operate in a distressed company 
(Ezzamel and Bourn, 1990), no prior examination has been attempted to ascertain the 
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information received from it in a distressed organisation. Previous researchers have 
only noted that it was one of a number of information sources which employees, as 
insiders, have access to (McBarnet et al, 1993). However, Argenti (1976a) reports 
that employees can potentially identify the symptoms of distress, and a preliminary 
study indicates that information was received from the company's grapevine. It 
could be that some information from the grapevine was used in that capacity. 
The IAIS has no prior links to distress by other researchers other than the observation 
of an IAIS in the preliminary case. However, it is another inside source of 
information which the employees may have received information from. 
Furthermore, according to Ezzamel and Bourn (1990), an accounting information 
system (AIS) performs two roles in an organisation which faces a crisis: 
• Firstly, an "AIS can play a major role in shaping the perceptions of decision 
makers in relation to each of the crisis elements, as well as in relation to crisis 
management" (Ezzamel and Bourn, 1990, p 400). 
• Secondly, and importantly to corporate distress, " ... by scanning the environment, 
gathering early warning indicators, processing and reporting these indicators 
quickly, AIS can reduce perceived time pressure and surprise, and at the margin 
can help the organization prevent crises altogether" (Ezzamel and Bourn, 1990, p 
400). 
If a company's formal AIS has a role in crisis detection and management (Ezzamel 
and Bourn, 1990), therefore, intuitively its informal counterpart an IAIS could 
potentially fulfil the same role. 
4. Failure Defined 
Previous researchers have classified a company as failed at a variety of different 
points in the distress process. For the purposes of his study, Miller defined failure as 
" ... protracted periods of poor profits and eroding market share but not necessarily 
bankruptcy" (1977, p 43). A similar definition was adopted by Giroux and Wiggins. 
For their research failure was " ... any event which signals that a firm may be 
experiencing some degree of financial distress" (1984, p 179). Alternatively, the 
works of Honsberger (1979), Hambrick and D' Aveni (1988) and the empirical work 
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of Altman (1968), and indeed most other empirical studies, have equated bankruptcy 
and failure. 
These definitions are markedly different. Bankruptcy is a legally determined state 
which occurs at a definite point in time. That is, when the court declares the 
company bankrupt. The other definitions of failure, proposed by Miller (1977) and 
Giroux and Wiggins (1984), are broader than that of bankruptcy. They also include a 
period in which the organisation exhibits signals that the organisation is distressed or 
failing, but has not yet failed. Hence, the definition of failure is malleable and differs 
markedly between researchers. 
In New Zealand companies are placed into receivership rather than being made 
bankrupt. After the appointment of a receiver the company may continue to trade 
and/or be liquidated. Similarly, depending on the type of application made to the 
court, bankrupt companies can continue to trade, restructure, or be liquidated. 
Hence, in New Zealand receivership is the equivalent term to bankruptcy. 
This thesis intends to examine F ortex' s informal information systems up to the point 
at which the receiver was appointed. Hence, for the purposes of this research the 
point of failure of the subject, Fortex, will be the time that Fortex was placed into 
receivership, that is, March 23rd 1994. Subsequently, the company's assets were 
liquidated, but it is at the earlier point that employees, the sample used for this 
research, ceased to hold a position as insiders. 
However, defining the point of failure is only the first point in clarifying the 
terminology as it is applied in this research, for there are two other synonyms for 
failure, namely distress and collapse, which are also commonly used. While collapse 
has been equated with bankruptcy (Boocock and Drozd, 1982) and receivership 
(Young, 1989), further confusion is caused when Argenti's definition is considered. 
Argenti defined collapse as occurring " ... when a company, which has hitherto been 
operating successfully, first begins to falter and then has to fight to remain 
profitable" (1976a, p 5). He continued by stating that " ... the key element is the 
transformation from corporate health and prosperity to a struggle for survival" 
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(1976a, p 6). Hence, like failure, collapse can potentially include a considerable 
period of time prior to legal failure. 
To avoid such confusion this research will assign terms to specific parts of the failure 
process. Thus, failing, distressed and collapsing will refer to periods where a 
company is struggling but has not yet been placed into receivership. Failed and 
collapsed will refer to periods when an organisation has been placed into receivership 
or, in the American literature, has filed for bankruptcy. 
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1. Introduction 
Each organisation has a formal system of communication which is established and 
regulated by that entity's management (Wooten, 1981). The formal system's 
structure normally follows the formal channels of authority and therefore 
corresponds to the organisational chart (Wooten, 1981). However, organisational 
communication is not restricted to the formal channels (Bavelas and Barrett, 1951 ). 
Instead, people often create informal communication systems which do not follow 
the company's hierarchical structure (Bavelas and Barrett, 1951). These informal 
systems are an integral part of an organisation and are essential to its continued 
functioning and communication (Barnard, 1938). One such system is the grapevine. 
This chapter outlines the characteristics, attributes, and provides an understanding of 
the information communicated by the grapevine system. Included is an analysis of 
whether previous research indicates that grapevine information could be useful to 
assist the detection corporate distress. 
2. The Grapevine 
The grapevine, or informal communication network5 (Walton, 1961; Sharma, 1979; 
Simmons, 1985; LaBarre, 1994; Wells and Spinks, 1994), is an informal and 
spontaneous communications network used by an organisation's employees which 
does not follow the formal organisational structure (Brownell, 1990; Zaremba, 1988, 
1989). 
Inherent within every organisation (Davis, 1953b; Walton, 1961; Downs, 1967; 
Davis, 1972; Simmons, 1986; Wells and Spinks, 1994), the entire content of the 
grapevine is incorrectly typified as malicious rumour. Its perceived inaccuracy, 
combined with its rapid speed and ability to spread a rumour throughout the entire 
5 
The grapevine is also referred to as a company's informal information network (Small Business Reports, 1993), or simply 
its informal network (Zaremba, 1988). 
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organisation, has resulted in it being viewed as an unnecessary and disruptive 
element which undermines the formal communication system (Davis, 1953b; Nicoll, 
1994). Consequently, the grapevine is a much maligned part of the organisation. 
However, a considerable amount of popular opinion which surrounds the grapevine 
is incorrect. Rather than being an unnecessary inconvenience which is begrudgingly 
accepted, the grapevine is an important element in every organisation which should 
be acknowledged and used. 
Managers wishing to be free of informal communication fail to understand that a 
grapevine indicates the vitality of an organisation (Davis, 1969). Grapevine 
communication indicates that employees are interested in their job or events which 
affect their work environment (Walton, 1961; Davis, 1969; Arnold, 1983). As the 
noted grapevine expert Keith Davis states: 
"[i]f employees are so disinterested in their work that they do not engage in 
shop talk, they are maladjusted. A lively grapevine reflects the deep need of 
people to talk about their jobs and their company as a central life interest" 
(1969, p 54). 
Hence, an organisation lacking a grapevine would be unhealthy (Walton, 1961; 
Davis, 1969). Without the informal communication the grapevine carries, an 
organisation's overall functioning and communication would be inhibited (Barnard, 
1938). 
The grapevine also provides a valuable source of operating intelligence, acts as a 
means to generate and maintain corporate memory, reinforces work standards and 
group norms (Brownell, 1990; Nicoll, 1994), and disseminates information with 
speed and economy (LaBarre, 1994). Nevertheless, its many positive and beneficial 
aspects are habitually overlooked. 
3. Characteristics of the Grapevine 
Davis (1953b) identified four significant characteristics of the grapevine: speed of 
communication; the locale of the grapevine; relationship of the grapevine to formal 
communication; and a degree of selectivity which referred to the information 
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transmitted via the grapevme. However, there are two additional important 
characteristics, the grapevine's accuracy and its structure. 
3.1. Speed 
Grapevine communication is fast (Davis, 1953b; Caplow, 1976; Downs, 1967; 
Wooten, 1981; Zaremba, 1988; Goldhaber, 1993). In one example, provided by 
Davis (1953b), a manager's wife had given birth at llpm. Within the next 14 hours, 
of which only 5 to 6 were spent at work, 31 other managers were informed via the 
grapevme. However, its speed is not restricted to personal information. The 
grapevine often pre-empts information from the formal communication system 
(Davis, 1969, 1972; Hussey and Marsh, 1983; Mishra, 1990; Wells and Spinks, 
1994).6 The literature is rife with anecdotes of employees hearing about events, such 
as resignations and dismissals, through the grapevine hours or even days before an 
official announcement (Zaremba, 1988). 
The grapevine's speed arises because it avoids the restraints imposed by formal 
communication channels. In so doing, the information may not be exposed to cross-
checks which verify a message's validity or accuracy (Walton, 1959; Garnett, 1992). 
Lacking accuracy checks, the grapevine would intuitively seem more error prone or 
inaccurate than the formal system. 
3.2. Accuracy 
Grapevine communication is typified as rumour. Rumour is defined in the Concise 
Oxford Dictionary as " ... general talk or hearsay of doubtful accuracy" or " ... a 
current but unverified statement or assertion" (Allen, 1990, p 105 5). Hence, the 
classification of all grapevine communication as rumour propagates the popular 
belief that the entire grapevine is inaccurate. However, this reasoning is flawed in 
two fundamental respects. 
6 
Sharma (1979), Wooten (1981), Arnold (1983), Zaremba (1989), Brownell (1990), and Garnett (1992) also state that the 
grapevine provides information more quickly than formal communication channels. 
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Firstly, when referring to the grapevine, rum our IS defined as " ... grapevine 
information which is communicated without secure standards of evidence being 
present" (Davis, 1972, p 268). Hence, rumour is only that part of the grapevine 
which is injudicious and untrue. Categorising all grapevine information as entirely 
consisting of speculation or rumour is a mistake. 
Secondly, as Table 3.1 indicates, five researchers have determined that the grapevine 
is at least 7 5 percent accurate. 
Table 3.1: Research into the Grapevine's Accuracy 
Author Accuracy Level Organisation Type 
Walton (1961) 82% Naval Ordinance Station 
Marting (1969)7 80% Manufacturing Organisation 
Rudolph (1971)8 80% Public Utility Company 
Davis (1972) 80-99% Manufacturing Organisations 
Hymowitz (1988)9 75-95% Various 
This level of accuracy has resulted in suggestions that grapevine information is often 
more accurate than formal communication (Terry, 1972; Arnold, 1983; Garnett, 
1992; Wells and Spinks, 1994). 
Walton's (1961) and Davis's (1972) findings have received acceptance and been 
cited by other authors such as Arnold (1983), Simmons (1985) and Brownell (1990). 
However, each of the later works have failed to regard the provisos Walton and 
Davis placed on their accuracy figures: 
• Firstly, Walton (1961) admitted that his findings were severely limited by the 
method he used to assess the accuracy of grapevine information. 
7 
Reported in Goldhaber (1993). 
8 
Reported in Goldhaber (1993). 
9 
Reported in Wells and Spinks (1994). 
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• Secondly, both Davis's (1972) and Walton's (1961) research was restricted to 
non-controversial, work-oriented information. Davis admitted that " ... it is 
probable that accuracy is not so great for personal or highly emotional 
information" (1972, p 263). Consequently, the overall accuracy ofthe grapevine 
is likely to be lower than 80 percent. 10 
• Thirdly, while the overall accuracy of the grapevine for company-related 
information is approximately 80 percent, no single message will be entirely 
correct or incorrect. Instead, each grapevine message contains a portion which is 
inaccurate (Davis, 1972). The level of inaccuracy differs for each individual 
message, but averages 20 percent for all grapevine messages. 
Unfortunately, the 20 percent average inaccuracy is often the most critical portion of 
a message and can distort it to the extent that it loses its initial meaning or at worst 
becomes untrue. The grapevine's purported inaccuracy arises from this distortion. 
People more readily remember the rare, severely distorted rumours than the many 
occasions where the grapevine provides accurate information (Davis, 1972). 
Furthermore, grapevine information is usually incomplete, making messages easily 
misinterpreted (Davis, 1972). 
3.2.1. Grapevine Distortions 
As most grapevine messages start as a report of an actual event, any distortions or 
misinterpretations must occur when the information is transmitted from person to 
person (Allport and Postman, 1947). Research has indicated that most occur at the 
beginning of the chain (Allport and Postman, 1947; Caplow, 1976; Garnett, 1992). 
Hence, a person at the end of the chain will receive the most distorted version of a 
message. 
Distortion generally occurs in three ways which are: 
10 
While the research undertaken in this thesis only concerns company related, and not personal, information, there remains 
scope for distortions as any distressed situation would increase the emotional content of the grapevine. 
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• Simplification or filtering: where information is reduced to a few basic details 
(Caplow, 1966; Davis, 1972). In many cases simplification occurs when 
individuals forget details of the message. Often the gaps left are filled or recreated 
(Brownell, 1990), thus introducing further distortions. 
• Assimilation: where an individual amends and relays, either consciously or 
unconsciously, information that re-enforces their pre-existing attitudes (Davis, 
1972; Brownell, 1990). 
• Elaboration: where grapevine participants distort messages by introducing their 
own biases, opinions, feelings or reasoning to a message (Davis, 1972). 
By the time a message has passed through several people, it may become so distorted 
that its initial meaning is lost. Furthermore, the distortions introduced predominantly 
concern bad news (Simmons, 1985, 1986; Brownell, 1990). Hence, any message is 
likely to be distorted for the worse rather than for the better. Example 4.1 provides a 
common scenario of an event which is distorted as it passes through the grapevine: 
Example 4.1 I 1 
John Worker cut two fingers of his left hand at his machine 
one morning. He was sent to the dispensary for first aid, and 
he returned to his job in about thirty minutes with his fingers 
bandaged. Meanwhile, word had spread through the shop that 
John had cut his fingers. The farther from John's department 
the story travelled, the more gruesome were his injuries, until 
finally the story had him losing his left hand. 
Distortion is somewhat limited by the circularity of the grapevine system where 
individuals may receive and send the information on more than one occasion. 
Moreover, even though they may be so distorted that they are entirely inaccurate, a 
rumour indicates the employees' feelings and concerns, and is based on an 
underlying factual event. Therefore, rumours should be investigated by management 
(Davis, 1972). However, according to Davis, it is the same distortion and the 
incompleteness of grapevine messages which " ... mean[s] that in total it [the 
11 
Adapted from an example provided by Davis (1972, p 269). 
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grapevine] probably produces more misunderstanding than its small percentage on 
wrong information suggests" (1972, p 264). 
3.3. The Grapevine's Relationship to Formal Communication 
The grapevine relies on personal communication for the transmission of information 
(Davis, 1953b). Because its participants are not constrained by their formal position, 
grapevine communication can by-pass formal communication channels. The 
resulting communication can, and does, cross functional groups, hierarchical levels 
(Davis, 1953b), and organisational boundaries (Davis, 1969; Grant, 1987). Hence, 
grapevine communication can arise between managers and non-managers, employees 
in differing departments and even employees and non-employees. 
These boundary spanning characteristics result in the formal system being 
occasionally undermined, particularly where confidential or privileged information is 
disseminated prior to an official announcement. However, the grapevine also forms 
an important· adjunct to the formal communication system, without which 
communication as a whole would be less effective (Wooten, 1981). The formal and 
informal systems interrelate and support each other in two ways: 
• Firstly, by providing an employee with information from different sources and 
information which is not suitable for the formal system (Walton, 1961), the 
grapevine provides information complementary to that received from formal 
communication (Hayden, 1986; Zaremba, 1988; Garnett, 1992). 
• Secondly, it can also act in a supplementary manner to the formal system (Davis, 
1953b; Caplow, 1976; Arnold, 1983; Mishra, 1990). For instance, due to its 
speed, the grapevine may pre-empt information from the official communication 
channels. Where the formal system verifies the content of the grapevine, the 
grapevine has performed in a supplementary role (Davis, 1953b). 
The complementary and/or supplementary nature of grapevine information means 
that there is always a niche within each organisation for the grapevine to operate. 
However, because the grapevine cannot carry all the information that a formal system 
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can, it cannot replace the formal system. Furthermore, the grapevine may not reach 
as many, or the necessary people, as the formal communication channels. 
The volume of information received, whether complementary or supplementary, is 
inversely related to the effectiveness of communication from the formal system. 
Hence, the grapevine is less active when formal communication is functioning 
correctly12 (Walton, 1961; Wooten, 1981; Arnold, 1983; Pozgar, 1986; Booher, 
1990; Mishra, 1990). Moreover, the grapevine is rendered less effective if the formal 
system over-supplies information on topics related to that in which the employees are 
interested (Caplow, 1976). 
3.4. Locale of the Grapevine 
3.4.1. Internal Locale and Participants 
The grapevine predominantly operates at the place of work (Davis, 1953b). Davis 
(1953b) found that even where the local community is small, people overhear most 
of their information about company activities at the plant. 
3.4.1.1. Who uses the grapevine? 
The grapevine is usually associated with floor or blue-collar workers, for whom the 
grapevine ranks second, only behind an employee's direct supervisor in importance 
(Friedman, 1981). However, it is a misnomer that reliance upon, and usage of, 
grapevine information is restricted to non-managerial employees. Managers also use 
the grapevine extensively (Davis, 1953b; Sharma, 1979; Anon, 1994a; Anon, 1994b) 
and, similar to non-managers, research has found that managers may also find the 
grapevine more useful than formal communication (Harcourt, Richerson and Wattier, 
1991). 
12 
There is one dissenting opinion from Davis (1953b) who found that the grapevine and the formal system were positively 
associated. That is, if the formal system is not functioning effectively, neither will the informal system. 
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3.4.1.2. Employees' Grapevine Usage and Perceived Accuracy 
An employee's reliance on grapevine information_ is determined by how accurate the 
information has proven to be in the past (Wells and Spinks, 1994). For example, 
Walton (1961) and Friedman (1981) determined that employees perceive the 
grapevine to be accurate at least 50 percent of the time. 13 Therefore, it is 
unsurprising that Modic (1989) reports that employees trust the grapevine's content 
more than information from any management group. 
The grapevine's perceived accuracy and legitimacy is reinforced where management 
denies information carried by the grapevine, only to confirm it later when they 
receive the information through the slower official channels (Zaremba, 1988). 
Therefore, non-managerial employees will refer to the grapevine for information if 
the formal channels are inaccurate or slow. Managerial employees will also rely 
more heavily on the grapevine if the formal system has proven less accurate or 
inadequate in the past. 
3.4.2. External Locale and Participants 
While the grapevine reaches most people within a company, it may also ignore 
organisational boundaries and extend into the local community (Davis, 1969; Nofel, 
1985; Grant, 1987), gaining information from, and supplying information to, persons 
outside of the organisation (Arnold, 1983). These external parties can include 
spouses, friends and relatives, and former employees (Davis, 1969). 
Informal communication has also been established as occurring between companies 
(von Rippel, 1987; Schrader, 1991; MacDonald 1992a, 1992b). For example, Davis 
(1969) discovered that manufacturers' representatives from different companies were 
grapevine participants. This phenomenon has been found particularly in highly 
technical fields where information is collected, and sometimes traded, by individuals 
acting as gatekeepers (MacDonald and Williams, 1992; MacDonald, 1993). 
13 
Friedman (1981) found that 52.3 percent of the employees reported the grapevine was accurate, while Walton (1961) 
found that 78 percent of employees believed it was accurate more than half the time. 
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Gatekeepers are " ... employees assigned to stay informed in selected areas, and then 
direct thejlow ofinformation to other employees as needed" (Dixon, 1991, p 19). 
They can be either fulfil the role informally (Hayden, 1986), or can be formally 
appointed within an organisation (Dixon, 1991; MacDonald and Williams, 1993, 
1994). 
The gatekeeper process is distinct from the grapevine system. However, by 
disseminating the information to employees within their own company, gatekeepers 
could be an external source of information which can be carried by the grapevine. 
Furthermore, the grapevine itself can extend between competing companies (Nofel, 
1985). Grapevine participants who communicate with individuals in other 
companies effectively operate as gatekeepers. 
The information provided from both the inter-company grapevme and informal 
information transfer can be used to indicate industry and competitor practices, and 
environmental changes, which in turn can aid strategic decision making (Nofel, 1985; 
Weedman, 1992). By providing information on these issues, the grapevine can 
communicate information which could directly affect a company's performance, 
cause it to lose competitive advantage, and ultimately contribute to corporate 
distress. 
3.4.3. Non-personal Information Sources 
External grapevine information is not restricted to personal sources. Employees also 
glean information, and form opinions, from information in newspapers, magazines 
and on the television (Hull, 1994). Such information may include predictions about 
economic downturns in the specific industry or general economy, which may lead 
employees to incorrectly doubt the viability of their company (Hull, 1994). 
The external and internal portions of the grapevine interrelate so that employees may 
receive information from both within and outside of the organisation. This 
relationship is depicted in Figure 3 .1. 
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Note that not all of an organisation's employees may receive information from 
external sources. Some external information passed via informal communication is 
kept for personal use by one department's gatekeeper (A) who does not pass the 
information to any others. Conversely, the gatekeeper in department B passes 
information which reaches two other departments (M and N). However, this 
information does not reach the employees in departments X, Y, and Z who only have 
access to information from the internal network. Hence, the messages individual 
departments and employees receive may differ depending upon their contact with 
other internal or external grapevine participants. This difference arises due to the 
grapevine's structure. 
3.5. Structure 
Because the grapevine does not follow a company's formal communication system, 
its structure is different and more flexible (Davis, 1953b). The common perception 
of the grapevine communication is that of a linear chain, where A communicates to 
B, B to C and so on. Allport and Postman (1947) proved that this method of 
communication severely distorts the content of a message. 
14 
Adapted from Zaremba (1989, p 9). 
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Davis (1953b) proposed four alternative structures that a grapevine could feasibly 
take. These alternatives, single-strand (linear), gossip, probability and cluster, are 
shown in Figure 3.2. He found that, contrary to popular perception, the grapevine is 
not a single strand chain but a cluster chain. 
In a cluster chain a few people, termed liaison individuals, 15 perform all of the 
communication (in the cluster chain example shown in Figure 3.2 these would be 
individuals A, D, and I). Commonly 10 percent of employees function in this role at 
any one time (Davis, 1953b; Sutton and Porter, 1968). 
Staff members most frequently function as liaison individuals because they can 
constantly move through different departments (Simmons, 1985). However, the 
exact composition of this group is unclear with Davis (1953b) finding that liaison 
employees differed for different messages, and Sutton and Porter (1968) finding that 
people consistently performed in a liaison role. 
The cluster chain also consists of two other types of persons; isolates or passive 
receivers, and dead-enders (Davis, 1953b; Simmons, 1985). Dead-enders are those 
people who receive the message from liaison individuals, but do not transmit it to 
others (Davis, 1953b). In the cluster chain example shown in Figure 3.2 these would 
be individuals C, F, B, and K. Research indicates that 57 percent function as dead-
enders (Sutton and Porter, 1968). 
15 
Jacobsen and Seashore (1951) created the term 'liaison individuals' when they found that a small group of individuals 
functioned in a role as communicators in their research into communication practices in complex organizations. 
Figure 3.2: Types of Communication Chains* 
0 
0 
1. Single Strand 2. Gossip 3. Probability 4. Cluster 
*Adapted from Davis (1953b, p 45). 
Each letter represents a person, each arrow represents grapevine communication. 
1. The single strand chain represented the commonly held view where A communicates to B, B to C and so on in a linear manner (Davis, 1953b ). 
2. The gossip chain would occur where one person, A, seeks out and informs everybody else (Davis, 1953b). 
3. The probability chain is where A communicates at random to whomever they meet first. Those persons who choose to communicate to others also do so in a random manner (Davis, 1953b ). 
4. The cluster chain is where A tells information to selected people. If these people choose to communicate the information, they will only do so with other selected people (Davis, 1953b). 
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The last group, isolates, are those individuals who do not receive the information or 
receive the information poorly (Davis, 1953b). In the cluster chain example shown 
in Fig 3 .2 these would be individuals E, H, and J. Sutton and Porter (1968) found 
that 33 percent of a company's employees functioned as·isolates. 
The grapevine's cluster chain structure is affected by many factors such as the layout 
of buildings and offices, hobbies and activities which employees have in common, 
and even the formal network (Zaremba, 1988). Therefore, due to the geographical 
and/or social position within an organisation some employees will be isolated from 
the grapevine (Davis, 1953b). For example, employees who work at a different 
geographic site or department, or move in different social circles, from liaison 
individuals, may not be privy to grapevine information. 16 
However, the cluster chain has advantages to those people that are privy to it. Due to 
the structure of the chain, liaison individuals and dead-enders are likely to get fast 
and accurate information from the grapevine. For example, referring again to Figure 
3 .2, person K in the cluster chain would receive information that has passed through 
only three other people; A, the originator of the message, D and I. Under the 
conventional, single strand view of the grapevine, K would receive information that 
has passed through ten people; A, the original liaison individual, and B through to J. 
By passing through fewer individuals, the message flows around the grapevine 
quickly, and has less scope for the distortions which occur in the transfer of 
information from person to person. 
3.6. Topics Carried 
Davis noted that "[i]nformal communication ... arises from the social and personal 
interests of people rather than the formal requirements of an organization" (Davis, 
1954, p 217). Due to its social nature, it is commonly held that the grapevine carries 
16 
Therefore, the interviews conducted as part of this thesis may involve people who, by not being privy to grapevine 
information, will provide no assistance. Furthermore, the grapevine, by being affected by many factors including the 
layout of building and offices, may function differently at various sites, therefore affecting the generalisability of this 
research. 
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anything, any time, anywhere (Arnold, 1983). However, this is somewhat simplistic 
and incorrect as the grapevine does not carry patently false information (Simmons, 
1985), and has been found to exhibit a degree of selectivity17 (Davis, 1953b). 
Moreover, the grapevine only disseminates new information (Walton, 1961; Davis, 
1972), the majority ofwhich concerns the work-place, because it is the common link 
between employees (Simmons, 1986). However, the grapevine also carries personal 
gossip and rumour (Goldhaber, 1993; LaBarre, 1994). 
Amongst the topics which employees communicate about are such issues as 
management-union relations, job promotions, safety conditions, bonuses, lay-offs, 
contract talks and the like (Esposito and Rosnow, 1983). Therefore, the grapevine 
provides a communication channel for employees to express their concerns and seek 
assurances about issues which could directly affect their livelihood. As such it would 
be unsurprising for speculation about the collapse or failure of their work-place to be 
communicated via the grapevine. 
4. The Grapevine and Corporate Distress 
Davis's (1954) research found that the grapevine quickens it pace when a company is 
in a period of transition, change or crisis. Subsequent articles by authors such as 
Esposito and Rosnow (1983), Simmons (1985) and Garnett (1992) assert that in 
addition to increased speed, the volume of information carried by the grapevine 
increases in such periods. The communication helps the employees understand their 
environment and relieve tension and stress (Esposito and Rosnow, 1983; Simmons, 
1985, 1986; Mishra, 1990). Therefore, in any distressed situation, communication on 
the grapevine will be more prolific as people seek to understand and interpret the 
events which may affect them. Hence, increased activity could signal the onset of an 
organisation's distress. 
17 
Davis (1953b) found that even the grapevine has a type of confidential information which was not passed to those people 
not meant to hear it. However, Davis also acknowledged that the extent to which the grapevine can be counted upon to 
discriminate for such information was questionable. 
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However, during such periods the grapevine is likely to contain more emotional 
content which could lead to a reduction in the accuracy of the information carried. 
Moreover, if the formal communication system provides little information, the 
employees may resort to speculation with little factual basis (Brownell, 1990). This 
speculation may also decrease the accuracy of the grapevine's content, and could 
result in the exaggeration or inaccurate depiction of events. However, the 
grapevine's accuracy with respect to company related information has been 
established as approximately 80 percent. Therefore, the distortion will need to be 
severe before the information carried would be wholly, or even mostly, inaccurate. 
Furthermore, regardless of the level of distortion introduced, the grapevine will 
continue to carry information on the underlying facts which initially caused the 
employees' concern (Davis, 1972). Table 3.2 displays examples ofthe events which 
are the subject of grapevine communication. Many of these issues, such as 
transitions in leadership, 18 entrenchment/lay-offs and union strikes/employee-
management relations, 19 have been identified as factors which potentially lead to, or 
indicate, corporate distress. Hence, distress or internal problems within a company 
are the subject of grapevine communication. 
While the examples in Table 3.2 only refer to events internal to the entity, employees 
may also have access to grapevine information from external sources. Such 
information, which is obtained from both personal and impersonal sources and which 
can even extend to information on competitors, may also allow the identification of 
areas of concern. For example, employees may identify where competitors are out-
performing their own company. Competition is a major contributor to organisational 
failure (Hartigan, 1976; Boocock and Drozd, 1982; Milburn et al, 1983; Scherrer, 
1988; Makridakis, 1991). 
18 
For example see Gilson (1990) and Robb (1986b). 
19 
See Robb (1986b). 
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Table 3.2: Events which are the Subject of Grapevine Communication 
Author Grapevine Communication 
Davis (1953b) Executive Resignation 
Davis (1969) Transfer of Manager to another Division 
Promotion 
Davis (1972) Company Relocation 
Employee-Management Relations 
Davis (1973) Company Relocation 
Resignations 
Impending Lay-offs 
Computer Installation 
Arnold (1983) New Computers 
Promotions 
Procedures 
Transfers 
Job Performance 
Employment Opportunities 
Simmons (1986) Retrenchment 
Esposito and Rosnow Management-Union Relations 
(1983) Job Promotions 
Safety Conditions 
Bonuses 
Lay-offs 
Contract Talks 
Davidson (1988) Crises 
Powershifts 
Brownell (1990) New Equipment Installation 
Changes to Schedules 
New Managerial Appointment 
Expansion or Renovation 
Garnett (1992) Lay-offs 
Transitions in Leadership 
Union Strikes 
Overholt (1992) Rapid Growth 
Downsizing 
Mergers 
Goldhaber (1993) Retirement 
Job Opportunities 
Wage Rises 
Furthermore, Overholt (1992) asserts that a 'well-connected employee', that is, one 
with personal contacts in a variety of departments, can often gather diverse 
information together to predict and interpret a company's strategy in a changing 
environment. Overholt (1992) gave rapid growth, downsizing or merging as 
examples of change. All of these activities have been identified as signs of corporate 
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distress (Robb, 1986b ). Therefore, in distressed situations, some individuals may be 
privy to enough grapevine information to provide an overview of the company's 
position. 
The way a well-connected employee reacts to· a situation also influences the manner 
in which other employees respond to the change (Overholt, 1992). Such employees 
may inform others via the grapevine as to their view of events or remain silent. If 
only silence is forthcoming, other employees will interpret a well-connected 
employee's actions, such as looking for another job, remaining with the company, or 
continuing to work cooperatively, and respond accordingly (Overholt, 1992). 
Previous grapevine research indicates that through their position within a company, 
employees participate in, and have access to, an information source which could 
potentially be used to identify factors which promote corporate distress. However, 
whether they realise they have this ability is another matter. It is possible that many 
employees recognise an event as affecting their job, but may not perceive the effect it 
has on the organisation, particularly because it is unlikely that most employees have 
an understanding of the many factors that are said to cause, or indicate, distress. 
Furthermore, employees' ability to identify distress may also be inhibited where they 
have little or no access to the grapevine or where they do not believe the information 
carried by the grapevine. 
5. Conclusion 
Contrary to popular perception, the grapevine 1s a large, accurate and fast 
communication network which is used by managers and floor workers alike. The 
information it carries predominantly concerns the organisation itself, as that is the 
one thing employees have in common. In times of stress or change, grapevine 
activity increases as employees attempt to clarify uncertainty. Therefore, in a crisis, 
any information which affects employees' jobs will be conveyed to employees 
around the company. Some of the issues discussed on the grapevine have been 
identified as contributing to corporate distress. Therefore, the grapevine may provide 
information which could assist employees to detect of distress. 
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1. Introduction 
An organisation's accounting information system has two components: a 
management accounting system and a financial ·accounting system (Hansen, 1990). 
Each serves different needs. The financial system is externally focussed, following 
standards and guide-lines which prescribe the financial information which the public 
should receive, and how that information should be prepared. The management 
accounting system is internally focussed, and provides managers with information 
for planning, controlling and decision making (Hansen, 1990). 
Without externally imposed restrictions, management accounting information can be 
prepared for the individual needs of differing departments, product lines, and 
managers (Hansen, 1990). Unfortunately, the information produced can be too 
limited, too aggregated, too late or unreliable, therefore not meeting managerial 
requirements (Mintzberg, 1975; Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; McKinnon and Bruns, 
1993). To compensate for these inadequacies, managers often construct their own 
informal accounting information systems (IAIS) (Mintzberg, 1975; McKinnon and 
Bruns, 1993). 
This chapter provides an overview of previous IAIS research, and includes an 
assessment of its characteristics, such as what information they contain and who 
maintains them. The body of the chapter is split into three sections. The first 
reviews IAISs found incidentally in other research. The second examines explicit 
IAIS research. Then, within the third section, several potential interrelationships 
between informal accounting information and corporate distress are proposed. 
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2. Informal Accounting Information Systems 
2.1. Incidental IAIS Findings 
IAISs were first noted by Simon, Guetzkow, Kozmetsky and Tyndall (1954) in their 
study of six large North American companies?0 They observed that operating 
executives kept 'black books' or 'butcher books' which showed signs of constant 
use. The records were summary in nature, requiring little time to update or operate, 
and gave the kinds of figures that supervisors and executives found "significant and 
useful" (Simonet al, 1954, p 34). Examples of such useful figures included: 
• accounting figures transcribed from the formal records for quick reference; 
• the translation of data into physical terms; and 
• figures from basic production reports (Simonet al, 1954). 
The IAISs were maintained because the formal system failed to provide the 
information managers desired, or did not meet managers' needs quickly enough 
(Simonet al, 1954). For example, the basic reports originated with the factory's time 
and production clerks. By going to the source the executives obtained the data before 
it became available from the formal accounting system (Simonet al, 1954). 
Myers (1970) found that lower level managers maintained small information 
subsystems. However, in this instance the subsystems were: 
"... developed by managers in an attempt to measure self performance and 
make decisions in response to the performance schemes informally reinforced 
by top executives" (1970, p 201). 
Whereas Simonet al's (1954) managers utilised informal accounting information for 
decision making purposes, the systems in this case had the secondary purpose of 
maximising the manager's financial returns. Therefore, Myers (1970) findings 
20 
The companies were: General Mills Incorporated; Eastman Kodak Company; H. J. Heinz Company; the National Supply 
Company; Westinghouse Electric Corporation; and two divisions of the U. S. Steel Company (Simonet al, 1954). 
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indicated that an IAIS may be used for company-related and/or purely personal 
reasons. 
Similarly, Hopwood (1973, 1974) discovered, in a budgeting context, that managers, 
dissatisfied with the quality and timeliness of information: 
" ... designed and operated independent information systems which provided 
timely and parsimonious information relevant to their own personal needs" 
(1973, p 123). 
The IAISs were used for a variety of reasons including budget manipulation, and 
defending the manager's decisions and departments. They ranged from regular but 
limited notes to a level of complexity comparable to the organisation's official 
accounting system (Hopwood, 1973). Hopwood believed that these systems were: 
" ... capable ofprovidingsome.further insights into the anxieties experienced by 
the cost centre heads and the behaviours which were intended to cope with the 
tensions and pressures" (1973, p 123). 
Therefore, informal accounting information may document areas which cause 
managers the most concern or which they see as particularly important. These areas, 
being important and needing personal attention, may indicate weaknesses within an 
organisation, such as production inefficiencies or a poor formal accounting system, 
which could contribute to distress in an organisation. 
Latterly, IAISs have been noted by Earl and Ong (1987) and Davis and Olson (1985). 
Earl and Ong's (1987) IAISs were found in a treasury management setting, where 
again the formal systems were inadequate and provided information too slowly. 
Davis and Olson (1985) reported that IAISs may supplement or duplicate the formal 
accounting systems, and that occasionally an IAIS may receive official sanction and 
be encouraged. They also asserted that many varied IAISs exist in organisations. 
For example: 
''An industrial sales manager might maintain a separate file of performance 
data on sales representatives which she uses to augment the information 
receivedjrom the formal sales information system" (1985, p 51). 
This quotation is typical of the earlier findings of Simon et al (1954), Myers (1970) 
and Hopwood (1973, 1974), in which IAISs were maintained only by managers or 
persons in a position of authority and responsibility. However, IAISs can occur at a 
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very low level of an organisation. For instance, Lupton (1963) found that workers in 
an electrical component factory manipulated their wage incentive scheme using such 
a system: 
" ... every worker kept a notebook in which he reco,rqed the jobs which he had 
worked on, the actual time taken to complete them and the time which he had 
reported in the official records" (Hopwood, 1973, p 125). 
Therefore, while being more likely to be kept by managers, IAISs can be found at 
any level of an organisation where people need timely, accurate and detailed 
information, and where it is in the person's interest to keep such records. 
2.2. Formal Research into IAIS 
2.2.1. Clancy and Collins 
The first reported research into IAISs appears to have been in 1979 when Clancy and 
Collins conducted research into the existence of IAISs and its relationship to an 
enterprise's formal AIS?1 They defined an IAIS as " ... non-legitimised sets of 
records concerning items typically of an economic or quantitative nature" (1979, p 
22), and suggested that these records were kept on mediums ranging from scraps of 
paper to computer files. 
A pilot study performed in a single organisation found that nearly all the respondents 
maintained that the formal AIS was more efficient and effective than an IAIS. The 
findings were a surprise for it was hypothesized that the primary reason for utilising 
an IAIS would be due to deficiencies in the formal system. Instead, they were 
maintained to provide additional information for the managers personal needs, 
including performance assessment of themselves and their departments. However, 
while not meeting all of their information requirements, the managers recognised that 
the formal systems were performing well overall. 
21 
Until this stage, the documented evidence on IAIS had been generated incidentally from research into other topics. For 
example, Simonet al (1954) studied the merits of centralisation and decentralisation, and Hopwood's (1973, 1974) and 
Myers' (1970) research primarily concerned the behavioural implications of using accounting information for 
performance evaluation. 
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Based on the responses from the case study, a questionnaire was developed with the 
objective of assessing mid-level managers' attitudes towards formal and informal 
accounting systems. Of the usable responses 79 percent of the respondents indicated 
that they maintained some form ofiAIS.22 
While respondents held favourable views on both systems, the formal system was 
viewed more positively for 8 of 13 variables. However, the respondents reported that 
the informal systems: 
• were easier to use than the formal system; 
• were easier to understand than the formal system; 
• more readily reflected the accomplishment of a manager's personal goals; 
• were more accurate than the formal system; and 
• more accurately reflected operating results. 
The first three of the five variables listed above, indicate that informal information 
was perceived to be more relevant and practical to a manager for assessing his or her 
own, and his or her department's, performance. Significantly, there were only two 
variables contained within the questionnaire which concerned the relative accuracy of 
the informal and formal accounting systems. In both cases the managers questioned 
rated IAISs as being more accurate than their formal counterparts. 
The variables were then subjected to a factor analysis which found that the formal 
and informal accounting systems were not substantially associated with each other on 
most variables. 23 The independence indicated that informal systems did not compete 
with, or attempt to supplant, the formal system but rather that they were 
complementary. 
22 
23 
Of 438 questionnaires sent, 156 were returned (a response rate of35.6 percent) with 148 being usable (Clancy and Collins, 
1979). 
The only notable exception was where the managers believed that their success in the company was affected by reports 
from both systems, and that both systems were valuable because they reflected the accomplishment of organisational 
goals (Clancy and Collins, 1979). 
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Clancy and Collins concluded that IAISs were widespread, relatively efficient and 
effective and, most importantly, " ... should be considered a useful and necessary 
adjunct to the formal system rather than the unnecessary dissipation of resources" 
(1979, p 29). 
2.2.2. La/ and Donaldson 
Lal and Donaldson (1988) examined the existence of informal systems and their 
relationship to formal systems in a New Zealand context. They stated that: 
"The relationship is important because the informal system may process 
information that is vital to the organizational functioning but without formal 
records of that process" (1988, p 86). 
The research utilised semi-structured interviews with managers of two manufacturing 
companies. Of the managers interviewed, 56 percent stated that they maintained 
some form of IAIS. These systems were mostly unstructured (11 from 14) and 
simple, however three were structured and accordingly more complex. Exhibit 4.1 
presents the contents of the informal systems and describes the relationship between 
the informal and formal accounting systems: 
Exhibit 4.1: The Relationship of Informal Information Systems to Formal 
Information Systems24 
Informal System Relationship to formal system 
24 
Labour charges 
Union problems 
Efficiency 
Order book 
Order ledger 
Operations problems 
Efficiency 
Machine breakdowns 
Project costs 
Customers 
Production 
Responsible for costs 
Explanatory 
Check accuracy of formal system 
Adapted from Lal and Donaldson (1988, p 89). 
Complements/Supplements 
Complements/Supplements 
Complements/Supplements 
Replaces 
Replaces 
Complements/Supplements 
Duplicates 
Complements/Supplements 
Duplicates 
Complements/Supplements 
Complements/Supplements 
Duplicates 
Complements/Supplements 
Complements/Supplements 
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As shown in Exhibit 4.1, the majority of systems (9 of 14) were found to 
complement or supplement the company's formal system. The research also 
indicated three instances where the IAIS was a duplication of information from the 
formal system and the first two examples of IAISs which effectively replaced a 
portion of the formal system. 
Lal and Donaldson also questioned the managers as to the reasons why the IAISs 
were created and maintained. The manager's reasons are displayed in Exhibit 4.2. 
Exhibit 4.2: Causes of Informal Information Systems25 
Cause Number of Cases 
Defense mechanism 1 
Help manage job better 2 
Formal system too awkward to use 2 
Responsible for cost (report not produced by formal system) 2 
Explanatory purposes 1 
Check accuracy of formal information 1 
Help prepare report 1 
Provide justification for capital expenditure 1 
Keep check on efficiency of department 2 
Need to do something if problems recur 1 
Remember important information 1 
As Exhibit 4.2 indicates the reasoning for the systems was diverse. Only four 
responses were mentioned by more than one individual. The responses ranged from 
purely personal reasons, such as a defense mechanism, to helping the manager 
perform his or her job better. However, most fitted the latter category with only the 
use of the IAIS as a defense mechanism being the obvious exception?6 Hence, these 
findings confirmed Clancy and Collins conclusion that IAISs may benefit and not 
hinder an organisation. Notably, deficiencies in the formal system, awkwardness to 
use and responsible for cost, constituted 29 percent of the responses. Unlike Clancy 
and Collins' US research, poor formal information was a significant reason for an 
25 
Adapted from Lal and Donaldson (1988, p 90). Note that one manager supplied two reasons as to why he kept an IAIS. 
26 
Therefore, the number of cases sums to 15 not 14. 
Depending on the context, justifYing capital expenditure could also arise from managerial self-interest. Similarly, a 
cynical observer could say that by performing their job better, a manager is acting out of self-interest by enhancing their 
own future, remuneration and promotion prospects. However, even if this is the case, their actions likely to assist and not 
hinder the organisation. 
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IAIS in one of the two New Zealand companies examined. However, regardless of 
the underlying motivation, each area obviously warranted careful attention and was 
an important or troublesome area under the managers' control. 
Lal and Donaldson concluded that IAISs served many useful purposes. The IAISs 
found were mainly unstructured and infrequently used. In most cases they 
supplemented/complemented the formal systems. 
2.3. Summary 
Research has shown that both managerial (Simon et al, 1954; Myers, 1970; 
Hopwood, 1973, 1974; Clancy and Collins, 1979; Lal and Donaldson, 1988) and 
non-managerial employees (Lupton, 1963), maintain informal accounting records for 
personal use. The systems contain both financial and non-financial information 
which either duplicates, replaces, or complement/supplements, information from the 
formal records. IAISs are maintained regardless of the effectiveness of the formal 
system. However, IAIS information is perceived to be more accurate than that 
produced by the formal system. 
3. Implications of IAISs in Corporate Distress 
3.1. For Employees 
Employees may maintain, and therefore have access to, IAISs (Lupton, 1963). 
Depending on the relationship to the formal system and the type of information 
contained therein, two potential opportunities for employees to detect distress are 
offered. Firstly, the identification of inadequate formal accounting information, 
creative accounting and fraud. Secondly, the documentation of weaknesses within an 
organisation. 
3.1.1. Inadequate Formal Accounting Information 
Where the information contained is financial in nature, IAISs, which are perceived to 
be more accurate than formal accounting information, offer the potential to detect 
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financial manipulation and creative accounting in the official records, and indicate 
defective accounting systems. Defective formal accounting systems produce poor 
information which contributes to inappropriate managerial decisions. Inaccurate 
accounting information (Bibeault, 1982; Bahr, 198 8), defective accounting systems 
and poor managerial decision-making contribute to an organisation's distress 
(Argenti, 1976a). 
In the instances where the informal system effectively replaces part of a formal 
system, a weakness in the formal system is obvious. If the system was effective it 
would be used. Furthermore, in distress the information produced by a formal AIS 
may not be timely (Goodman, 1982; Kibei, 1982), accurate (Bibeault, 1982; 
Goodman, 1982), or may be too complex or overly simplistic (Bahr, 1988). 
Mintzberg (1975) proposed that defective accounting systems which produce 
information which is too late, too aggregated, untimely, and unreliable, cause 
managers to create IAISs. Hence, in distressed situations, IAISs are likely to exist, 
and the existence of an IAIS may indicate a defective accounting system which is a 
contributing factor to an organisation's distress. 
IAISs offer the two other potential means to detect a poor formal accounting system: 
• Firstly, some complementary/supplementary IAISs are maintained with the 
explicit purpose of checking the accuracy of formal information (Lal and 
Donaldson, 1988). 
• Secondly, IAISs which duplicate the formal system could be used to verify the 
accuracy of the formal records. 
A comparison between formal and informal records may reveal that the formal 
system is failing to record and produce accurate information. Furthermore, a 
comparison may indicate discrepancies and errors which arise from creative 
accounting and fraud, both of which have been posited as symptoms of corporate 
distress (Argenti, 1977). Substantial discrepancies or a defective formal accounting 
system may also mean that the financial information in annual reports may not 
accurately represent the firm's performance. 
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3.1.2. Organisational Weaknesses 
The subject of an IAIS is an area of concern which requires more attention for the 
person maintaining it (Hopwood, 1973). Therefore, the area with the most potential 
for distress detection is when the IAIS provides additional complementary/ 
supplementary information for the employee's or manager's use. 
A review of the nine areas reported as complementary or supplementary by Lal and 
Donaldson (1988), three, union problems, operations problems and machine 
breakdowns, explicitly concerned problems within an organisation. Maintaining 
information on these areas may reflect weaknesses in the company's operations 
because union disputes (Robb, 1986b ), and problems which affect production (Bruno 
et al, 1987; Scherrer, 1988; Lingard, 1989) have been identified as factors which 
contribute to organisational distress. 
Furthermore, two other IAISs, efficiency and production, concern the most vital 
aspect of the manufacturing organisations studied. Hence, IAISs may be established 
due to poor performance in, or the special attention demanded by, vital areas. 
Records containing data of the same or similar problems may signal potential distress 
or failure within a company. Furthermore, the information maintained in these areas 
may reveal a trend where the area of concern is either improving or worsening. 
Worsening performance in crucial areas such as efficiency and production could 
contribute to poor organisational performance and distress. 
In these respects, IAISs could potentially be one of the informal information sources 
McBarnet et al (1993) referred to which led employees to identify financial and non-
financial problems within a company. 
3.2. For External Parties 
Through keeping individual data on items not provided by formal records, employees 
may have unwittingly provided an alternative information source useful to assess an 
organisation's performance for external parties. For example, IAISs which are used 
to evaluate the accuracy of the formal system effectively fulfil the same role as an 
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internal audit. Where an internal audit function is perceived to be unreliable (or if it 
does not exist at all), these informal systems would provide a valuable check on the 
accuracy of the formal system. As New Zealand companies are commonly small to 
medium in size on an international scale, and are therefore unlikely to have internal 
audit functions, external auditors should pay particular heed to those informal 
systems that check the accuracy of the formal systems. Furthermore, if an external 
party, such as an auditor or banker, had access to these systems and a knowledge of 
corporate distress, they could potentially use the information to assist an assessment 
of whether an organisation was distressed. 
3.3. Limitations 
Accepting that the employees may not use information from the IAIS, there are four 
potential limitations regarding an employee's use ofiAIS(s) for detecting distress: 
• Firstly, not all the employees may have access to information from the IAIS; 
• Secondly, the informal accounting information systems of a company are often 
small and restricted, and do not contain information from sources outside a single 
manager or employee's department. Therefore, a single IAIS will not provide 
alternative evidence of an entire organisation's performance. 
• Thirdly, employees may not have access to the formal records to compare 
information. 
• Fourthly, IAIS have, in past research, only kept management accounting 
information which is generated internally within the company. Management 
accounting information may differ from the financial accounting information 
which is the subject of creative accounting. 
4. Conclusion 
IAISs contain internal information of both a financial and non-financial nature which 
details problems and areas of managerial and employee concern within a single 
department. It is proposed that they could be used to detect distress in two ways. 
50 EMPLOYEES' OBSERVATIONS, INFORMAL INFORMATION AND CORPORATE DISTRESS 
Firstly, that an IAIS may indicate a defective formal accounting system which 
produces inaccurate information for managerial decision-making. Moreover, it is 
proposed that a comparison between informal and formal accounting systems could 
reveal discrepancies. Substantial discrepancies could indicate a defective formal 
accounting system or areas where fraud or creative accounting have occurred. 
Secondly, IAISs often detail concerns and weaknesses, such as union and operations 
problems, which contribute to distress. 
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1. Introduction 
Research into company failure occurred as early as the 1930's (Fitzpatrick, 1931; 
Sadd and Williams, 1932; Smith and Winakor, 1935). Due to a successful business 
climate where the failure rate was low, it received little more attention until the late 
1960's when the seminal works of Beaver (1966; 1968) and Altman (1968) were 
written (Argenti, 1977; Altman, 1983; 1984)?7 However, the US $5 billion collapse 
of Penn Central in 1970, and Rolls Royce ten months later, dispelled the myth that 
failure was the providence of small companies and inspired increased interest and 
research into corporate distress (Argenti, 1977). 
Much of the subsequent distress research caused by these two collapses used 
methods and empirical techniques similar to those of Altman's (1968). However, 
there were exceptions, such as the works of Argenti (1976a) and Miller (1977) which 
sought to identify the factors which caused distress. These two divergent techniques 
have remained fundamentally unchanged until the present day. 
This chapter presents the differing methods used in prior failure research. It then 
continues, outlining prior qualitative research which details the factors that previous 
researchers posit are the observable causes, or symptoms, of distress a,nd eventual 
failure. Lastly, the limitations ofthis approach are presented. 
2. Corporate Failure 
The failure of an organisation is not a rapid event but rather a process which occurs 
over a period of time (Argenti, 1976a; Sharma and Mahajan, 1980; Bruno and 
Leidecker, 1988; Young, 1989; Bortiz, 1991; Greatorex, Holden, Iliffe, and 
Wauchope, 1994). Although its approach is heralded by symptoms (Argenti, 1976a; 
27 
During the 1930 to 1970 period, research was also performed by Merwin (1942) and Tamari (1966). However, it is the 
works of Beaver and, in particular, Altman, which others such as Deakin (1972), Edmister (1972) and Blum (1974), used 
as a basis for their research. 
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Cohn, 1985) or signals (Bortiz, 1991), the underlying causes of failure occur at a 
much earlier stage (Smith, 1963; Argenti, 1976a; Honsberger, 1979). 
The failure process has led some researchers, such as Robertson (1984), Robb 
(1986b), and Altman (1988), to compare company failure to human illness. Altman 
commented that: 
"Just as a sick person often has certain symptoms that enable his physician to 
diagnose his disease, a firm is very likely to display signs of deterioration 
before its ultimate failure" (1988, p 40). 
Like a physician, researchers have attempted to detect distressed or potentially failing 
companies. To do so they have predominantly utilised two differing approaches 
which Argenti (1977) classified as the analytic, (or mathematical), method and the 
list method. 
3. Prior Research into Corporate Distress 
3.1. The Analytic Method 
The analytic method focuses on ways to classify bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms 
using financial ratios. Quantitative in nature, it is characterised by the univariate 
ratio analysis approach of Beaver (1966, 1968), and ·the multivariate approach of 
Altman's Z-Score (1968), and Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan's ZETA analysis 
(1977). 
Put simply, the analytic approach involves using linear discriminant analysis ( eg 
Altman, 1968), or another statistical technique, to analyze the financial ratios of a 
sample of failed and matching non-failed companies. The equation developed from 
the independent variables (the financial ratios) establishes a cut-off point (Jones, 
1987). Firms which fall below the cut-off point are expected to become bankrupt. 
Firms above the point are classified as non-failed and are expected to continue 
operating successfully (Jones, 1987)?8 
28 
A very simplified example of the analytic approach has been presented. While the essential method remains the same, 
differing statistical analyses such as logit (Martin, 1977; Ohlson, 1980; Gentry, Newbold and Whitford, 1985; Casey and 
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The results of such research indicated that the financial signs of company failure may 
be evident up to five years prior to a company failing. For instance, Altman et al's 
(1977) ZETA analysis, which combined seven financial variables, classified over 96 
percent of firms correctly one period prior to failure and 70 percent correctly five 
reporting periods prior to collapse. 
3.2. The List Method 
The second approach is qualitative in nature. Self-described by Argenti (1977) as the 
list method, it 'lists' observable factors that researchers posit cause, or are signs of, 
financial distress. Both Argenti (1977) and Bruno and Leidecker (1988) assert that it 
is the identification of both causes and symptoms which makes qualitative research 
better for understanding a company's failure?9 As Bruno and Leidecker assert: 
Failure can be better understood through analysis of both the underlying 
causes and performance indicators that identify symptoms of eventual demise. 
The financial modeling approach is useful for predicting the likelihood of 
failure, but does not identify the causes of that failure (1988, p 53). 
These causes and performance indicators are predominantly derived from case 
studies (Smith, 1963; Ross and Kami, 1973; Boocock and Drozd, 1982). However, 
personal experience (Hartigan, 1973, 1976; Cohn, 1985; McQueen, 1989a, 1989b), 
and interviews with such people as company founders (Bruno et al, 1987; Bruno and 
Leidecker, 1988) and receivers or accountants (Argenti, 1976a; Young, 1989; 
Greatorex et al, 1994) have also been used to identify factors in failure. 
The list approach is typified by Argenti's (1976a) research, in which he proposed ten 
factors which caused, contributed to, or were symptoms of, failure. These factors 
were categorised as defects, mistakes and symptoms, and were subsequently formed 
into the A-Score list (Argenti, 1977).30 
Bartczak, 1985; and Zavgren, 1985), probit (Zmijewski, 1984), and recursive partitioning (Frydman, Altman and Kao, 
1985) have been utilised. However, a more detailed examination of this method is beyond the scope of this thesis. For 
an overview of the techniques and limitations of the methods used in analytic bankruptcy prediction, see Zavgren (1983), 
Zmijewski (1984) and Jones (1987). 
29 h' h While qualitative and list style research offer explanations ·of company failure, they also have numerous weaknesses w Ic 
will be presented later in this chapter. 
30 
The A-Score list is presented on p 59 of this thesis. 
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3.3. Other Methods 
Recently, Hambrick and D'Aveni (1988) categorised distress research into three 
areas: 
• Financial ratios (Altman, 1968; Altman, 1982); 
• Anecdotal (Argenti, 1976a); and 
• Qualitative (Daughen and Binzen, 1971; Starbuck, Greve and Hedburg, 1978). 
The financial ratio approach corresponds to Argenti's mathematical or analytical 
approach, while qualitative refers to the in-depth examination of single or multiple 
cases of company failure. 
Anecdotal refers to the lack of methodological rigour which Argenti (1976a) used to 
derive his list. Much of his work was unsupported assertion with scant evidence. 
However, this does not necessarily mean Argenti's work is incorrect because it has 
many similarities to the qualitative research of Miller (1977) among others. 
Furthermore, other researchers such as Robertson (1984), and Keasy and Watson 
(1987) have applied parts of his list and found that they were useful in predicting 
failure. 
Buttery and Shadur (1991) also identified three major categories of research into 
distress: the analysis of financial standing of firm (Altman, 1968); research which 
captures the main features of collapse trajectories (Argenti, 1976a); and case studies 
of specific companies. However, individual case studies, which Hambrick and 
D'Aveni (1988) termed qualitative research, could also be categorised under the 
mantle of the list method, as they often highlight weaknesses which caused a 
company to fail (eg Lawson, 1982; Lee, 1982; Robertson, 1984; Robb, 1985; Robb, 
1986b; Buttery and Shadur, 1991), and have been used as a basis to delineate 
common factors in distress (Miller, 1977). 
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3.4. The Distress Approach Adopted for this Research 
The present research seeks to ascertain whether employees' are aware that an 
organisation is distressed prior to its failure, and investigate the observations and 
concerns which caused that awareness. Therefore, only the qualitative or list 
approaches which identify observable factors in corporate failure are relevant in 
assessing the employees' perceptions. The following section details the models of 
failure proposed by Argenti (1976a) and Miller (1977), and derives a list of 
individually observable factors from previous list and qualitative research. 
4. Differing Distress Models 
4.1. Argenti 
Argenti (1976a) believed that corporate failure was a process consisting of three 
distinct phases which he termed defects, mistakes and symptoms. As shown in 
Exhibit 5.1, defects cause mistakes which in tum lead to observable symptoms. 
Therefore, a company without defects does not make mistakes and, as a consequence, 
does not fail (Argenti, 1986a). 
Exhibit 5.1: The Failure Process31 
Defects ______ _.. 
Management ( 6) 
Accounting (3) 
Response to Change 
Mistakes-------+ Symptoms 
Leverage 
Big Project 
Overtrading 
Financial 
Non financial 
Creative 
Accounting 
Nose Dive 
Within some of the factors, Argenti identified more than one problem. For example, 
he identified six management defects and three accounting defects. Included in 
31 . 
Argenti (1976c, p 14). 
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management defects were such deficiencies as autocratic leadership, non-
participating boards of directors and imbalanced skills amongst senior management 
and directors (Argenti, 1976a). Similarly, the financial symptoms could be detected 
through the use of a variety of ratios, and non-financial symptoms could range from 
offices needing a coat of paint to low morale amongst the employees. 
According to Argenti, a single observation of a defect, mistake or symptom should 
not be enough to cause concern but the observation of several defects and mistakes 
would indicate that an organisation was distressed. To assist in the application of the 
factors Argenti (1977) formed the A-Score in which distress factors were listed and 
assigned a weighting based on the severity of the issue (refer Exhibit 5.2). 
The list identified elements common to companies of all sizes. However, Argenti 
posited that there were three different organisational types, each of which failed in 
differing ways. These failures were graphically depicted as failure trajectories. 
Typically referred to as Types 1, 2 and 3 (Argenti, 1976a), they were alternatively 
termed the stillborn company, the meteoric company and the mature company 
(Argenti, 1976c). 
4.1.1. The Failure Trajectories 
4.1.1.1. Type 1: The Stillborn Company 
Typically these are small companies run by one person who knows how to 
manufacture a product or deliver a service but has few accounting or marketing skills 
(Argenti, 1976a). Due to their lack offmancial skills, the initial forecasts prove to be 
wrong with sales targets not being met. Therefore, the owner cannot met debts as 
they fall due. Furthermore, he or she cannot refmance because the company was 
originally overgeared, so he or she mistakenly overtrades in an attempt to raise cash 
to pay expenses. During the life ofthe company, losses, or minimal profits, are made 
and cash flow is non-existent. Most Type 1 companies fail within a few years of 
incorporation. 
While Type 1 companies were never successful, Type 2 companies are the opposite 
(Argenti, 1979a). 
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Exhibit 5.2: Argenti's Scorecards for the A-score32 
Defects 
Management 
1. Autocratic chief executive. 
2. The chief executive is also the chairman. 
3. The skills on the board are unbalanced. 
4. There is no strong finance director. 
5. Most board members do not actively participate in big decisions. 
6. No depth of professional management below the board. 
Accounting · 
1. There is no budget or budgetary control system. 
2. There is no cash flow plan- if there is, it is out of date. 
3. There is no costing system 
Response to change 
Maximum Weighting 
1977 1984 
-0.50 8 
-0.30 4 
-0.15 2 
-0.15 2 
-0.15 2 
-0.15 1 
-0.20 3 
-0.20 3 
-0.20 3 
Company exhibits clear and vital example of failing to respond to change. -1.00 15 
Total for Defects 
Mistakes 
Leverage 
The company's capital gearing or income gearing is noticeably high. 
Overtrading 
The turnover is rising at a much faster rate than profits or cash flow. 
Projects 
The company has launched a project of such a size that if it goes wrong 
it will more than exceed any possible cash available from all sources. 
Total for Mistakes 
Symptoms 
Financial signs 
The traditional ratios will deteriorate and cash will be extremely scarce. 
The share price will fall versus the index. 
Creative Accounting 
The accounts will show signs of window dressing to "improve" profits. 
Non-financial signs 
The office needs painting, quality and morale falls, etc. 
Nose-dive 
It becomes impossible to hide the last-gasp scramble for cash. 
Total for Symptoms 
Grand total for A-score. 
32 
The differing weightings are found in Argenti (1977, p 52) and (1984, p 15). 
-3.00 
-1.00 
-1.00 
-1.00 
-3.00 
-0.25 
-0.25 
-0.25 
-0.25 
-1.00 
-7.00 
43 
15 
15 
15 
43 
4 
4 
3 
12 
100 
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4.1.1.2. Type 2: The Meteoric Company 
The meteoric company is led by an entrepreneur who has a great deal of business 
expertise and acumen. The company starts small then .undergoes rapid expansion. 
The early success of a Type 2 company draws public attention. Feeling such 
attention the CEO attempts to keep the company growing at the same phenomenal 
rate through overtrading. 
During this time the entrepreneur continues to control the company, even though he 
or she cannot do so effectively due to its increasing size, and the company makes all 
six of the management defects. While turnover continually increases, profits do not. 
This lack of success is disguised through creative accounting. Then an event 
happens which stalls the company's progress, such as an unsuccessful product or 
change in the business environment. The event causes a loss in confidence from 
creditors and investors. As confidence plummets, the media, banks, and stockmarket 
also become concerned that the company is distressed. Despite reassurances and 
creative accounting, the loss of confidence continues and the company collapses a 
short time later. 
The collapse of these companies is rapid (Argenti, 1979a) and often occurs in a blaze 
of publicity (Argenti, 1976c). Most last as long as a decade but some may only 
survive for 2 or 3 years (Argenti, 1976b). Conversely, the third failure trajectory 
involves a company that has existed and been successful for a considerable period of 
time. 
4.1.1.3. Type 3: The Mature Company 
Like the meteoric company, the mature company is dominated by a single person 
(Argenti, 1976b). However, in this case the autocrat does not change the 
organisation to meet the requirements of a changing market and environment, 
preferring to stay with the strategy and products which proved successful in the past. 
As a result, the company's sales, profitability and cash flows decline. Low cash flow 
causes gearing to rise as debt is acquired to meet expenses. 
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After these initial problems, the company reaches a plateau where its performance 
stabilises. The autocrat attempts to launch the company from the plateau by using 
debt to finance a new project, or overtrading. The failure of these efforts causes the 
failure ofthe financially frail company (Argenti, 1979a). 
4.2. Miller 
Miller (1977) analysed 31 variables for each of 42 cases with the objective of 
grouping organisations into recurring forms of failure. He found that 85 percent of 
the cases were incorporated in one of four 'archetypes.' Two of the archetypes, 
failure syndromes 1 and 2, are similar to Argenti's (1976a) Type 2 and 3 failure 
trajectories, respectively. 
4.2.1. Failure Syndromes 
4.2.1.1. Failure Syndrome 1: Tlte Impulsive Syndrome: Running Blind. 
According to Miller: 
"[t]he F1 firms fail because they are dominated by a power-hoarding chief 
executive and because their strategies are over-ambitious, incautious, and 
oblivious to some every important features in their environment" (1977, p 45). 
Bold decisions and rapid expansion overtaxes the firm's financial and managerial 
resources. During this period the CEO neglects to delegate power or consult with 
middle management, and the organisation's information systems fail to keep pace 
with the company's increased size. The inadequate information, and lack of other 
managerial input, results in poor strategies and decisions, and poor control of 
problems which ultimately results in failure. 
4.2.1.2. Failure Syndrome 2: Tlte Stagnant Bureaucracy. 
The stagnant bureaucracy, like the impulsive syndrome, is dominated by a power 
hoarding CEO who ignores advice from other management. However, in this case, 
the firm is not young and expanding, but old and well established and used to 
operating in a stable environment. These companies ignore external environmental 
changes, preferring to stay with status quo as that has proven successful in the past. 
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Due to the autocratic CEO, a lack of management information, and a bureaucratic 
system whereby policies and rules are followed automatically, the organisation fails 
to change and consequently fails to remain competitive. 
4.2.1.3. Failur~ Syndrome 3: The Headless Firm. 
Miller states that "[t]he F3 ... companies are usually large and quite diversified, and 
important changes in markets have occurred recently" (1977, p 48). The headless 
firm does not suffer from autocratic leadership but instead has a leadership vacuum 
with the CEO being a figurehead only. The CEO fails to respond to the market 
changes, or any opportunities, nor does he or she co-ordinate the organisation's 
various departments. The firm's information systems are also faulty and fail to 
produce the information required to control the organisation's diverse operations. 
Consequently, the firm is slow to adapt to changing conditions, there are no clear 
strategies, and the departments operate as independent units which conflict with one 
another. 
4.2.1.4. Failure Syndrome 4: Swimming Upstream: The Aftermath. 
This firm has been harmed by past failure " ... perhaps from being in an FJ> F2, or F3 
mode for an extended period" (Miller, 1977, p 49). As such, it is debatable whether 
this syndrome is truly independent. Instead, it should be viewed as an extension of 
the three other syndromes which explains their final collapse. 
After a period of prolonged distress a new CEO and executive management team are 
appointed. They are unfamiliar with the industry but decide that drastic action is 
required to turn the company around. However, they fail to obtain support from the 
company's employees making any changes more difficult to undertake. The new 
management institutes a number of policies and objectives, but, due to the company's 
depleted resources, poor market position, or outdated plant and equipment, such a 
drastic manoeuvre consigns the company to a rapid demise. In this instance the 
failure to understand the company combined with a new bold strategy results in 
failure. 
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After proposing these failure syndromes, Miller also presented a list of warning signs 
to use when assessing whether or not a company is distressed. Some of these factors, 
such as a power-hoarding chief executive, over-extension of financial resources, and 
a commitment to old products and markets, are similar to factors proposed in 
Argenti's (1976a) list. The corresponding problems in the A-Score would be an 
autocratic CEO, overgearing, and a failure to change. Therefore, Miller's research 
provides a deal of evidence on the accuracy of Argenti's list and failure trajectories 
which have received criticism for a lack of methodological rigour. 
However, while Argenti's (1976a) and Miller's (1977) classification of failures are 
consistent in some respects, they are presented as stereotypes. The list of factors 
each determined, differs. Furthermore, other researchers have found factors not 
covered by either Argenti's or Miller's general approaches which employees could 
potentially observe. The following section presents many of the common elements 
in distress but is by no means definitive. 
5. Common Factors in Corporate Distress 
Elements which cause the distress and eventual failure of a company can originate 
both internally and externally to an organisation (Starbuck, Hedburg and Greve, 
1978; Sharma and Mahajan, 1980; Scherrer, 1988) .. 
5.1. Internal Factors 
5.1.1. Management and Executive Function 
The most important determinant of any organisation's performance IS its 
management. As Altman remarks: 
Usually, a bankruptcy can be traced to some kind of managerial incompetence 
and the Penn-Central case is certainly no exception (1971, p 153). 
As indicated in Table 5.1 bad management or managerial incompetence is the single 
most recurring feature cited in distress literature. 
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Table 5.1: Poor or Inexperienced Management as an Underlying Cause of 
Company Failure 
Sadd and Williams, 1932 Dun and Bradstreet, 1981 
Smith, 1963 Altman, 1983 
Lippitt and Schmidt, 1967 Landesburg and Edmunds, 1983 
Dun and Bradstreet, 1969 Aigenti, 1986a 
Altman, 1971 Rolph, 1988 
Hartigan, 1973 Scherrer, 1988 
Willis, 1975 Scherrer, 1989a 
Argenti, 1976a Scherrer, 1989b 
Argenti, 1976b Young, 1989 
Argenti, 1976c Bortiz, 1991 
Hartigan, 1976 Cohn, 1991 
Miller, 1977 Makridakis, 1991 
Hays, 1977 Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1992 
Abdelsamad and Kindling, 1978 Mukerjee, 1993 
Starbuck, Greve and Hedburg, 1978 Greatorex et al, 1994 
Sharma and Mahajan, 1980 
The recurring nature with which poor management is reported as contributing to 
failure should be unsurprising for a company's management makes the strategic 
decisions and it is their reaction to internal (Scherrer, 1988; Mukerjee, 1993), and 
external (Robb, 1986a; Scherrer, 1988; Mukerjee, 1993), events that determines an 
organisation success (Lippitt and Schmidt, 1967). · 
While inadequate or bad management had previously been identified as the primary 
cause of distress, Argenti (1976a) noted that the behaviour which constituted it had 
not been defined. He proposed six areas of concern, the first and most important 
being the autocratic leader. 
5.1.1.1. Autocratic CEO or One Man Rule 
An autocratic CEO dominates an organisation and his or her colleagues, hoarding 
power and making decisions without listening to advice (Argenti, 1976a). Initially 
proposed by Argenti (1976a) and reaffirmed by Miller (1977), the role of an autocrat 
in company failure has found acceptance with other authors such as McKinlay 
(1979), Boocock and Drozd (1982), Makridakis (1991), and Mukerjee (1993). 
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One man rule does not necessarily consign a company to failure (Argenti, 1976a). 
However, by not having to reach consensus with his or her colleagues, the autocrat 
may be more susceptible to making mistakes (Argenti, 1976b, 1986a) and more 
willing to take risks (Mukerjee, 1993). The potential to make mistakes compounds 
as an organisation's size and complexity increase, making it more difficult for a 
single person to control (Lippitt and Schmidt, 1967; Miller and Toulouse, 1986). 
An autocrat is more likely to dominate the organisation where the supporting 
executive team is weak or unbalanced. Therefore, autocratic leadership is a 
particular problem when an organisation also exhibits one or more of following six 
management defects. However, it must be noted that the following defects are also 
problems within their own right. 
5.1.1.2. The Chairman is also the CEO 
An independent chairman could censure the CEO's actions, limit his or her 
autonomy, or dismiss him or her for their performance (Argenti, 1976c, 1979b). 
However, a CEO who is also the chairman is unlikely to dismiss, or discipline, 
themself. 
5.1.1.3. Unbalanced Top Team 
The top team includes directors, senior executives and advisers (Argenti, 1976a). It 
is unbalanced where the preponderance of these people have skills in the same area, 
such as engineering or marketing. Without a wide variety of skills at the top, the 
chances of a threat appearing and going unnoticed is increased (Argenti, 1976a). An 
unbalanced top team is particularly common in small companies where the 
management team is small (Abdelsamad and Kindling, 1978). 
5.1.1.4. Weak Finance Function 
Closely associated with a lack of skills in the top team, a weak or non-existent 
finance manager means the top team does not have its attention drawn to any 
emerging financial difficulties (Argenti, 1979b ). Therefore, they may be unaware of 
financial issues involved in, or consequences of, a decision. 
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5.1.1.5. Inactive Board of Directors 
A board of directors may not play an active part in decision making, preferring to 
leave it all to the CEO (Argenti, 1976c, 1979b). Inactivity may be caused where the 
board members are inexperienced. Inexperience was found by Greatorex et al (1994) 
to be significant weakness in large, medium and small failed companies. 
Alternatively, the board or top management team may believe they play an active 
role in decision making but be guilty of 'group think' and follow blindly where the 
CEO leads (Makridakis, 1991). 
5.1.1. 6. Lack of Management Deptlt 
While Argenti (1976a) mentioned lack of management depth as a defect, he was 
unsure of the influence it had on the collapse of a company. However, it is a factor 
which recurs in small company failure where size precludes development of 
managers (Abdelsamad and Kindling, 1978). 
5.1.1. 7. Failure to Take Enough Interest in tlte Business 
In the case of Stirling Homex reported in Business Week (1972) the managers failed 
to take interest in the company's production and instead focused on marketing 
hyperbole. Furthermore, they used the company to fund their own expensive 
lifestyle. Similarly, executives of struggling companies have been noted as lending 
themselves interest free loans from company funds (Barnard, 1988). 
While poor management is a recurring factor it is not confined to failing companies 
(Dunn, 1986). For a company to fail other factors must also occur. One of the 
foremost is inadequate accounting information. 
5.1.2. Inadequate Accounting Information 
Distressed companies often have inadequate accounting information systems 
(Argenti, 1976a; Altman, 1983; Scherrer, 1988; Altman and La Fleur, 1989) which 
produce poor management information (Smith, 1963; Argenti, 1976a; Boocock and 
Drozd, 1982; Greatorex et al, 1994). Poor quality information contributes to poor 
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managerial decision-making and may also obscure the position of a company, 
making distress undetectable to any party except top management (Argenti, 1976a). 
The three most common accounting weaknesses which have been found to contribute 
to failure are: 
• Poor or non-existent budgets (Argenti, 1976a; Argenti, 1979b; McKinlay, 1979; 
Lingard, 1989). Without a comparison of organisational performance against 
some budget or standard, deficiencies can not be detected (Argenti, 1979b ). 
• Deficient costing systems (Hartigan, 1973, 1976; Argenti, 1976a, 1976c; Lingard, 
1989; Greatorex et al, 1994). Where costing systems are inadequate, production 
expense may be underestimated and selling prices set too low (Hartigan, 1973; 
Scherrer, 1988). 
• Inadequate cash flow forecasts (Argenti, 1976a; Abdelsamad and Kindling, 1978; 
Argenti, 1979b; McKinlay, 1979; Lingard, 1989; Greatorex et al, 1994). Without 
anticipating when cash expenses will occur, and providing cash to meet those 
expenses, an organisation may become insolvent (McKinlay, 1979). 
While most weaknesses in accounting information are associated with small and 
medium sized companies (Greatorex et al, 1994), specific deficiencies such as 
inadequate cash flow forecasts may contribute to a lack of financial management 
which is an element common to failures regardless ofthe size of the company. 
5.1.3. Financial Management 
Two of the most common recurring themes in distress are poor cash flows and 
overleveraging/undercapitalising. Both are examples of poor financial management 
and contribute greatly to the failure of organisations. 
5.1.3.1. Cash flows and Operating Cash Flows 
Both empirical (Gentry, Newbold and Whitford, 1985; Dambolena and Schulman, 
1988; Giacomino and Mielke, 1993) and non-empirical research (Houston, 1972; 
Perry, 1982; Platt, 1985; Robb, 1985, 1986b; Fredenberger, DeThomas and Ray, 
68 EMPLOYEES' OBSERVATIONS, INFORMAL INFORMATION AND CORPORATE DISTRESS 
1993) indicates cash flows are a critical for organisational surviva1.33 Without cash, 
an organisation can not meet its expenses (Perry, 1982; Robb, 1986b). However, it 
must be noted that poor liquidity is not a cause of failure, only an indicator of 
problems which must ultimately be attributed to management (Willis, 1975) who 
may misunderstand or ignore cash flows (Houston, 1972; Lee, 1982). 
Cash flows are generated through a variety of means, including issuing share capital, 
selling assets, raising debt and selling goods and services. Of these forms cash flows 
from operating activities, roughly calculated as cash sales less cash expenses incurred 
to produce those sales, is particularly important.34 Operating cash flows signal the 
success ofthe organisation's trading activities (Lawson, 1982; Robb, 1985). Without 
generating cash flows from operations, a business will have to continuously borrow 
to survive (Lee, 1982). 
Lee (1982) and Robb (1986a, 1994) posit that it is the cumulative lack of operating 
cash flows over time which is a determining factor in failure. Where operating cash 
flows fail to met cash disbursements over a prolonged period, other sources of 
finance, such as debt, are required. Continuous borrowing will increase leverage and 
interest expense. A cyclical effect ensues whereby interest payments need to be met 
through continual refinancing or borrowing. While this strategy may be sustained in 
the short-term, in the long term such a strategy will not succeed as creditors will not 
advance further money when the company becomes overleveraged. 
5.1.3.2. Overleveraging!Overgearing 
Gearing or leverage refers to the proportion of an organisation's assets funded by 
debt. Overleveraging arises from an heavy reliance on debt (Abdelsamad and 
D . 
Early research by Beaver (1966), Altman (1973), Altman et al (1977), Sharma and MahaJan (1980) and Mensah (1983) 
34 
have also found 'cash flow' based ratios significant. However, care must be taken when referring to such findings. In 
each of the above studies, cash flow was defined or approximated as income plus depreciation which Robb (1985) 
correctly describes as a measure of working capital. 
Empirical evidence on the usefulness of operating cash flows as a predictor of distress are divided. Casey and Bartczak 
(1984) and Gombola, Haskins, Ketz and Williams (1987) found that ratios involving cash flow from operations proved to 
be an inaccurate predictors of bankruptcy. Conversely, the empirical research performed by Gentry, Newbold and 
Whitford (1985) found that the dividend cash flow component was a significant indicator of distress. They commented 
that " .. .failing firms tended to experience a shortfall in inflows from operations, which forced a reduction in dividend 
payments" (1985, p 52). 
OBSERVABLE FACTORS IN CORPORATE DISTRESS 69 
Kindling, 1978; Williams, 1984; Greatorex et al, 1994) or initial undercapitalization 
(Hartigan, 1973, 1976; Small Business Reports, 1982; Robb, 1985; Lingard, 1989; 
Cohn, 1991; Greatorex et al, 1994). If a company is overgeared any misfortune, 
ranging from management error to an economy wide economic downturn, can cause 
an organisation to fail to meet its interest payments or debt covenants (Argenti, 
1976a). Creditors seeing this may lose confidence and choose to place the 
organisation into receivership. 
Once again overgearing is the result of poor financial management, and is caused by 
management ineptitude or overoptimism (Argenti, 1976a). This problem is 
compounded if there is a weak fmance adviser who cannot inform his colleagues as 
to the seriousness of the situation (Argenti, 1979b). 
Just as poor gearing and cash flows are interrelated, two of the other mistakes 
proposed by Argenti (1976a), overtrading and the big project, will only cause an 
organisation to fail if it is already overleveraged (Argenti, 1976a, 1979b). These two 
factors can be categorised as organisational expansion. However, both are also 
directly attributable to management error. 
5.1.4. Managerial Mistakes 
5.1.4.1. The Big Project 
Loosely defined by Argenti as " ... any undertaking or obligation that is large 
compared to the resources of the company" (1976a, p 134), the big project could be a 
new product, merger, diversification, technological leap forward, or anything new 
which is on a large scale (Argenti, 1976c, 1979b). Such projects are characterised by 
managerial optimism which is supported by an initial underestimate of costs and 
overestimation of revenues (Argenti, 1976a). 
While not termed the big project by other researchers, large scale expansion from a 
poor financial base is a characteristic of many business failures (Birchfield, 1972 -
JBL; Robertson, 1984- Laker Airways; Robb, 1985 -PSIS; Robb, 1986b- Mosgiel 
Ltd; Buttery and Shadur, 1991 - Bond Corporation). Such mistakes are normally 
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associated with large companies (Greatorex et al, 1994), or companies striving to 
restart, (Type 3), or continue, (Type 2), rapid growth (Argenti, 1976a). 
Argenti' s broad definition allows many elements to come under the heading of the 
big project. Some of which may include: 
• Diversification into non-core or incompatible activities (Smith, 1963; Robb, 1985; 
Makridakis, 1991; Greatorex et al, 1994); 
• Ambitious or high priced acquisitions (Greatorex et al, 1994); 
• Investments in managerial ego (Greatorex et al, 1994); and 
• Technological or product innovation, especially where products or technologies 
are introduced which are not economically viable (Makridakis, 1991). 
5.1.4.2. Overtrading 
"A company is said to be 'overtrading' when its sales turnover rises faster than its 
profits" (Argenti, 1979b, p 5). As an organisation overtrades, production increases. 
More cash is tied up as inventory and accounts receivable meaning a short term 
supply of funds is often needed (Lingard, 1989). These funds are typically debt. If 
leverage is high then the borrowing and interest repayments can cause insolvency, 
particularly where sales or profitability reduce (Argenti, 1976c, 1979b; Robertson, 
1984). Furthermore, companies which overtrade may loosen their credit policies 
meaning bad debt levels increase which also may contribute to failure. This is a 
particular problem in small firms where it is asserted that as little as 10 percent of 
debtors need turn 'bad' to cause a company to fail (Young, 1989). 
Robertson and Mills state that "[a} company cannot be accused of overtrading 
simply because it is increasing its stocks or its fixed assets" (1991, p 42). However, 
increased stocks and fixed assets are two indicators of overtrading which, when seen 
in conjunction with increasing sales without commensurate increases in profits, may 
indicate distress. 
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5.1.4.3. Inappropriate Structure and Strategy 
Amongst the other managerial mistakes which contribute to failure are adopting a 
poorly conceived strategy and an inappropriate organisational structure. 
5.1.4.3.1. Strategy 
In the pursuit of success management may adopt a strategy which is poorly 
conceived (Makridakis, 1991) or inappropriate (Smith, 1963). Inappropriate 
strategies may involve taking excessive risks, such as the aforementioned big project 
and overtrading, which are an important component in failure (Makridakis, 1991 ). 
In the pursuit of differing strategies managers may lose sight of t~eir original purpose 
of the company (Abdelsamad and Kindling, 1978; Boocock and Drozd, 1982; Small 
Business Reports, 1982). This is a particular problem for small companies who, by 
attempting to expand, lose their niche market and consequently fail to serve their 
original customers requirements. Furthermore, expansion typically involves 
competing against larger companies who have an advantage of scale (Abdelsamad 
and Kindling, 1978). 
5.1.4.3.2. Structure 
Failing companies often have an organizational structure which is inappropriate for 
the size or type of the company (Smith, 1963; Boocock and Drozd, 1982; Small 
Business Reports, 1982). Decentralisation is often a key element in crisis with 
companies adopting it without the necessary controls or structure (Smith, 1963; 
Boocock and Drozd, 1982). Similarly, centralisation must also suit a company's 
style (Smith, 1963). 
The structure of an organisation should change as organisational size increases 
(Small Business Reports, 1982; Buttery and Shadur, 1991). Therefore, small 
companies should adopt a conservative structure because, by overstructuring, they 
may constrain their employees' performance (Small Business Reports, 1982), and, 
due to inflexibility, find it difficult to respond to environmental change (Smith, 
1963). 
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5.1.5. Production and Marketing 
Lastly, production and marketing problems have been identified by Bruno et al 
(1987), Lingard (1989) and Scherrer (1988) as internal elements which contribute to 
failure. Often overlooked, production problems include machine breakdowns and 
manufacturing poor quality products (Lingard, 1989).35 According to Lingard (1989, 
p 1) "[t)he causes range from technical defects or inefficient procedures to bad 
labour relations. " Production problems can lead to expensive, poor quality products 
which can not be sold profitably (Lingard, 1989). 
The marketing function must sell the product. To do so it must identify the correct 
market for that product, or establish whether there is a market at all (Scherrer, 1988; 
Lingard, 1989). Furthermore, the marketing function must determine the size of the 
market as over-production of a product which cannot be sold consumes financial 
resources which in turn may contribute to insolvency and receivership. 
5.2. External Events 
Often general economic events and industry specific events seem to initiate a 
company's decline. Each of these will be discussed in turn. 
5.2.1. General Economic Events 
Khandwalla (1982), Rose, Andrews and Giroux (1982) and Platt and Platt (1994) 
found that a change in general economic factors is an important component in an 
organisation's decline. Economic factors which influence failure include: 
• Government influence and government imposed restrictions (Hartigan, 1976; 
Boocock and Drozd, 1982; Milburn et al, 1983; Scherrer, 1988; Lingard, 1989); 
• The performance ofthe stock market (Altman, 1983; Scherrer, 1988); 
35 
Deteriorating product quality is mentioned by Argenti (1976a) as a non-financial symptom of distress. 
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• Money supply or credit availability (Altman, 1983; Scherrer, 1988; Greatorex et 
al, 1994); 
• Inflation, which, for example, may impact on production considerations (Scherrer, 
1988); and 
• Reduced economic growth or economic downturn (Sharma and Mahajan, 1980; 
Boocock and Drozd, 1982; Altman, 1983; Williams, 1984; Scherrer, 1988; 
Altman and La Fleur, 1989; Makridakis, 1991; Greatorex et al, 1994; Platt and 
Platt, 1994). 
While the extent to which these general environmental factors affect a company may 
differ according to its industry and individual characteristics, all organisation's will 
be affected in some way. The only exception in the above list is where a government 
imposes restrictions which only affect specific industries or groups of industries, 
such as import tariffs or quotas. 
5.2.2. Industry Specific Events 
Events and changes within an industry also contribute to collapse. For instance Dunn 
reported that: 
"[h]igh interest rates, low export commodity prices, a depreciating currency 
and drought in the rural community have contributed to record business 
failures during 1986" (1986, p 100). 
A drought is an industry specific factor which will predominantly affect primary 
sector companies. Commonly mentioned industry specific factors include: 
• Competition (Hartigan, 1976; Boocock and Drozd, 1982; Milburn et al, 1983; 
Scherrer, 1988; Lingard, 1989; McQueen, 1989a; Makridakis, 1991). Ignoring or 
underestimating competition can lead to failure because existing and new 
competitors attempt to gain market share or other competitive advantages at the 
expense of successful, profitable firms (Makridakis, 1991 ). Technological 
changes may also allow new competitors into a market by changing its boundaries 
(Makridakis, 1991). 
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• Suppliers (Milburn et al, 1983). Just as the failure of a large company can create a 
domino effect whereby small to medium sized companies may enter into 
receivership after a debtor fails (Dunn, 1986; Young, 1989; Buttery and Shadur, 
1991 ), the failure of a crucial supplier may also contribute to corporate distress 
(Robb, 1986b). The term 'suppliers' refers to those people supplying land, labour 
and capital to an organisation (Milburn et al, 1983). Therefore, included in this 
term are the labour disputes mentioned by Hartigan (1976) and Robb (1986b). 
• Natural environmental events such, as droughts, floods and storms (Milburn et al, 
1983; Dunn, 1986); 
• Changes in public taste (Willis, 1975; Hartigan, 1976; Sharma and Mahajan, 
1980; Milburn et al, 1983; Scherrer, 1988); and 
• Technological change (Hartigan, 1976; Boocock and Drozd, 1982; Scherrer, 1988; 
Makridakis, 1991). 
While environmental events are a factor in distress they are rarely the underlying 
cause. Instead it is how management reacts, or fails to react, to the change such 
events cause in the environment which is the important determinant of organisational 
success or failure (Argenti, 1976a). For example, the 1980's saw a period of easily 
available credit which CEO's believed would continue (Greatorex et al, 1994). 
When the economy went into recession, credit tightened and companies which relied 
on debt financing struggled (Greatorex et al, 1994). 
5.2.3. Change 
Houston identified obsolete products and services as an indicator of an organisation 
which is heading toward failure and asserted that " ... no company, especially a young 
one, can make a go of it without some innovative product or service" (1972, p 59). 
However, he recognised that an innovative product may soon become outdated so 
continued innovation or product renovation was required to maintain success. 
Later, Argenti (1976a) stated that failing to respond to competitive trends, political 
change, economic change, and changes in society and technology, was a defect 
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which caused failure. However, he noted that this factor was only important in the 
old, established organisations represented in the Type 3 failure trajectory (Argenti, 
1979b, 1979c ). In such companies, obvious signs of a failure to change were 
outdated machinery, poor employee relations, a. lack of computer applications, and 
the failure to use marketing techniques (Argenti, 1986b). 
Alternatively known as organisational arteriosclerosis (Makridakis, 1991 ), the failure 
to respond to environmental change as identified by Houston (1972), Argenti (1976a) 
and Makridakis (1991) is an important factor in the failure of many organisations. 
However, events causing change need not be external to an organisation. 
Robb proposed commercial life events, defined as " ... those occurrences which 
change the status quo under which an entity has operated, necessitating adaptive 
efforts by the entity to attain homoeostasis" (1986b, p 7), as important indicators of 
distress in a company. The 23 events, which are presented in Exhibit 5.3, were 
classified into three categories which incorporated internal and external change: 
• "Category A: those involving people within the entity, 
• Category B: those involving business activities, 
• Category C: those involving the economic environment" (Robb, 1986b, p 8). 
Robb found that the number of life events increased as failure approached. As the 
findings were derived from a single case their generalisability is limited. 
However, many ofRobb's life events have gained support from other research, such 
as that by Gilson (1989, 1990) into management and director turnover, and from the 
variety of environmental changes mentioned earlier. As such, life events emphasise 
the influence of change in failure. 
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Category 
Category A 
CategoryB 
Category C 
Exhibit 5.3: Robb's Life Events36 
Life Event 
1. Unexpected death of an executive 
2. Resignation of an executive 
3. Dismissal of an executive 
4. Unexpected death of a director 
5. Resignation of a director 
6. Appointment of an executive 
7. Appointment of a director 
8. Industrial dispute with employees 
9. Loss of existing agency 
10. Insolvency of supplier 
11. Company involved in litigation 
12. Insolvency of major debtor 
13. Termination of a part of entity's operations 
14. Expansion into new geographical market 
15. Expansion into new products/services 
16. Delays in commencement of new project/ 
equipment 
17. Acquisition of a subsidiary 
18. Attempted or successful takeover of 
business 
19. Change in major shareholding 
20. Change in foreign exchange rates 
21. Change in government taxes/tariffs/ duties 
22. Natural disaster affecting part of operations 
23. Entry of a major competitor 
5.2.3.1. Failure to Identify or Respond to Change 
Several reasons have been posited as to why managers do not respond to change or 
fail respond to change in an inappropriate manner. The first three have elements of 
over-optimism which has been identified as an important reason why managers do 
not respond adequately to a crisis (Abdelsamad and Kindling, 1978; Makridakis, 
1991; Small Business Reports, 1982): 
• Managers may underestimate the effect of economic events (Abdelsamad and 
Kindling, 1978). This loss of touch with the environment may be partially due to 
36 
Adapted from Robb (1986a, p 9). 
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poor management information. However, as we have seen, this is also a defect of 
management origin. 
• Managers may procrastinate, treating any problem as temporary in the hope it will 
vanish (Smith, 1963; Scherrer, 1988). For example, poor performance by a firm 
in crisis is often rationalized by managers as being caused by external factors such 
as economic recessions, competitors and the like (Starbuck, Greve, Hedburg, 
1978). 
• People are unwilling to admit a firm is in trouble (Argenti, 1977; Cohn, 1985). 
Managers are no exception. Instead of responding they may try and conceal 
problems from everybody including themselves (Argenti, 1977). 
• Managers may simply ignore the warning signals (Abdelsamad and Kindling, 
1978; Boocock and Drozd, 1982). 
• Where managers attempt to respond to a crisis they may remedy the symptoms 
and not underlying causes (Scherrer, 1988). When the problem worsens, 
management may freeze and not be able to respond (Boocock and Drozd, 1982). 
5.3. Symptoms of Distress 
The previous pages outlined the events which cause organisations to fail. However, 
there are also four categories of observable symptoms which an organisation exhibits 
in its last few months prior to failure (Argenti, 1976a). Those symptoms are creative 
accounting, financial and non-financial symptoms, and the nose dive. 
5.3.1. Creative Accounting 
Argenti asserts that "[i]f a company is failing it will be using creative accounting; if 
a company is using creative accounting it is failing" (1976c~ p 13). While the 
embodied assertion is strong, it cannot be said that every company which distorts its 
financial position through creative accounting is failing, an organisation in crisis may 
resort to adopting such practices (Argenti, 1976a; Boocock and Drozd, 1982; 
Schwartz, 1982). 
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Creative accounting may occurs for two related reasons. Firstly, it may be used as a 
means to protect the company until the problem is solved or disappears of its own 
accord (Argenti, 1980). Secondly, managers may attempt to suppress or control 
publicly available information in annual reports to favourably reflect their own 
performance (Salamon and Smith, 1979; Kluger and Shields, 1989). In some 
instances this control can amount to misrepresentation (Salamon and Smith, 1979). 
5.3.1.1. Fraud and Misrepresentation 
Fraud is often anecdotally attributed as a cause of company failure (Hartigan, 1973, 
1976; Cohn, 1991). Hartigan (1973, 1976) reports that fraudulent activities have 
involved stealing from a company or establishing a company for illegal purposes 
(Hartigan, 1973). However, recent research by Greatorex et al (1994) found that 
receivers believe fraud is not a major factor which causes failure. Rather the reverse 
is more common. Instead of causing failure, organisations may use fraudulent means 
to create profits and prosper (Seidler, Andrews and Epstein, 1977). 
The use of fraudulent means to overstate the company's fmancial position is an 
indicator of distress (Argenti, 1976a). However, fraud is only likely to be undertaken 
by the managers of a severely distressed organisation who have already used other, 
non-fraudulent means to favourably depict the organisation's performance. One such 
way is by changing accounting policies. 
5.3.1.2. Changing Accounting Policies 
The management of an organisation in crisis may changes its accounting practices 
(Starbuck, Greve and Hedburg, 1978). Research by Schwartz (1982) has found that 
distressed companies have been found to change their accounting policies more often 
than non-distressed companies. Such changes can improve the financial position and 
performance of the organisation (Schwartz, 1982), or draw attention away from a 
poor cash flow position (Robb, 1985). Examples of accounting policies changed 
during distress include inventory valuation methods (Schwartz, 1982) and the criteria 
for capitalising of expenses (Robb, 1985). Other means of creative accounting 
include revaluing assets to unrealistic levels (Argenti, 1976a), reducing expenditure 
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on maintenance and repairs, and selling assets to a third party and then leasing them 
back. 
5.3.1.3. Other Indicators of Creative Accounting 
Robb submits that: 
"It is not always clear what is 'creative accounting' given the imprecision of 
basic accounting concepts such as financial position, assets, liabilities, and 
funds from operations" (1986b, p 5). 
Furthermore, where it occurs, creative or fraudulent accounting practices are difficult 
to detect. However, there are two potential indicators of creative accounting; the 
changing of an external auditor and lateness of financial statements. 
• Change of External Auditor (Schwartz and Menon, 1985; Kluger and Shields, 
1989). A company's managers may attempt to make undisclosed changes in 
accounting methods or other means to better reflect the organisation's financial 
position (Kluger and Shields, 1989). Where the auditor disallows such changes, a 
different auditor may be appointed. 
• Lateness of financial statements (Argenti, 1976a; Lawrence, 1983; Whittred and 
Zimmer, 1984; Robb, 1986a; Keasy and Watson, 1987). Delays may be caused 
by weaknesses of a company's formal accounting system which, means more time 
is required to prepare the accounts and for client/auditor negotiation (Whittred and 
Zimmer, 1984). 
5.3.2. Financial Symptoms 
5.3.2.1. Financial Ratios 
The analytic approaches adopted by Altman (1968) and Altman et al (1977) have 
indicated that the financial position of failed and non-failed companies differs 
dramatically before failure. Therefore, the distress or failure of an organisation 
maybe detected by calculating financial ratios. This can be performed by calculating 
data from several years to detect any trend. Ratios may also be compared to industry 
average ratios. However, it must be remembered that creative accounting and 
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environmental influences such as inflation can distort the accounting information 
from which the ratios are prepared (Argenti, 1976a). 
5.3.2.2. Financial Position 
Even without calculating financial ratios, an examination of the data contained in 
annual reports could yield useful information. For example, Giroux and Wiggins 
(1984) found that: 
" ... the events most closely associated with bankruptcy are net losses, debt 
accommodation, and loan default. Indeed, almost all failed firms experienced 
combinations of these three events within 2 years prior to bankruptcy" (1984, p 
179). 
Net losses were especially prevalent with each of the 22 firms suffering a net loss 
within two years of bankruptcy. Many of these losses were the company's first. 
Giroux and Wiggins (1984) also noted that dividends were eliminated by 59 percent 
of failing firms. Such obvious indicators as net losses, and dividend elimination, can 
be detected by reading annual reports. 
5.3.3. Non-financial Symptoms 
Failing firms also display non-financial indicators of distress. These are many and 
varied and differ from case to case. For example, non-financial symptoms may 
include: poor product quality; offices in need of paint; neglected repairs; reduced 
market share; and suppliers becoming suspicious and restricting delivery (Argenti, 
1976c). While it is obvious that not all organisations which have neglected repairs 
will fail, non-financial factors should not be ignored as they provide additional 
evidence of distress. 
One recurring non-financial symptom is low employee morale (Argenti, 1976a; 
Scherrer, 1988, 1989b). Morale has been noted to be the domain of the grapevine 
(Davis, 1953b; Arnold, 1983; Esposito and Rosnow, 1983; Simmons, 1986; Mishra, 
1990; Garnett, 1992; Hull, 1994; Wells and Spinks, 1994) with employees gleaning 
information from it in times of crisis. Therefore, this interrelationship would again 
suggest the grapevine has a role in distress with employees gaining information on 
their own and the company's future from it. 
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A second common non-financial symptom is management turnover, which is more 
likely to occur in distressed firms (Gilson, 1990; Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1992). For 
instance, Gilson (1989) found that 52 percent of senior managers leave distressed 
firms in any given year compared to 19 percent for non-distressed companies. 
Furthermore, after a period of distress such as debt restructuring or bankruptcy, only 
46 percent of incumbent directors and 43 percent of CEOs remain with a company 
(Gilson, 1990). 
The managers who leave a distressed company are likely to have more prestige than 
those who replace them (D' Aveni, 1990). A reduced level of management prestige 
may in tum cause creditors to withdraw their support, thus aggravating the distressed 
position of the organisation (D'Aveni, 1990). Therefore, the departure of senior 
management or directors, particularly where such departure is sudden or unexplained 
(Robb, 1986a, 1986b), may indicate distress within an organisation. 
5.3.4. Nose Dive 
Described as the nose dive, during the last few months of an organisation the 
symptoms become more severe and difficult to hide (Argenti, 1976a). By this stage: 
" ... virtually everyone who is closely connected with the company, creditors, 
customers, employees and so on, know that something is wrong but even now 
may refuse to accept that the worst may be about to happen" (Argenti, 1976c, p 
15). 
It is the sudden deterioration which occurs in the last few months which people 
commonly associate with the failure of an organisation, not realising that the 
underlying causes of failure may occur up to ten years earlier. 
5.4. Summary 
Organisational failure originates with poor management. Poor management 
manifests itself with mistakes such as choosing an inappropriate strategy, 
overtrading, embarking on an especially ambitious project, and overleveraging the 
organisation, and is exacerbated by ineffective accounting information. However, 
even making these mistakes a company may survive until there is an unanticipated 
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change in its external environment. Again, it is how management responds to that 
change which determines an organisation's success. By this stage, the organisation 
begins to display several symptoms of distress. After a period of time, the 
company's struggle to survive becomes obvious, a rapid decline occurs to the level 
where the company is unable to continue operating or is precluded from operating by 
its creditors. 
6. Limitations 
The use of a list style approach has numerous weaknesses, not the least of which is 
the vast number of diverse factors identified as causing, contributing to, or signalling 
corporate distress. 
6.1. Diversity of Factors Identified 
As is evident from the preceding pages, there is a multitude of factors which can 
contribute to the failure of an organisation. Often factors proposed by one researcher 
are not evident in the generic list approach or the research of other company failures. 
Organisational age and size has been indicated as a reason for such differences with 
Argenti (1976a) differentiating between the failure paths of small-young (Type 1), 
large-young (Type 2) and large-old companies (Type 3). Each organisation 
displayed a different combination of list factors. 
A second reason could be differences between industries. For instance, Bruno et al 
(1987) assert that different attributes are required to be a successful Silicon Valley 
firm than other firms. The differences arise due to the difficulties of producing 
equipment in an industry characterised by a changing market and rapid technological 
advances. Bruno et al's (1987) findings included industry specific environmental 
factors, undercapitalization, debt problems and an ineffective team, which were also 
mentioned by Argenti (1976a) and various other researchers. However, Bruno et al 
(1987) reported that cultural/social factors, personal problems, one-track thinking, 
problem with the venture capital relationship and over-reliance on one customer were 
also reasons for failure. These reasons are not apparent in other research. 
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Both Argenti's (1976a) and Bruno et al's (1987) research indicates that failing 
company's may exhibit different characteristics. The list method only identifies the 
common elements in the majority of failures. Argenti acknowledged that a list 
approach has this limitation, stating that " ... many [companies} will fail without even 
displaying any of the signs at all and never having moved down any of the three 
trajectories" (1976a, p 168). 
As factors presented earlier are only those commonly mentioned in a wide variety of 
studies, the case of an individual company may display numerous reasons for failure 
which have not been mentioned. 
6.2. Disagreement over Factors 
Researchers also disagree as to whether some factors do contribute to failure. 
Disputed factors include: 
• Product and manufacturing problems (McKinlay, 1979); 
• Inability to attain financing (McKinlay, 1979); 
• Fraud (McKinlay, 1979; Greatorex et al, 1994); 
• Bad luck (Greatorex et al, 1994); and 
• Failure to move with the times (Greatorex et al, 1994). 
The above factors have been proposed as contributing to failure by authors other than 
those referred to above, (the listed authors state that these factors did not contribute 
to failure). Again, the differences may be due to differences in individual cases. 
However, they may also be attributable to confusion as to which factors cause failure, 
as opposed to those that apparently cause failure. This is illustrated by Landesburg 
and Edmunds (1983) who attribute 95.6 percent of failures to managerial 
shortcomings. In the same cases the apparent causes of failure were inadequate sales 
41.3 percent and heavy operating expenses 46.9 percent (Landesburg and Edmunds, 
1983). 
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6.3. Research Methods 
Discrepancies may also be attributable to differences in the research method used to 
determine the factors. Argenti's (1976a) work has been criticised for its lack of 
empirical evidence, as he used predominantly anecdotal evidence as the basis for his 
assertions (Keasy and Watson, 1987). However, research by Miller (1977) and 
others has provided empirical evidence which supports Argenti's assertions. 
Furthermore, parts of Argenti's (1976a) list have been applied and found to be 
evident in other failed companies (Robertson, 1984). 
This chapter has included the common elements from list style research and other 
factors which can potentially be observed in a failing company. Consequently, no 
distinction was made between empirically derived research, such as that of Gilson 
(1989, 1990) and Hambrick and D' Aveni (1992), anecdotal evidence (Argenti, 
1976a), and qualitative research (Starbuck, Hedburg and Greve, 1978). Often the 
sources relied on nothing more than their own observations and experiences when 
identifying factors which cause distress (Hartigan, 1973, 1976; Williams, 1984) or 
the analysis of a single case (Lawson, 1982; Lee, 1982; Robertson, 1984; Robb, 
1985, 1986a). However, while a variety of sources have been used, only the 
common elements identified from all of the various research styles have been 
presented. The resulting overview indicates that there are many common factors 
mentioned, regardless of the rigorousness, or lack thereof, of the research method. 
6.4. Observation 
The list approach relies on the ability to observe the factors. In many instances 
observation is difficult. For instance, the defects which lead to failure, such as 
management and accounting inadequacies, are internal to an organisation, making 
observation by an external observer difficult (Robb, 1986b). However, such a 
problem may be potentially negated by an insider within a company, such as an 
employee. 
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6.5. Judgement 
Lastly, the list method is judgemental and relies on a skilled, experienced person, 
such as a banker, analyst, consultant or professional non-executive director, to 
interpret the situation (Argenti, 1977). Despite any levels of experience and skill, the 
approach is difficult to use for three reasons: 
• Firstly, the importance of list factors relative to one another is unknown. For 
instance is overtraqing more important than an unbalanced board or poor financial 
information? 
• Secondly, where a factor is observed, a subjective judgement has to be made as to 
its severity (Robertson, 1984). Without a reference point to compare the factors, 
such judgement is difficult to make. 
• Thirdly, there is no indication of how many factors are required before an 
organisation must eventually fail (Sharma and Mahajan, 1980). 
Argenti (1977, 1984) realised such difficulties and consequently assigned weightings 
to his list to form the A-Score.37 The weightings were skewed so that early factors 
were rated more highly than later factors. Through such an approach Argenti (1976a) 
indicated that the observation of defects and mistakes, which cause failure, was 
important for the early detection of distress. Moreover, the severity of each factor 
could be varied within the range based on the perceived severity in that situation. 
For example, using the 1977 version of the A-Score: 
"If one [company] scores as much as -1.0 you should be worried. If one scores 
-3.0 I would guess that means that only a major operation will save the 
company" (Argenti, 1977, p 50). 
This quote again indicates the weakness of the approach; even after applying the 
weightings, it substantially relies on guess-work and subjective judgement. 
Other than Argenti (1976a), few have attempted to delineate an individual factor's 
contribution to failure. Bruno and Leidecker (1988) classified reasons for failure as 
37 
Argenti's (1977) A-Score list was presented on p 59 of this thesis. 
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either major or minor. Greatorex et al (1994) asked respondents to indicate the 
extent to which the factors contributed to failure. However, only a three point scale 
was used. Furthermore, while Greatorex et al's (1994) findings tend to support 
Argenti's (1977) weightings they did not determine any process of failure. 
Therefore, the authors did not indicate whether there are differences in the 
importance of factors in the process in relation to one another; neither did they 
indicate whether the importance of the factors varies over time. Other researchers 
tend to ignore the problem and instead refer to any factors identified as absolutes, 
which provides no indication at all as to the relative importance of the factors. 
7. Conclusion 
The list approach to distress attempts to determine which factors cause, contribute 
and are symptoms of distress. Prior research indicates that companies primarily fail 
due to poor management. It is management's role to respond to internal and external 
factors which affect a company. 
There are a variety of general economic and specific industry events which affect an 
organisation. Such factors include government restrictions, technological advances, 
increased competition, and economic recessions. In the face of such events 
management often make internal errors such as adopting an inappropriate strategy, 
overtrading or launching a big project. This is potentially fatal to an organisation 
which is in a poor financial position due to mismanagement. In the years just prior to 
failure, distress can be observed through the deterioration of financial ratios, and 
non-financial symptoms such as poor morale, and production problems. 
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1. Introduction 
The dual objectives of this thesis are to ascertain the extent to which employees can 
detect distress prior to a company's failure, arid whether their observations are 
influenced by information from informal sources. While these objectives involve 
establishing whether employees believed Fortex was distressed prior to its collapse, 
the examination will extend further as employees may have obtained informal 
information relating to events that they did not identify as contributing to the collapse 
but which have been identified as important factors in corporate distress research. 
Hence, examining the objectives involves three processes, which are: 
• Investigating whether former Fortex employees believed the company was going 
to collapse before it was placed into receivership. 
• Ascertaining the employees' pre-collapse opinions, observations and concerns and 
comparing them to factors that are reported as causing, or indicating, distress in a 
company. 
• Establishing which whether the former F ortex employees used information from 
the IAISs and the grapevine to form their opinions, observations, and concerns 
regarding the company's operations. 
The research was conducted as a case study, and predominantly utilised evidence 
gained from semi-structured interviews. 
This chapter presents and discusses the reasons why a case study was the appropriate 
technique for the research undertaken in this thesis. Contained within it is an 
overview of the purported advantages and disadvantages associated with using both a 
case study and interviews, and an outline of the means used to minimise the possible 
effect the method's limitations. This chapter also documents the site and interviewee 
sample selection processes. 
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2. The Case Study Method 
Case studies have been described as a naturalistic approach to research as they 
involve the observation of phenomena in their natural setting (Abdel-khalik and 
Ajinka, 1979). After the phenomena are observed, theories are derived to explain the 
analysis ofthe data (Abdel-khalik and Ajinka, 1979). In this respect, the case study 
method is different from 'traditional scientific research' which " ... is characterized 
by systematic manipulation and collection of data, control over extraneous variables, 
and hypothesis testing" (Abdel-khalik and Ajinka, 1979, p 29). Due to this 
difference the case-study method has been criticised, and until recently, been rejected 
as a non-scientific or a poorer research method (Yin, 1989; Bailey, 1992). However, 
many of these criticisms are unjustified as case studies have numerous benefits and 
are an appropriate research method in certain situations. 
A case study is defined by Yin (1989, p 23) as: 
" ... an empirical enquiry that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real life context; when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used " 
This definition encompasses two important strengths of case study research; its use 
of a variety of data collection methods and the examination of the phenomena in their 
natural context. However, it fails to identify that case-studies are particularly useful 
in exploratory research where the objective is to generate hypotheses and theories, 
and add to a field's knowledge (Mitchell, 1983; Emory and Cooper, 1991). Hence, 
case studies have several strengths, but like any research method, they also have 
inherent weaknesses which make them more appropriate in some situations than in 
others. The following section outlines these strengths and then presents an analysis 
of why those features made a case study the ideal method for the present research. 
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3. Strengths 
3.1. Full Contextual Analysis 
By examining phenomena in their natural environinent (Yin, 1989; Bimberg, Shields 
and Young, 1990; Merriam, 1990), case studies provide a level of detail or richness 
beyond that which can be obtained from laboratory (Kaplan, 1986) or survey 
research (Hagg and Hedlund, 1979). This detail allows the researcher to obtain an 
overview of the complexity of the situation from which the phenomena arose (Hagg 
and Hedlund, 1979; Otley and Berry, 1994). 
Without this contextual approach, any understanding of the causes, and meanings, of 
a phenomenon is limited as the researcher is restricted to looking for predetermined 
traits or variables. In so doing, they may disregard other factors which may have 
contributed to, or caused, the phenomenon (Hagg and Hedlund, 1979; Merriam, 
1990). 
3.2. Examination of Social Phenomena 
A contextual analysis is particularly beneficial where the research examines a social 
phenomenon. In these instances the traditional scientific approach, which utilises 
such tools as experiments and surveys, is inappropriate because it: 
" ... does not pin down in an exact way the nature of the analytical elements in 
the empirical social world nor does it ferret out in an exacting manner the 
relation between these analytic elements" (Blumer, 1978, p 41). 
Therefore, traditional research does not provide the researcher with any 
understanding of the social interrelationships which form an important component of 
many phenomena. 
3.3. Hypothesis Generation 
Full contextual analysis of a case allows is provides fertile ground for generating 
insights which other methods, such as survey and experiments, would not provide 
(Morgan, 1983). For instance, a case may generate hypotheses by making formerly 
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obscure theoretical connections apparent (Mitchell, 1983)?8 Merriam asserts that 
"[t]hese insights can be construed as tentative hypotheses that help structure future 
research; hence, case study plays an important role in advancing afield's knowledge 
base" (1990, p 32). Therefore, case studies can be used as a basis to generate 
hypotheses and build theories (Hagg and Hedlund, 1979; Morgan, 1983; Reid, 1987; 
Emory and Cooper, 1991; Bailey, 1992; Ferreira and Merchant, 1992). As a result 
they are a useful exploratory tool in a field where there is little prior research (Yin, 
1989). 
3.4. Researcher Benefits 
Because case studies allow the researcher to examme an event within the 
environment which it occurred, the researcher derives some benefits: 
• Firstly, they can directly observe the data themselves through interviews and 
examination of documented evidence (Merriam, 1990). Therefore, the researcher 
is forming a view from the actual situation and evidence, not an abstracted or 
artificial situation as in an experiment, or evidence out of context, such as in a 
survey. 
• Secondly, the researcher has the ability to adapt to situations encountered (Yin, 
1984). The researcher can therefore " ... respond to a situation by maximising 
opportunities for collecting and producing meaningful information" (Merriam, 
1990, p 37). Consequently, any areas of interest which arise can be examined 
further, and the researcher can even change the focus of the study when 
unexpected factors or phenomena are revealed. 
• Thirdly and lastly, through personal communication and contact, a rapport can be 
established with the subject or subjects which may allow the researcher access to 
38 
Such a case is provided by Beveridge (1953) who relates how a chance observation of flies congregating around urine 
passed by a dog without a pancreas, led to the discovery of the connection between the pancreas and diabetes. However, 
such a connection was only possible because the observer was able to perceive the contradiction in the material which did 
not explain why the flies congregated (Mitchell, I 983). 
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sensitive knowledge that other methods such as surveys or experiments do not 
gather (McKinnon, 1988). 
Therefore, in an exploratory field where unexpected factors and phenomena may 
arise, and which also depends on personal contact to establish people's views and 
opinions, the benefits the case study method provides to the researcher would 
indicate that a case study is appropriate. 
3.5. Variety of Data Collection Methods 
Unlike many other research methods, in case research, data can be collected in a 
variety of ways (Bonoma, 1985; Kaplan, 1986; Yin, 1989). The different types of 
data collection methods include: 
1. Documentation 
2. Archival Records 
3. Interviews 
4. Direct Observation 
5. Physical Artifacts 
6. Participant observation (Yin, 1989; Emory and Cooper, 1991). 
The use of multiple sources " ... permit[s] the verification of evidence and avoidance 
of missing data" (Emory and Cooper, 1991, p 143), thereby assuring an accurate 
representation of the full context in which events occur. 
3.6. Internal Validity 
Multiple methods and an analysis of a phenomenon within its natural context allows 
the identification of many, if not all, of the factors which affect the phenomena being 
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studied (Yin, 1989; Merriam, 1990). Hence, case studies normally have high internal 
validity.39 
3.7. Other Benefits 
3. 7.1. Longitudinal Study 
Case studies may be conducted longitudinally (Emory and Cooper, 1991). Unlike 
other research methods, a single case used in such a way can examine events over a 
period of time. Longitudinal case studies are particularly useful for identifying 
variables which contributed to a phenomenon in the past, but which may not exist at 
the single point in time in which an alternative method, such as a survey, takes place. 
3. 7.2. Subject Participation 
Lastly, and importantly, the subject of a case study is likely to receive the benefits 
that accrue from the research, therefore giving them an incentive to participate 
(Birnberg et al, 1990). However, this is their only incentive to cooperate. A case 
study will only be successful if the participants perceive that the benefits are enough 
to warrant their time and effort (Birnberg et al, 1990). 
4. Applicability of the Case Study Method 
A case study's strengths are apparent in certain areas: 
• Firstly, they are appropriate where a full contextual analysis and a volume of 
detailed information is required. 
• Secondly, they are especially useful where the subject examined is a social 
phenomena or requires analysis in a social context. 
39 
Abdel-khalik and Ajinka define internal validity as the " ... measure of the extent to which variation in the dependent 
variable can be really allributed to (or said to be caused by) variations in the independent variable included in the study 
- that is, how valid is the inference that causality exists" (1979, p 33). 
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• Thirdly, they can be used to derive hypotheses and theories in areas of scant 
previous research. 
• Lastly, they provide the researcher with three distinct benefits and a variety of 
data collection methods which ensure an · accurate representation of the 
phenomena being studied and high internal validity. 
The requirement for these strengths is apparent when an analysis of the present 
research is undertaken. 
The majority of previous research into the grapevine (Davis, 1953a, 1953b; Walton, 
1961) andiAISs (Myers, 1970; Hopwood, 1973, 1974; Lal and Donaldson, 1988) has 
been conducted as single or multiple case studies. Moreover, the qualitative 
corporate distress approach adopted in this thesis had also predominantly used case 
study or field study research to discern factors which cause collapse. Furthermore, 
the research objectives examined in this research were developed from a pilot study 
where a potential interrelationship between employees detection of distress and 
informal information was revealed. The successful use of the case study method in 
previous research into the individual aspects researched in this study, and in the pilot 
study, provided an initial indication that the case study research method would be 
applicable to the research to be undertaken in the present study. 
The author has been unable to find any research which examined the IAIS, the 
grapevine or employees' observations, in a distress context. Chapter 2 reported that 
Argenti (1976a), Altman (1983) and McBarnet et al (1993) had each provided 
examples of events which employees may observe. Implicit within Argenti's claims 
was that employees' observations were restricted to the non-financial symptoms of 
distress. However, McBarnet et al (1993) reported that employees may detect 
creative accounting. Creative accounting is a symptom of distress. However, it is 
not a non-financial symptom. 
The lack of any prior research establishing the events which employees may observe 
in a distressed company, and the anomaly between Argenti's claims and McBarnet et 
al' s findings, means that this research could not be restricted to focus on a specific 
96 EMPLOYEES' OBSERVATIONS, INFORMAL INFORMATION AND CORPORATE DISTRESS 
part of the failure process. For example, by focusing on non-financial symptoms, the 
research may have failed to identify where employees observe and recognise other 
issues such as Argenti's (1976a) mistakes and defects. Moreover, as employees' 
observations and ability to assess distress in an organisation were previously 
unresearched, the secondary objectives of assessing whether employees observations 
are influenced by information from an IAIS and/or the grapevine was devoid of any 
previous research. 
Without previous research in the specific areas of study, and because the IAIS and 
the grapevine lacked a comprehensive body of knowledge, the research undertaken in 
this study was exploratory in nature. Case studies are ideal for exploratory research 
(Yin, 1989) and provide a basis to generate hypotheses and theoretical connections 
(Mitchell, 1983). Furthermore, adopting a case study allows the researcher flexibility 
to adapt to any situations encountered (Yin, 1989; Merriam, 1990). This was 
perceived as an especially beneficial aspect because the previous literature was both 
scant and anomalous, thereby increasing the possibility of unexpected factors or 
phenomena arising. 
A case study was also considered appropriate because the research conducted in this 
thesis is an examination of a social phenomena. . Grapevine communication is a 
function of personal and social relationships (Davis, 1954). Furthermore, the 
research examines employees' observations and opinions which are influenced by 
other employees and the company's environment. 
The analysis of a collapse also relies of the context in which the company operates 
and derives meaning from the surrounding environment. Therefore, this study 
required the examination of the research questions in a way by which the natural 
social context of the phenomena could be assessed. Even though Fortex no longer 
existed, a case study using interviews allowed the interviewer to enquire about the 
circumstances which surrounded their observations~ Hence, the interviewees' 
responses included a contextual component which could not have been provided by 
an alternative method such as a survey. Without this contextual analysis, the 
conclusions could fail to depict the true situation, and vital information and 
interrelationships may be omitted (Hagg and Hedlund, 1979; McKinnon, 1988). 
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4.1. Other Research Alternatives 
4.1.1. Experiment 
Because the research sought to examine a single example of a social phenomena 
which had ceased to exist, an experiment was not considered as an appropriate 
alternative. 
4.1.2. Survey 
The exploratory nature of the present research, and the inability to focus on one 
specific part of the distress process, precluded the adoption of a survey as an 
appropriate research tool. To assure all the employees' concerns and observations of 
factors in distress were covered, a questionnaire would have had to cover the 
multitude of potential factors proposed in the qualitative distress research. Due to 
this requirement a questionnaire approach was considered infeasible for three 
reasons: 
• Firstly, a survey would be inordinately long to cover even the majority of the 
events which the employees' may potentially have observed. 
• Secondly, while the failure of an organisation has many common elements, each 
organisation has differences which vary according to the context in which it 
operates and which may not be accounted for in previous research. Hence, in 
Fortex's failure employees may have recognised problems not contained within 
the questionnaire. 
• Thirdly, an employee is most unlikely to be familiar with many of the technical 
terms used in distress research. Therefore, an employee may be unaware that his 
or her observation coincided with one of the factors listed in the questionnaire. 
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One potential alternative would have been to utilise the reasons for failure proffered 
by external parties, such as the media, to form part of a survey. 40 This alternative 
would have avoided the problems detailed in point one above. However, this 
approach would not counteract any unfamiliarity with distress terms and could 
potentially exacerbate the second weakness, as the employees, from their inside 
position, may have observed markedly different events or problems which external 
parties, such as the media, had not. 
The research undertaken in this study was also exploratory. A case study is best 
suited to exploratory research because it analyses phenomena in context and could 
potentially identify other variables, which due to its restrictive nature, a survey could 
not assess. 
5. Weaknesses 
Having established that a case study was an appropriate research method, 
consideration was accorded to the criticism the method has received. For example, 
the research was not devoted to aimless exploration and hypothesis generation, but 
also sought to examine whether the case provided supporting evidence for the 
interrelationships derived from earlier studies. However, hypothesis testing is one of 
many areas for which a substantial number of researchers assert that the case study is 
inappropriate. The criticism even extends to internal validity which is a purported 
strength of the case study method. 
Yin (1989) lists construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability 
as characteristics good research must exhibit. Case studies have received criticism in 
each of these four areas. The following section outlines and examines the 
justification of these purported weaknesses. Included are the measures undertaken to 
reduce the possible effects of the weaknesses which are relevant to this research. 
40 
These opinions are covered in detail in Chapter 7, Fortex's Story, p 115. 
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5.1. Construct Validity 
Construct validity involves "establishing correct operational measures for the 
concepts being studied" (Yin, 1989, p 40). Case studies have been criticised for 
failing to meet this criteria because, in many situations, measures for the focus of a 
case study are not developed. Instead researchers rely on their own subjective 
judgements to collect data (Yin, 1989). 
To ensure construct :validity the researcher should: 
"(1) Select the specific types of changes that are to be studied (in relation to 
the original objectives of the study), and 
(2) Demonstrate that the selected measures of these changes do not indeed 
reflect the specific types of changes that have been selected" (Yin, 1989, p 42). 
The objectives of this research, employees' observations and concerns in a distressed 
company, whether observations are influenced by informal information, the method 
of assessment of the phenomena, and a comparison of observation with factors 
proposed in qualitative corporate distress research, have been explicitly stated. 
However, there are also three more possible options to increase construct validity. 
These are: 
• using multiple sources of evidence; 
• establishing a chain of evidence; and 
• having a draft of the case study reviewed by key informants (Yin, 1989). 
The author endeavoured to use documented and archival records as evidence to 
complement information from interviews, and utilised a key informant, Union 
Secretary Mr Peter Binnie, to examine the interpretation of events. This should 
provide increased, but not assured, construct validity. 
Tl1f UBRI'"" ali'IIVERSil~ OF CANTE~lBIJR't' 
CHR1STCHURCH. N.Z. 
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5.2. Internal Validity 
Internal validity, as defined earlier,41 involves establishing whether the independent 
variable(s) cause the dependent variable to occur, and is purported to be a strength of 
case studies. However, critics have questioned this claini and have indicated five 
weaknesses which impinge on any case study's internal validity (Lee, 1989). These 
areas are: 
a) causality and control; 
b) observer bias; 
c) observation caused effects; 
d) data access limitations; and 
e) respondent biases (Merriam, 1990). 
5.2.1. Control Over Variables and Causality 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to control the variables in case studies (Abdel-khalik 
and Ajinka, 1979; Kaplan, 1986; Kerlinger, 1986; Lee, 1989; Birnberg et al, 1990; 
Otley and Berry, 1994). Therefore, cause and effect are nearly impossible to 
establish (Lee, 1989; Bailey, 1992). Hence, the researcher may not be able to 
distinguish between the effect of the independent variables studied and other 
variables in the environment. As this study is retrospective in approach, this problem 
is accentuated because internal validity is also threatened when the researcher infers 
that an event resulted from some earlier unobserved occurrence (Yin, 1989). 
While it is undeniable that there is a low level of control over variables in case study 
research, there are some tactics, similar to those used to increase construct validity, 
available to the researcher to combat such a problem. The researcher can use 
multiple sources of evidence, increase the amount of time spent on the case site, and 
41 
The definition is presented in footnote 39, p 94 of this thesis. 
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observe the social behaviour in the setting (McKinnon, 1988). As outlined earlier, 
the author endeavoured to use multiple sources of evidence. The other two methods 
are impractical because the entity no longer exists. 
5.2.1.1. Hypothesis Testing 
Due to the difficulty of controlling variables, case studies have traditionally been 
viewed as appropriate only for hypothesis generation, not hypothesis testing (Hagg 
and Hedlund, 1979; . Kaplan, 1986). However, case studies can be used to test 
hypotheses (Katz, 1953; Reid, 1987; Sykes, 1990; Ferreira and Merchant, 1992). For 
example, under Popper's (1962) view of scientific progress, where one contrary 
observation can refute a theory, case studies provide an ideal means for hypothesis 
testing. Hence, case studies can test hypotheses and lead to the progression of 
scientific knowledge. They are not restricted to being a device for hypothesis 
generation. 
5.2.2. Observer/Researcher Bias 
In a case study, the researcher is the primary instrument for gathering and analysing 
data (Merriam, 1990). As such the research itself is open to human fallibilities, with 
the researcher potentially making mistakes, missing opportunities and introducing 
personal biases into the research (Merriam, 1990). Of these three human 
weaknesses, researcher bias is often viewed as a case study's greatest pitfall (Bailey, 
1992). 
Researcher bias primarily results from the researcher's preconceived notions or 
expectations (Bailey, 1992). As researchers have different backgrounds, training and 
experience of the phenomena under investigation, they " ... come complete with a 
unique set of biases which mean that the way in which an event is seen, interpreted 
and recorded may differ from one observer to another" (McKinnon, 1988, p 38). 
These personal biases can be introduced into the research through interviews, 
conversations, the analysis of documentation, and field notes made immediately after 
an event has occurred (McKinnon, 1988). Interpretations made from biased data 
yield incorrect conclusions. 
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Unfortunately researcher bias cannot be avoided (McKinnon, 1988). Instead, a 
researcher must try to step away from preconceived notions (Bailey, 1992), and take 
measures to protect against them as much as possible. One such way is to discuss 
research design and interpretation with colleagues (Bailey, 1992). The research 
design was discussed with the author's supervisor. Furthermore, to avoid the biases 
introduced in field notes, all the interviews conducted were audio-taped and fully 
transcribed. The transcriptions were used as the basis for the results. 
5.2.3. Observation Caused Effects 
Researcher observation can affect the phenomena being studied by causing 
participants to change their behaviour (Birnberg et al, 1990). If this occurs, the 
researcher will not be observing the phenomena in their natural setting (Simon and 
Burnstein, 1985). Hence, the validity of the conclusions drawn would be suspect. 
Such a problem was noted as the Hawthorne effect.42 No direct observation will be 
undertaken in the present study. However, even interviews, which are the primary 
means used in this research tq gather information, can introduce observation effects 
which alter the natural environment. 43 
5.2.4. Data Access Limitations 
Data access limitations occur in two ways. Firstly, the researcher is only on the site 
for a limited time and cannot see earlier or later events (McKinnon, 1988). 
Therefore, the researcher has no way of establishing whether the observed events 
were typical. Secondly, the researcher's hosts may limit access to documents, 
events, people and places to the extent that the researcher is studying less than the 
complete phenomena (McKinnon, 1988). 
Data access limitations could be a particular problem for this thesis when the 
researcher attempts to gain a variety of evidence, much of which may no longer exist 
42 
An account of the Hawthorne studies is contained within Roethlisberger and Dickson's (1939) Management and the 
Worker. 
43 
This problem is covered in the Interview Bias section, p 108 ofthis thesis. 
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since the company itself no longer exists. Moreover, with the continuing court case 
concerning alleged fraudulent activities by CEO, Graeme Thompson, and financial 
controller, Michael Mullen, the employees may be reluctant to provide information. 
The potential lack of a variety of evidence will be somewhat negated with evidence 
gained from interviews being verified by reference to other interviews. 
5.2.5. Respondent Biases 
In many cases the actors may be hesitant or not reveal truthfully what actually occurs 
in the organisation (Beed and Stimson, 1985). Therefore, any information gained 
could be inaccurate, making the findings incorrect and lowering the internal validity 
of the research. 
While hesitancy may be difficult to avoid in a typical situation when comments may 
lead to recriminations from the employer or entity involved, in this situation the 
company has failed, so the employees should have the ability to speak openly and 
freely. The second problem, that of revealing the truth, will be somewhat negated 
with: 
a) the use of multiple sources of evidence; 
b) conducting enough interviews so that discrepancies between interviewees' 
responses can be identified; and 
c) the use of follow up interviews. 
However, some risk of respondent error will remain. 
5.3. External Validity/Generalisability 
External validity is the extent to which findings of one study are generalisable to 
other situations (Abdel-khalik and Ajinka, 1979; Yin, 1989; Merriam, 1990). Critics 
of the method argue that because of the uniqueness of a single case study, any 
attempt to generalise is invalid (Hagg and Hedlund, 1979; Lee, 1989; Birnberg et al, 
1990; Flagg, Hale and Glover, 1992; Spicer, 1992; Otley and Berry, 1994). 
However, these authors are referring to statistical generalisation, which is 
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inappropriate when applied to case studies which do not use random sample selection 
but instead select and study a specific phenomena for interest and the generation of 
new ideas (Yin, 1989; Merriam, 1990). 
Instead, due to the large contextual component of the· research, case studies are 
analytically or theoretically generalisable (Mitchell, 1983; Yin, 1989; Scapens, 
1990). Therefore, the validity of extrapolating a case study to a population depends 
on the theoretical reasoning underlying the work, not on whether the example is 
representative of that population. Furthermore, as well as being generalisable to a 
theory, cases can be generalised to a class of organisations which have the same 
characteristics (Ferreira and Merchant, 1992). 
The generalisability of a case can be improved by providing an in depth description 
ofthe context from which the case arose (Guba and Lincoln, 1981). This description 
can then be considered by those seeking to transfer the findings to their own settings. 
The researcher has endeavoured to provide this description in the following chapter; 
Chapter 7: Fortex's Story. Through such a description of the context, other 
researchers can determine if the findings are applicable to their own situations 
(Kennedy, 1979). 
5.4. Reliability 
Reliability involves " ... demonstrating that the operations of a study - such as the 
data collection procedures - can be repeated with the same results" (Yin, 1989, p 
41). Without reliability research cannot be regarded as objective (Lee, 1989), and 
can therefore not be used to derive knowledge about stable laws or theories 
(Merriam, 1990). 
Critics posit that a single case study is likely to be unique with the same set of events 
unlikely to occur again in the same manner, thereby making it virtually impossible 
for independent researchers to verify the findings of a case (Lee, 1989; Bailey, 1992). 
However, the objective of reliability is that if the study was re-performed by another 
researcher, who follows exactly the same procedures used in the earlier research, that 
the second researcher should arrive at same conclusions (Griggs, 1987; Yin, 1989). 
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Consistent with Yin's (1989) and Sykes' (1990) recommendations reliability has 
been increased through the documentation of the procedures used in the case study so 
that others can follow exactly the same method. 
5.5. Other Possible Weaknesses 
5.5.1. Defining the Boundaries of a Case 
Case researchers have to face the problem of defining how much of the context to 
analyse and examine when they are investigating phenomena (Scapens, 1990). One 
approach is to explicitly limit the area of the study and leave the work to be extended 
by other researchers. However, the researcher risks missing variables and 
interrelations by limiting their research in this way. A second approach is ((... to 
attempt to study everything, but in a more superficial way" (Scapens, 1990, p 277). 
A researcher who adopts this approach may not be able to identify which variables 
have the largest effect of the phenomena being researched. Being exploratory, this 
thesis adopted the first approach, and sought only to examine two variables which 
could influence an employee's observations in distress. The risk of missing other 
variables which contributed to the employees' perception is acknowledged and is a 
potential limitation of the research. The examination of other variables will be left to 
later researchers. 
5. 5.2. Over-simplification 
Case studies have also been criticised for over-simplifying or exaggerating a situation 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1981). For example, a researcher, when analysing a complex 
situation within its context, will risk mis-attributing, or under or over-emphasizing 
variables. Similarly, when the report is written, coverage of each individual 
observation may be impossible through time and page restrictions. However, these 
restrictions are faced by most, if not all, research of complex social phenomena. For 
instance, surveys and experiments may fail to identify or mis-attribute variables' 
relations to each other or over-simplify the interrelations of social phenomena. 
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At the very least, case studies have the advantage that they initially examine the 
context from which a clearer depiction of the complexity of a situation may be 
gained. From this the researcher may choose to simplify the account into what they 
perceive to be the important issues. Other research methods, by not examining the 
context, simplify a situation from the outset. Therefore, any criticism of case studies 
because they can simplify or over-emphasise events is unwarranted because other 
research methods also have the same associated risks. 
5.6. Summary 
A case study was selected as the appropriate method to be used in this research for 
several reasons. Firstly, lacking prior research in the area, the study was exploratory 
in nature and attempted to generate and examine hypotheses. Secondly, in 
exploratory research, unexpected situations and variables may arise. A case study 
allows the researcher the flexibility to adapt to any problems encountered or new 
issues which arise. Thirdly, employees perceptions, views and opinions are formed 
through social interaction. Furthermore, the grapevine's functioning is solely based 
upon personal communication governed by social relationships, and analysing the 
failure of a company requires an understanding of the internal and internal 
environment which contributed to its demise. Hence, the research required 
examining the phenomena in their natural social context, an approach the case study 
method allows. 
The limitations of the method were reduced through the use of multiple sources of 
evidence, follow-up interviews, documenting the procedures and research method, 
and providing a detailed description of the context. However, as with all research 
methods, some risk of researcher bias will remain. 
6. Site Selection 
The subject of a case study subject should be carefully selected. It would be 
pointless and potentially fruitless to choose a company at random in the hope of 
examining a particular phenomena which might not exist in that entity. Therefore, 
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case subjects are chosen because they are anomalies, or are sites in which the 
researcher expects to find the phenomena (Merriam, 1990). 
At an earlier date, a pilot study was performed using employees from Fortex's 
Seafield plant in Ashburton. It revealed that employees were aware of the company's 
troubled position prior to its failure. This thesis sought to re-examine and extend this 
earlier work, and clarify inconsistencies in the scant previous research. Therefore, 
employees from the same site, were chosen as the focus of this research. 
The participants in the pilot study indicated a willingness to cooperate in any future 
research. Despite this indication, and consistent with Yin's (1989) belief that prior 
contact makes site access easier, the researcher sought to verify that Fortex's former 
employees remained willing to participate in further research. Mr Peter Binnie, the 
former union secretary at the Seafield plant, who had acted as an intermediary and a 
contact by organising and taking part in the earlier interviews, was reached with a 
telephone call June 5, 1995. During this call the researcher provided details of the 
study, including its objectives, the potential number of interviewees required 
(approximately 15), and the duration of the interviews, 30 minutes. Mr Binnie 
confirmed that he and other former employees were willing to participate. 
7. Data Collection 
Where possible, data was collected through the use of multiple methods. For 
example, archival records of the IAIS were obtained. However, because informal 
grapevine communication is largely undocumented, the majority of data was 
collected through semi-structured interviews. 
7.1. Interviews 
In exploratory research Emory and Cooper assert that the researcher is: 
"[t]ypically ... less interested in getting a representative cross-section view 
than in getting information from those sources that might provide special 
insights" (1991,p 146). 
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Interviews provide a depth of information that may reveal these special insights 
(Emory and Cooper, 1991), particularly as respondents may be more willing to 
participate in interviews than surveys (Emory and Cooper, 1991). 
Of the three common interview formats, structured, unstructured and semi-structured, 
the semi-structured interview was selected for this research. This style allows the 
interviewer to have a list of predetermined topics to ask questions about, but offers 
the researcher the flexibility to adapt questions to the situations encountered 
(Merriam, 1990). The flexibility and extra control interviews means the interviewer 
can change questions to improve the quality of information received. For example, if 
an interviewer observes that the question is too complex for the respondent, they may 
rephrase it using simpler terms (Emory and Cooper, 1991). 
The benefits associated with this method were also noted by Lal and Donaldson 
(1988) who utilised semi-sturctured interviews in their research into IAISs. They 
selected this approach because it " ... allow[ed] the interviewee freedom to respond as 
fully as possible without the constraint of prearranged questions, thus providing 
more in-depth information" (p 87). However, while interviews, particularly semi-
structured interviews, have advantages and are appropriate in a situation where the 
research is exploratory, they also have numerous limitations which must be carefully 
guarded against. These limitations can be generally categorised as bias, most of 
which is a side effect of the personal nature of interviews, especially the control and 
influence an interviewer can have over a respondent. 
7.1.1. Interview Bias 
Emory and Cooper (1991) list sampling error, non-response error and response error 
as the three ways bias can be introduced into interviews. Non-response bias was 
irrelevant to this research as all the interviewees contacted by courtesy of Mr Binnie 
agreed to be interviewed. Sampling error is only relevant for statistical 
generalisability. Hence, the primary concern for the research was response bias 
which "... occurs when the data reported differs from the actual data" (Emory and 
Cooper, 1991, p 328). Response error can be introduced in two ways, interviewer 
error and respondent bias. 
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7.1.1.1. Interviewer Error 
Emory and Cooper assert that " ... there are many points where the interviewer's 
control of the process can affect the quality of the data" (1991, p 328). For example, 
the interviewer can make mistakes questioning the respondent and recording 
interview data, or at the extreme, even falsify records and data (Emory and Cooper, 
1991). These examples are obvious areas where error occurs. However, error can be 
introduced through unconscious as well as conscious means. 
Error can be introduced where the interviewer makes inappropriate suggestions, 
emphasises specific words, uses differing tones of voice, and rephrases questions 
(Emory and Cooper, 1991 ). Through such means, the interviewer may consciously 
or subconsciously be biasing the questions, thereby altering the replies respondents 
give to a question. For instance, a positive affirmation such as saying "yes" to a 
reply may indicate to an interviewee that response was of the type the interviewer 
wants. Consequently, the interviewee may change their subsequent responses to 
what they perceive the interviewer requires. 
The interviewer can also influence interview respondents through non-verbal means. 
For example, an older interviewer may be seen as authority figure by younger people. 
These young people may modify responses in attempt to please their elder (Emory 
and Cooper, 1991). The perceived social distance between the interviewer and 
interviewees is also purported to have some influence on responses (Emory and 
Cooper, 1991). Similarly, educational levels could have some impact on their 
perception by interviewees. For instance, where respondents are less well educated 
than the interviewer, they may defer to him or her and/or alter their responses. 
Interviewer error will invariably impact on the responses given by interviewees. 
However, the interviewees can, without the influence of interviewer error, introduce 
errors into data themselves. This error is termed respondent error. 
7.1.1.2. Respondent Bias 
Respondent bias occurs where the respondent give incomplete or inaccurate 
information (Beed and Stimson, 1985; ~mory and Cooper, 1991). This can be either 
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purposefully, in an attempt by respondents to present themselves in a better light 
(Simon and Burnstein, 1985) or through natural human fallibilities, such as forgetting 
information (Simon and Burnstein, 1985; Beed and Stimson, 1985), and the person's 
own existing biases (Simon and Burnstein, 1985). 
Furthermore, as the research examined phenomena in an organisation which has 
already failed, the interviewee's responses could be prone to hindsight bias. 
Hindsight bias refers to the tendency of individuals with knowledge of an outcome to 
alter the perception, of an event so that their ability to predict an event ex-post is 
greater than their ability ex-ante (Lowe and Reekers, 1994). Therefore, post-
collapse, employees may report that they were aware the company was distressed or 
identify problems which were not apparent before the failure. Due to such problems, 
responses should not be taken at face value (Simon and Burnstein, 1985). 
There are no definite means to negate the effect of response error. The researcher can 
attempt to view all responses in a critical manner in an attempt to discern where any 
response error has occurred. However, this will not assure that all incorrect 
responses will be detected. Instead Emory and Cooper assert that " ... the safest 
course for research directors is to recognise that there is a constant potential for 
response error" (1991, p 329). Through continual awareness of this problem, the 
author endeavoured to be careful that such bias is not introduced into the interview 
process by taking care with questions asked, and the responses, both verbal and non-
verbal, from the interviewees. 
7 .2. Interview Details 
Former Seafield plant Meat Workers Union Secretary, Mr Peter Binnie, agreed to be 
one of the 15 interview candidates required and approached other former employees 
to ascertain whether they would be interested in participating in this research. From 
this process, a list of 14 other potential interview candidates was prepared.44 The 
44 
This process may have introduced self-selection bias. Benke and Street (1992) report self-selection bias occurs where 
subjects choose to participate in research for a specific reason. For example, they may participate because they are 
interested in the subject area. Therefore, those former employees willing to be interviewed may not have been 
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researcher telephoned these former employees to confirm their continued interest and 
to schedule a convenient time to conduct the interviews. Each reaffirmed their 
commitment to being interviewed. The times arranged resulted in telephone 
interviews being conducted between November 6th and 15th. The interviews ranged 
in length from 20 to 40 minutes. 
Where possible, the interviews were conducted so that the information supplied 
could be verified by reference to documentary evidence, other interviews or the 
background information provided in Chapter 7. To aid in this process, Mr Binnie, 
was available for follow-up interviews. 
From his position, Mr Binnie was in contact with all levels of personnel in Fortex's 
hierarchy and could form an overview of the concerns of the employees and 
company's performance. Therefore, he was an ideal person to contact regarding any 
issues or anomalies raised during the interview process. Furthermore, Mr Binnie has 
40 years work experience in the meat industry, which included positions with other 
meat-working companies. From this experience he could identify factors which are 
common to other meat companies, or industry specific, and therefore do not 
contribute towards collapse. 
Mr Binnie proved invaluable when he acted in this role during the preliminary 
research conducted in November 1994. From his considerable knowledge of the 
company, the industry and the staff, he indicated areas where other interviewees had 
misinterpreted the situation or even exaggerated the amount of people involved in an 
incident. Taking data and interpretations back to the people from whom they are 
derived and asking them if the results were plausible, constitutes a 'member check' 
which is one of six strategies which can ensure internal validity (Merriam, 1990). 
7.3. Interview Questions 
Consistent with the semi-structured interview approach adopted in this study, several 
standard questions were prepared. These questions, which are contained within 
representative of the population of Fortex employees. This limitation is discussed in detail in Chapter 11, Conclusions, 
Limitations and Recommendations. 
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Appendix 1, were asked of each interviewee. Based on their responses the author 
constructed more questions to further investigate or elucidate the response, thus 
providing more detail. However, to allow a comparison between the interviewees' 
responses each interview initially followed a standard format. 
Each interview began with an explanation of the purpose of the research, an 
assurance that the interviewee's name would remain confidential and a request that 
the interview be recorded so that the author could more easily remember what the 
interviewee said. No interviewees objected to the use of the tape-recorder. Mr 
Binnie, whose interpretation of Fortex's failure had already received media coverage 
(Brett, 1994), gave consent allowing his name to be attributed to his responses (Brett, 
1994). 
Several introductory questions were asked. The questions concerned such details as 
the length of time the employees had been employed by Fortex and whether they 
. were shareholders and/or union delegates. Then, to determine the distress events 
employees observed, whether the employees believed that the company was 
distressed and could fail, and the employees' information sources, the interviewees 
were asked five general questions. 
• Firstly, the employees were asked to report their reaction when Fortex was placed 
into receivership, in particular whether they were surprised. The interviewees' 
responses allowed the determination of whether they expected the company to fail 
and also indicated how many of the employees understood that the company was 
distressed prior to its failure. 
• Secondly, all of the employees were asked to report the concerns they held 
regarding, or rumours heard about, the company's future before it collapsed. This 
line of questioning established the problems the employees observed during the 
company's life, revealed whether the surprised and unsurprised employees 
observed the same factors, and also allowed an analysis of which of those factors, 
if any, caused the employees to believe that the company was distressed. 
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After the identification of each concern the interviewees were asked how they 
identified that concern. The interviewees were then asked if they had heard any 
rumours, or ifthe level of rumours had increased as the Fortex's failure approached, 
and where they obtained most of their information. This process allowed the 
influence of informal grapevine information to be placed in the overall context of 
available information sources. It also allowed a better identification of where the 
information was obtained which contributed to the employees' observation of 
distress. 
Because Walton (1961) warned that " ... it seems clear that employees don't get 
nearly as much information/rom the grapevine as they think they do" (1961, p 48) 
the term 'grapevine' was not mentioned in any of the questions. Therefore, when the 
interviewees mentioned the term grapevine the response was unsolicited. The effect 
of these measures is that the responses regarding grapevine information are likely to 
be more accurate, but if they are inaccurate, understated rather than overstated. 
The interviewees were also asked whether they were aware of the fraudulent 
activities, covered by the media post-collapse, prior to Fortex's receivership, and 
whether they believed that their observations and opinions of Fortex were consistent 
with the public's perception of a successful well-managed company. This second 
question provided information on the employees' views and opinions of the 
company, thereby assisting the interpretation of their observations in context. 
There was one question which related specifically to the IAIS (refer Appendix 1, 
Q6). While this question was directed to the union delegates who maintained it, each 
of the interviewees were asked if they were aware the system existed. If they were 
aware the interviewee was also asked to provide information about the IAIS. 
8. Conclusion 
This thesis uses the case study method with data being predominantly collected 
through the use of semi-structured interviews. This method is appropriate because 
the research is essentially exploratory and requires detailed data of a single entity in 
which the phenomena studied may have occurred. The method also offered the 
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researcher the flexibility to adapt to, and research, any anomalies encountered, a 
necessity in a previously unresearched field. 
While this method has limitations, many measures were used to counteract their 
effects. These measures included the use of multiple sources of evidence, follow-up 
interviews, a review of the draft case by both a contact within the company and the 
researcher's supervisor, and the detailed documentation of the both context of the 
case and research processes used. Through such means, the potential limitations of 
the method adopted in this thesis have been reduced and the validity of the findings 
increased. 
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1. Introduction 
Fortex was a Christchurch based meat marketing and processing company. Formed 
in 1985, it became New Zealand's only publicly listed meat working company when 
it was floated on the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZSE) in June 1990. Public 
listing was the first of many notable differences between Fortex and its competitors. 
In an industry characterised as conservative, Fortex differentiated itself by targeting a 
niche market, producing added-value products, and introducing numerous 
innovations. The innovations included a total quality management programme, the 
most advanced killing and processing plant in the world ( du Chateau and Legat, 
1992), and a unique labour contract which allowed shiftwork and abolished penal 
rates, attracted media and political attention. From their perspective Fortex seemed 
to epitomize the qualities that New Zealand companies needed to lead the country out 
of an economic recession ( du Chateau and Legat, 1992; Coddington, 1992; Brett, 
1994; The Press, 1995d). However, despite the positive attributes, the accolades, and 
the innovations, Fortex was placed into receivership on March 23rd, 1994. 
This chapter provides an overview of Fortex's performance, structure, size and 
objectives in the years prior to its collapse. Also contained is a brief synopsis of the 
reasons offered for Fortex's failure. The information contained in this chapter has 
been obtained from publicly available information sources, such as Fortex's annual 
reports, newspapers and magazine articles, and could potentially differ from the 
employees' observations. This background information is required to provide the 
reader with an understanding of the company, and is essential for the contextual 
analysis a case study necessitates. 
The overview ofFortex's life will be separated into two time periods; the pre-listing 
1985 to 1989 (inclusive) financial years and the post listing 1990 to 1994 (inclusive) 
financial years.45 The 1990 to 1994 financial years are be related on an individual 
45 
Fortex's financial year ended on August 31. 
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basis. The overview will be presented this way because post-listing, the company's 
size and strategy changed markedly. Furthermore, because Fortex was required to 
produce mandatory annual financial reports and attracted far more media attention in 
the post-listing period, there is more information from which to provide an overview 
ofthe company's performance. 
2. Fortex: Prior to Sharemarket Listing 
Fortex was formed in 1985 by the amalgamation of three companies: "Cattle 
Services, a small beef exporting and marketing company, Fort Export, a farmer co-
operative marketing sheep meat, and Canterbury Venison, a deer export and 
packaging facility" (Brett, 1994, p 52). Each of the three companies were headed by 
Graeme Thompson who, upon amalgamation, became the managing director of 
Fortex. 
In its early life Fortex differentiated itself in two ways. Firstly, it was demand 
driven, processing animals only after orders were received. Secondly, it further 
processed each carcase into specific chilled and frozen cuts to add value. To enable 
further processing, Fortex built its own technologically advanced plant in 1986. 
Situated at Ashburton, Seafield was a single-chain plant which was designed to 
process lamb, venison and goat meat (Fortex Group Annual Report46, 1990). The 
plant contributed to F ortex' s achievement of a first year turnover of $21,172,000 and 
an associated net consolidated profit of $695,000 (FGAR, 1990). 
Despite this positive start, the next two years were less financially successful. While 
turnover increased in both the 1987 and 1988 financial years, to $52,588,000 and 
$66,165,000 respectively, the company produced net losses- of $490,000 and 
$530,000 (FGAR, 1990). However, during this period, Fortex achieved its first two 
notable successes negotiating two breakthrough agreements with its employees. The 
first in January 1988 introduced a second shift which allowed the company to operate 
its plant for 16 hours a day, six days a week. This agreement significantly improved 
46 
From this point forward Fortex Group Annual Report is simplified to FGAR. 
FORTEX'S STORY 119 
the company's financial performance. In the 1989 financial year, Fortex achieved a 
$2,860,000 net profit and again increased turnover. 
The second agreement, which was termed "an employers' [sic] long-time dream" 
and "revolutionary" (Rennie, 1988, p 1) by the media, freed the company from the 
New Zealand Meat Workers' Union imposed productivity limitations and allowed 
the following: 
• Two 11 hour shifts per day over six days a week; 
• No penal rates for employees working weekends; 
• The workers to receive the same wage for working three 11 hour days per week, 
as they received in the past for working a five day week; 
• The workers to have three days on, followed by four days off; and 
• The introduction of four teams of employees to run the shifts (Rennie, 1988). 
The second agreement gave Fortex a considerable advantage over its competitors 
who continued operating under Meat Workers' Union imposed conditions, and was 
the catalyst for the Employment Contracts Act (Brett, 1994). In the early years the 
agreement was believed by management to be Fortex's greatest strength (Brett, 
1994). Indeed, when finally implemented in 1990 the second agreement contributed 
to an improved financial performance. 
In the same year Fortex formed its first wholly owned subsidiary (FGAR, 1990). 
Fortex Europe was a marketing company situated near Brussels, in Belgium, which 
predominantly supplied chilled meat cuts to the restaurant and hotel industry (FGAR, 
1993). This event was the first in a five-year plan which involved massive capital 
expansion. The expansion was to be financed by floating the company on the NZSE 
(FGAR, 1990). 
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3. Fortex: Post Stock Market Listing 
3.1. 1990 
The directors considered that the public share offer was " ... in the best interests of 
both shareholders and farmer suppliers" (FGAR, 1990, p 5). The $28 million of 
capital the offer provided was used to develop Fortex's second processing plant, 
Silverstream, which was to be constructed at Mosgiel near Dunedin (FGAR, 1990). 
3.1.1. Silvers/ream 
Silverstream was the flagship of the Fortex Group and considerably increased the 
company's processing capacity. It was envisaged that Silverstream would employ 
700 staff and process one million lambs in 1990/91 and two million lambs in 1992. 
Unsurprisingly, Fortex's Directors expected that Silverstream would be " ... a 
profitable and efficient strategic investment for the company" (FGAR, 1990, p 6). 
Based on Seafield' s proven design, Silverstream was a single chain processing plant 
which used all parts of an animal. However, it had considerably more automation 
and technology, and was variously described as " ... a new generation in meat 
processing" (FGAR, 1990, p 11) and " ... the most modern killing and processing 
plant in the world" (du Chateau and Legat, 1992, p 61). Lacking the facilities to 
blast-freeze entire carcases, Silverstream demonstrated Fortex's commitment to 
further processing to add product value. 
The Silverstream plant was the major component ofFortex's five-year business plan 
which involved considerable expansion of its processing and marketing activities 
(FGAR, 1990). Originally its construction was planned for the 1991 financial year 
(FGAR, 1990). However, " ... in response to major ownership changes within the 
South Island meat industry" (FGAR, 1990, p 13), construction was bought forward 
to April 26th, 1990. The plant was ready for commissioning on November 1st the 
same year (FGAR, 1990). This event was typical of Fortex's next four years. The 
company seemed to expand at a frantic rate; the Silverstream plant alone more than 
doubled the size ofthe company. 
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3.1.2. Seafield 
During the period in which Silverstream was constructed, Fortex's existing plant, 
Seafield, was also the subject of several capital development programmes (FGAR, 
1990). The programmes, which enabled the · implementation of the extended 
shiftwork system that the second agreement allowed, consisted of the following: 
• "Construction of a casings processing facility; 
• Extension of the sheepyards; 
• Additional cooling floor capacity; 
• A workshop for maintenance engineers; 
• Extra laundry facilities; and 
• A new automatic blast freezer for cartoned meats" (FGAR, 1990, p 1 0). 
The introduction of the extended shiftwork began in January and was completed in 
March (FGAR, 1990). The shiftwork, in conjunction with the extra room created 
from the capital expansion, resulted in an increase in throughout of 400,000 lambs to 
1.4 million in the 1990 financial year (FGAR, 1990). 
3.1.3. Company Objectives 
Silverstream's construction and the capital expansion at Seafield were expected to 
increase productivity and provide considerable cost savings. Both plants were 
integral to the achievement ofFortex's continuing goal which was " ... to be the most 
efficient meat marketing and processing company in New Zealand" (FGAR, 1990, p 
6), a goal which was to be achieved by targeting six areas (FGAR, 1990). These 
areas, according to the Chairman, John Austin, were: 
• Marketing activities; 
• Achieving higher margins; 
• Quality control; 
• Shiftwork; 
• Good employee relations; and 
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• Environmental soundness (FGAR, 1990). 
Of these areas, marketing was particularly emphasised, because Fortex was "first and 
foremost a marketing company" whose "[m]eat-related activities depend for their 
success on the ultimate effectiveness of marketing our meat products" (FGAR, 1990, 
p 9). 
3.1.3.1. Marketing 
The objective of the marketing function was to have all the animals pre-sold before 
they were processed (FGAR, 1990). Therefore, each animal's contribution to the 
company's profitability was already determined and assured. If this marketing 
objective was achieved, the company would have a minimal amount of inventory on 
hand at any given time. Any inventory would consist of sold goods which had not 
yet been delivered. 
To assist in meeting this objective, Fortex employed more marketing staff in the 
1990 financial year and intended to make further additions in strategic areas (FGAR, 
1990). One such addition was announced in 1990 with a sales and distribution 
office, similar to Fortex Europe, planned to open in the United States in the next 
year. The office would provide a means to increase Fortex's export sales in the US 
market. The US market was one of five markets47 where Fortex had " ... a wide range 
of dedicated customers for Fortex lamb, venison, and goat meat cuts" (FGAR, 1990, 
p 9). 
While the vast majority of Fortex's sales and marketing emphasis was directed 
towards the export market, 1990 saw its marketing activities extend into the domestic 
market where it introduced 'Courier Cuts.' Courier Cuts was a marketing concept 
which specifically catered for the restaurant industry. It offered the restauranteur a 
guaranteed 24 hour delivery service of Fortex lamb, goat, venison and beef (FGAR, 
1990). During the 1990 financial year, Courier Cuts supplied 350 restaurants 
situated throughout New Zealand (FGAR, 1990). The programme also provided a 
47 
The other markets were Europe (served by Fortex Europe), Japan, Scandinavia, and the Mediterranean (FGAR, 1990). 
FORTEX'S STORY 123 
testing ground for products for the export markets, where the majority of trade was 
also performed with the restaurant and hotel industry (FGAR, 1990). 
Fortex's strong marketing emphasis became even more important and necessary as 
the company's size and processing capacity increased. The inability to blast-freeze 
meat meant that, unlike its rivals, Fortex could not export whole carcases for which 
there was a well established market. Instead, increased production required 
identifying and developing new markets which demanded pre-cut lamb, beef, goat 
and venison. 
The other five target areas for Fortex to achieve its goal, like marketing, 
differentiated Fortex from its competitors. 
3.1.3.2. Achieving Higher Margins 
The directors believed Fortex's profitability would be enhanced by its added-value 
processing emphasis (FGAR, 1990). This approach was unique in an industry which 
predominantly sold its produce as blast-frozen whole carcases. 
3.1.3.3. Quality Control 
To ensure the customer always received a quality product, Fortex attempted to 
vertically integrate and take control of all operations from the farm gate to the 
market-place (FGAR, 1990). The company performed every function: procurement, 
slaughtering, added-value processing, by-product processing, cool storage, transport, 
and distribution and marketing, itself (FGAR, 1990). Therefore, Fortex could 
enforce, monitor and have total control over its own quality standards. 
3.1.3.4. Shiftwork 
As outlined earlier, the company had reached an agreement with the Meat Workers 
Union allowing extended shiftwork. Through this agreement Fortex could maximise 
the use of its plant and equipment (FGAR, 1990). For instance, in the 1990 financial 
year, Seafield operated for 265 days compared to the traditional processing chain 
which operated on average for 1 00 days a year (FGAR, 1990). Due to the extended 
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shiftwork, Fortex projected that it could slaughter and process 20 percent of the 
South Island's lambs per year on two chains while the remaining 80 percent would 
be slaughtered on 62 chains (FGAR, 1990). 
3.1.3.5. Good Employee Relations 
In addition to the agreement concerning shiftwork, Fortex also had an employee 
share scheme. Through these two measures the company experienced "harmonious 
industrial relations" (FGAR, 1990, p 7). Because the meat industry had historically 
been noted for its industrial disputes the good employee-management relations 
engendered by the shiftwork and share scheme provided another advantage for 
Fortex to exploit. 
3.1.3.6. Environmentally Sound 
Lastly, Fortex demonstrated a social conscience and environmental responsibility. 
Management adopted policies to eliminate odours from the plants and ensure effluent 
was disposed of responsibly (FGAR, 1990). 
These six areas, which were targeted in order to achieve its goal, initially provided 
the company with a considerable competitive advantage. However, despite this 
advantage, Fortex, like all meat companies, was dependent on the procurement of 
livestock at a reasonable price in order to remain profitable. 
3.1.4. Procurement 
With the increase in size of the plant and staff of the company, F ortex required an 
increased number of lambs to fully utilise its plants. To provide a wider coverage of 
South Island suppliers and attempt to obtain a targeted 20 percent market share, 
Fortex increased its procurement staff and offered a higher price per lamb than its 
competitors. For example, the 1990 Annual Report revealed that Fortex paid an 
average price of $34.31 per lamb whereas its competitors, Primary Producers 
Cooperative Society (PPCS) and Alliance paid $31.80 (FGAR, 1990). This 
substantial difference was also evident in 1989 where Fortex paid $22.42 per lamb 
compared to $19 by its competitors (FGAR, 1990). Fortex had also taken the 
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unusual step of contracting fanners to produce lambs out of season so that they could 
meet unseasonal export demand (FGAR, 1990). 
While Fortex's emphasis was on lamb processing, in 1990 Fortex also processed 30 
percent ofNew Zealand's fanned venison. Much ofthis venison was processed by 
Fortex's Tauranga based subsidiary, Summit Deer Products (FGAR, 1990). The 
company, in which Fortex held a 60 percent shareholding, had access to the North 
Islands deer supplies and in 1990 increased the number of deer processed by 35 
percent (FGAR, 1990). 
In 1990, Fortex had two other subsidiary companies, Fortex Europe SA/NV, and 
Ashcold. Ashcold was a cold store facility in Ashburton. Its acquisition was, 
according to the annual report, "a worthwhile purchase" (1990, p 7), because ofthe 
increased production shift work the Seafield plant allowed. Ashcold, like Summit 
and Fortex Europe, operated at a profit (FGAR, 1990). 
3.1. 5. Financial Performance 
In its first year of public listing, Fortex demonstrated its competitiveness and the 
effect of its differentiated and innovative approach with a profit after tax of 
$4,812,000, which to that point was the organisation's highest annual profit. This 
profit was generated from an increase in turnover of over 80 percent, from $7 4m to 
$136m. The company had also generated an increase in cash held in the cash flow 
statement of$14m, most of which could be attributed to the financing activities, the 
share float and loans received, which the company had undertaken during the year. 
Indeed, financing cash flows were $43m while, due to expansion, cash flows from 
operations and investment activities were negative $8.3m and $20m, respectively 
(FGAR, 1990). 
3.1.6. Summary 
Through building a new plant, expanding Seafield and purchasing Ashcold, F ortex 
had more than doubled its total assets. From its 1990 financial results, a record 
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profit, and " ... perhaps the strongest balance sheet in the meat business" (Gibson and 
Birchfield, 1991, p 36), Fortex's policy of expansion was seemingly justified. 
Unsurprisingly, the future of the company was seen to be promising with increases in 
profitability predicted to come from Silverstream and new marketing initiatives 
(FGAR, 1990). Both the managing director, Graeme Thompson, and the chairman, 
John Austin, emphasised the company's potential and promise. The public and 
media agreed and based on its 1990 performance, its potential, and its innovative 
approach and export emphasis, 1990 saw Fortex win its first award, the Management 
Magazine and Deloitte Ross Tohmatsu Award for 'Company of the Year.' From this 
base, Fortex continued its expansion in the 1991 financial year. 
3.2.1991 
The 1991 financial year, similar to 1990, was characterised by continued capital, 
processing, and marketing expansion. 
3.2.1. Silverstream 
The Silverstream plant was fully commissioned and employed over 700 new staff 
(FGAR, 1991). The plant processed one million lambs in its first season. However, 
due to staff training while the plant was operating, the products did not meet Fortex's 
high quality standards (FGAR, 1991). Some customers received cuts that did not 
meet their specifications (FGAR, 1991). The problems associated with the new 
plant, including staff training, were believed to be well behind the company by the 
end of the 1991 financial year. Silverstream was ready to perform to its maximum 
capability in 1992 (FGAR, 1991). 
3.2.2. Seafield 
The original plant at Ashburton was described as having had a "satisfactory year" 
(FGAR, 1991, p 10). Throughput in this year had increased from 1.4 to 1.5 million 
lamb-equivalents (FGAR, 1991). All but 300,000 of these lambs were further 
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processed to add value (FGAR, 1991). Contained. within the increased throughput 
was a 136 percent rise in deer kill and an increased goat kill (FGAR, 1991). 
3.2.2.1. Processing Expansion 
Despite Silverstream's construction in 1990, the five-year plan prescribed two more 
capital developments in 1991. Firstly, fellmongeries were to be built at both 
Silverstream and Seafield (FGAR, 1991). Fellmongeries remove wool from lamb 
skins. The pelts would be sent to Seafield for conditioning before being exported 
and the wool would be sold separately (FGAR, 1991). In total the project would cost 
$13m and was evidence of Fortex's commitment to efficiency, and a desire to use, 
and add value to, every part of an animal. With the fellmongeries came another 
technical innovation, barcoding. Each skin was barcoded so that the supplying 
farmers could be paid according to its quality. 
Secondly, $1.1m was invested to update Fortex's data processing systems (FGAR, 
1991 ). The update was required " ... to provide improved and quickly updated cost 
control for management as well as the ability to achieve rapid response to customer 
needs" (FGAR, 1991, p 6). The project was to be completed in 1992 with an 
additional $1m investment. 
3.2.2.2. Subsidiaries 
Summit Deer Products was fully taken over during the 1991 financial year (FGAR, 
1991 ). The purchase of the outstanding 40 percent capital was yet another cash 
outlay and an example of Fortex's policy of vertical integration. Summit and the 
company's other subsidiaries, Ashcold and Fortex Europe, had successful years and 
contributed a profit to the consolidated accounts (FGAR, 1991). However, Summit's 
1991 performance was notable for another reason. During the 1991 financial year it 
became the only meat processing company in the world to hold an ISO 9002 quality 
rating (FGAR, 1991). 
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3.2.3. Quality 
Summit's achievement further differentiated Fortex from its competitors both in New 
Zealand and world-wide, yet ISO accreditation was only one component ofFortex's 
emphasis on quality. The company adopted Total Quality Management a (TQM) 
philosophy programme.48 By instituting this regime, Fortex committed itself to 
" ... the attainment of excellence in all aspects of our operations" (FGAR, 1991, p 
13). 
3.2.4. Marketing 
Fortex's marketing activities, which with quality were to be the two objectives which 
from now until the company's eventual demise were particularly emphasised, also 
underwent expansion in 1991. Furthering the company's offshore activities was the 
establishment of a marketing office in Newport, near Los Angeles, in the USA 
(FGAR, 1991). Similar to Fortex Europe, this office predominantly supplied the 
restaurant and hotel industries. The future of the office was bright with sales growth 
expanding at 1 00 percent (FGAR, 1991). 
Fortex continued to be market driven. The company's marketing team was 
" ... successful in maintaining a pre-sold position on most of the high-value products 
processed during the year" (FGAR, 1991, p 11). However, the company's 
marketing function was inhibited by a reduced international demand for lamb and 
venison (FGAR, 1991). 
3.2.5. Procurement 
Fortex procured and processed 2.5 million lambs in the 1990/91 season, an increase 
of 1.1 million lambs from the last season. However, despite a successful lambing 
season, 
49 
" ... the company's livestock procurement representatives had a particularly 
48 
TQM involves continuous improvement to achieve a level of quality which meets customer expectations. It involves a 
daily commitment from every person in the organisation (Kanji, 1990; Smith, 1990; Claus, 1991). 
49 
The lambing season begins in August and ends in late September. 
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demanding year" (FGAR, 1991, p 9). Fortex's increasing requirement for lambs 
created intense competition between itself, PPCS and Alliance. There was an 
insufficient pool of stock for each company to fully utilize their plants. 
Excess demand meant Fortex paid an average of $34.20 per lamb, compared with 
$34.31 in the previous year (FGAR, 1991). Fortex was committed to buying at 
inflated prices to utilise the newly commissioned Silverstream and attain its goal of a 
20 percent market share. 
3.2. 6. Financial Performance 
The company's $2.89 million profit for 1991 fmancial year was considered 
" ... satisfactory in light of hostile market conditions coming on top of the strains 
imposed from doubling the Company's operations" (FGAR, 1991, p 8). The effect 
of the high prices paid for stock and the weakened overseas export market was 
evident. Even with a $77m increase in turnover, the company's net profit was $1.8m 
lower than 1990. 
Fortex also had a $12 million decrease in cash held. This decrease consisted of a $20 
million shortfall from operations, a $50 million deficit from investing activities, and 
a positive flow of $58 million from financing activities. Financing activities 
consisted of a $39m increase in term loans and a renounceable rights issue of 
ordinary shares raising $6.1m. As in 1990, the overall decrease in cash held was 
attributed to increased levels of inventory and capital developments. 
The balance sheet reflected this expansion in assets with an increase of $51 million 
from the last year. Notable changes in the balance sheet included a $16m decrease in 
cash at bank (which was used to fund Silverstream's development) and a build up in 
working capital, particularly inventories (FGAR, 1990). Unusually, during a year in 
which Fortex was purported to have been " ... successful in maintaining a pre-sold 
position on most of its high value products processed during the year" (FGAR, 1991, 
p 11), the inventory held by the company increased from $19m to $45m. Lastly, due 
to the capital expansion Fortex underwent during the year, the company's plant value 
increased by $40m. 
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3.2. 7. Summary 
Despite a disappointing year, the outlook for the company's performance in 1992 
was good for several reasons. Firstly, the world lamb prices were expected to 
improve through increased demand (FGAR, 1991). · Secondly, Alliance had 
announced the closure oftwo of its freezing works during the year. This closure was 
expected to reduce the lamb processing capacity by three million, thereby bringing 
more balance into the supply and demand balance in the South Island (FGAR, 1991). 
Thirdly, the company had finished its period of capital development; therefore, no 
further disruptions were expected. Lastly, New Zealand's economy was favourable 
due to low interest and exchange rates (FGAR, 1991). For these reasons, Graeme 
Thompson asserted that F ortex was " ... more confident about its ability to perform 
than at any time previously" (FGAR, 1991, p 13). 
3.3.1992 
The positive outlook was justified. The 1992 year saw Fortex produce its highest net 
profit of $9.12m and was undoubtedly the company's most successful year in all 
respects. The year saw the completion ofFortex's five-year strategic plan. The plan 
was completed in under four years. After such rapid expansion the company 
announced that it had entered into a period of 'consolidation' (FGAR, 1992). 
However, this consolidation period was obviously planned to be short. During the 
year the managing director, Thompson, announced that two wholly owned marketing 
companies were to be established in Hong Kong and the United Kingdom. The US 
office would also be strengthened (FGAR, 1992). This expansion was seen as " ... an 
important development during the present consolidation phase" (FGAR, 1992, p 11 ). 
Furthermore, the company investigated the viability of building a processing plant in 
the UK. 
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3.3.1. Processing 
In 1992 Silverstream completed its first full processing season50 (FGAR, 1992). 
During the year, the lamb and sheep kill was 1.64 million, a 57 percent increase from 
the last year (FGAR, 1992). The quality and efficiency problems which the plant 
experienced in the previous year had been successfully resolved with the plant 
operating at between 98 percent and 100 percent efficiency (FGAR, 1992). 
At Seafield, the lamb kill remained 1.5 million. However, as a result of " ... efficiency 
improvements, the increased deer kill and the addition of the fellmongery and the 
lamb pelt processing" (FGAR, 1992, p 11), Seafield's contribution to the 
consolidated accounts increased by 60 percent. 
3.3.2. Subsidiaries 
Summit Deer Products' throughput increased by 6.4 percent to a capacity 22,000 
deer processed in the 1992 financial year (FGAR, 1992). The increased throughput 
resulted in a four percent increased contribution to the company's consolidated 
account (FGAR, 1992). 
Ashcold, the company's wholly owned cold storage facility in Ashburton, exceeded 
its budgeted profit level and, consistent with Fortex's TQM policy, was rapidly 
working towards attaining ISO 9002 accreditation (FGAR, 1992). Ashcold would be 
the first cold store in New Zealand to hold such a quality rating. 
3.3.3. Quality 
Ashcold was not the only facility attempting to attain such a rating. Seafield and 
Silverstream were also working towards achieving ISO 9002 quality ratings before 
the end of 1993 (FGAR, 1992). The Chairman, John Austin, admitted that 
"[g]aining ISO 9002 accreditation throughout the Group by 1994 is an ambitious 
target. " However, when it was completed it would " ... put Fort ex as a complete unit 
50 Originally its first full processing year was meant to be 1991 (FGAR, 1990). 
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at the pinnacle of world certification standards" (FGAR, 1992, p 7). The effort 
demonstrated a commitment to quality which would be needed if Fortex was to 
achieve its newly worded mission statement which was to be " ... the world's best 
supplier of high quality selected meat products "51 (FGAR, 1992, p 4 ). 
This goal was to be achieved through a company wide TQM approach which would 
ensure customer satisfaction (FGAR, 1992). The company's quality policy was 
based on three principles: 
"1. High quality standards will be achieved mainly through our staff, who will 
be well trained (md disciplined, yet flexible. 
2. Our staff are empowered to manage and improve their own quality work, in 
an atmosphere that encourages collective participation. 
3. We will foster with our suppliers long term relationships based on trust and 
information sharing to our mutual benefit" (FGAR, 1992, p 5). 
To achieve the first and second objectives, the TQM programme was extended 
throughout the entire organisation. The third objective was to be achieved with the 
introduction of a unique marketing scheme which explicitly focused on suppliers. 
3.3.4. Marketing 
The scheme, entitled 'Fortex Formula,' rewarded fanners for the meat yield of each 
lamb (FGAR, 1992). Described as "a better system for rewarding farmers" 
(FGAR, 1992, p 13), Fortex Formula departed from the Meat Board grading system 
and instead " ... set its own comprehensive schedule of prices based on the meat yield 
of each carcase and its market value" (FGAR, 1992, p 12). The scheme consisted of 
three components: 
1. Fortex Yield Grading: which used an electric probe to distinguish between the 
meat and fat on a carcase so that a farmer could be paid for the actual meat yield at 
the market rate (FGAR, 1992). 
51 
The earlier pronounced 'continuing goal' was to be " ... !he mosl efficienl meal markeling and processing company in New 
Zealand" (FGAR, 1990, p 6). 
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2. Fortex Schedule Plus: which offered two methods by which a farmer could sell 
their stock. The first offered the schedule payment 14 days after processing with a 
market related bonus payable two to three months later. The second was the 
traditional option of selling from the farm-gate (FGAR, 1992). 
3. Fortex Information Reports: which gave details of the health, weight and fat 
content of each animal which farmers could use to improve the quality of their . 
stock and thus Fortex's meat products (FGAR, 1992). In early 1993 this service 
was expected to ·extend to include a report on the quality of the pelt of each 
animal. 
By rewarding farmers for healthy lean stock the quality of the animals Fortex 
received was expected to improve. According to one farmer, Fortex and Fortex 
Formula was: 
" ... exactly what we 'd all wanted: extended killing seasons, bonuses for quality 
stock, innovative processing. Service to the farmers in terms of feedback on 
stock condition and so on was excellent" (Brett, 1994, p 50). 
In the domestic economy, Fortex complemented its existing Courier Cuts programme 
with 'Fortex Gourmet Direct.' Gourmet Direct was a mail order service which 
courier delivered export quality cuts of lamb, beef, and venison to the door of the 
householder (FGAR, 1992). This programme was well received and won the 
Printpac UEB Food Awards trophy for excellence in meat, fish and poultry (FGAR, 
1992). 
The company's international marketing activities were performing well. During the 
year, Fortex had increased sales to the USA by 100 percent, opened a new market for 
lamb in Egypt and negotiated a $17 million venison contract in Germany. Its 
European marketing subsidiary, Fortex Europe, also had a very successful year, 
exceeding budget expectations by 175 percent (FGAR, 1992, p 12). 
3.3.5. Procurement 
Like the company's marketing function, the procurement team also performed well. 
3.1 million lambs were procured, an increase of 1.7 million from 1990 and 600,000 
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from 1991. The increased procurement was a considerable achievement when the 
total South Island lamb kill had reduced in both of these years. 
A reduced lamb kill was also expected in 1993 due to the severe storms which struck 
the South Island. The storms were predicted to reduce the 1993 lamb kill by two 
million, (from 17 to 15 million), and the mutton kill by over 650,000, (from 2. 7 to 
2.03 million), (FGAR, 1992). However, this further reduction in stock numbers was 
not expected to unduly affect Fortex because it was not seeking an increased number 
of animals to process (FGAR, 1992). 
3.3.6. Financial Performance 
Financially, the company posted a record profit of $9.13 million from a nearly $300 
million turnover. During the period, total assets increased by $27 million, most of 
which could be attributed to the completion of the fellmongery developments at 
Silverstream and Seafield. These developments cost $22 million and were 
predominantly funded from financing cash flows,52 particularly, from an increase in 
borrowings of$i5 million (FGAR, 1992). Another share issue, this time raising $14 
million, was undertaken in this year (FGAR, 1992). The proceeds of this issue were 
needed to establish the new overseas marketing offices (FGAR, 1992). 
3.3. 7. Summary 
This year was not only notable for the company's financial performance, Fortex also 
won two business awards, the Television New Zealand Award for best corporate 
strategy and the Tradenz Air New Zealand Export Award for overall excellence in 
exporting. Once again the company was in the public limelight for its achievements, 
particularly its emphasis on quality and export-led marketing approach. However, 
the period of success and consolidation would end in 1993. 
52 
Overall the company had a negative total cash flow of$1.06m (FGAR, 1992). 
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3.4. 1993 
As a result of many factors, most of which originated from the 1992 storms, the 1993 
financial year proved to be much more difficult than expected. 
3.4.1. Seafield and Silvers/ream 
The processing function was affected by the storms. Seafield was hit the hardest and 
suffered a 25 percent .reduction in the number of animals slaughtered (FGAR, 1993). 
By comparison, Silverstream's kill was only down six percent against an average 
reduction in South Island lamb kill of 16 percent (FGAR, 1993). However, both the 
chairman and managing director found positive . attributes from both plants 
performance during the year. At Seafield another upgrade in the lamb processing 
room had improved capacity and efficiency, the casings and renderings departments 
both had improved yields, and the fellmongery and pelthouse operations were 
refmed, resulting in better quality pelts and more wool recovery (FGAR, 1993). 
Silverstream was given credit for improved efficiency, quality and production 
standards (FGAR, 1993). 
3.4.2. Quality 
Both plants were also lauded by the managing director and the chairman for the 
change in organisation culture amongst the personnel (FGAR, 1993). This change 
provided an: 
" ... environment which encourages people to think, plan and improve methods, 
systems and techniques which is leading to productivity improvement, more job 
satisfaction and a general spirit of co-operation" (FGAR, 199 3, p 9). 
Despite the culture change, and both Seafield's venison plant and Ashcold receiving 
ISO 9002 accreditation, management realised that even the highest quality product 
could not assure the success of the company in the future. Therefore, in 1993 the 
organisation's marketing function was expanded and even more heavily emphasised 
as an attribute which would be important to Fortex's future success. 
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3.4.3. Marketing 
During the 1993 financial year Fortex opened two new marketing offices, Fortex UK, 
situated just outside London, and Fortex Hong Kong (FGAR, 1993). Fortex UK 
opened in November 1992 and concentrated on further ·developing the. market for 
chilled and specialist frozen lamb cuts (FGAR, 1993). The Hong Kong office 
emphasised the marketing of deer products, such as velvet, used in Asian medicines, 
but also supplied meat products to the restaurant and hotel trade (FGAR, 1993). 
Interestingly, this expansion of the marketing function was performed during a 
period of self-proclaimed consolidation. 
3.4.4. Expansion 
During 1993 there were two more indications that the period of consolidation, short 
as it had been, was over. The first was the purchase of a 15 percent interest in the 
Phoenix Meat Company a South Island beef processor. According to both the 
managing director and the chairman 
"[t]his strategic move reflects a desire to have an involvement in the 
procurement of beef from our South Island farming clientele and in the 
marketing of the product through Fortex USA and Fortex Hong Kong" (FGAR, 
1993,p 12). 
The second, was the planned development of a fully integrated sheepmeat plant in 
the United Kingdom (FGAR, 1993). While " ... no decision would be made in terms 
of developing in the United Kingdom until satisfactory profitability is established 
from existing activities" (FGAR, 1993, p 12), the plant was part of the company's 
strategic plan for Europe. The development seemed inevitable. Two potential sites 
had already been chosen. Planning approval and consent had been received for each 
site (FGAR, 1993). 
In the domestic market, Fortex's existing activities, Fortex Courier Cuts and Fortex 
Gourmet Direct, were also further developed (FGAR, 1993). Through this 
development Courier Cuts' sales volume increased by 155 percent (FGAR, 1993). 
Its other domestic marketing programme, Fortex Formula, received a Television New 
Zealand marketing award (FGAR, 1993). However, as unique and well received as 
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Fortex Formula was, it could not assure Fortex's immunity to the lamb shortage 
which faced the entire industry. 
3.4. 5. Procurement and Processing 
The meat processing function of the company was severely inhibited by the reduced 
stock caused by the storms in the 1992 lambing season (FGAR, 1993). Fortex was 
able to procure just 2.6 million lambs, a decrease of 500,000 from the previous year 
(FGAR, 1993). The scarcity of lambs caused intense competition and a price war 
between Fortex and its competitors, PPCS and Alliance. 
3.4.6. Financial Performance 
Due to high procurement prices and lower throughput, the company sustained a net 
loss of $4.8 million for the year. If the value of inventory had not increased by $21.2 
million, the loss would have been much worse. The cash flow statement also 
reflected that the company's operations were not profitable. Operating cash flows 
were negative $16.3 million, the third deficit in the last four years. 
3.4. 7. The Future 
Despite 1993 having the worst financial performance since the company was listed, 
the company's future was viewed as positive with the directors expecting " ... a 
significant improvement in the Company's performance for the 1994 year" (FGAR, 
1993). The expectations were based on cost reductions and improved productivity 
from the company's processing activities (FGAR, 1993). Better results were also 
predicted from livestock procurement and marketing due to a return to more 
favourable climatic conditions and a consequent increase in livestock numbers 
(FGAR, 1993). 
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4. 1994: The Collapse of Fortex 
Despite the positive predictions, Fortex's performance did not significantly improve 
in the 1994 year. The company failed just six months later. 
Fortex's 1993 annual report, detailing the $4.8 million loss, was released in 
September. Later in the same month, with the realisation that the company was in 
difficulty, the company's management approached the union for wage concessions. 
An agreement was reached which provided for an extra 20 minutes unpaid work from 
each worker per day and increasing the speed of the killing chain (Brett, 1994). The 
concessions were expected to save $3.8 million (Brett, 1994). 
On January 24th 1994, Fortex responded to its trustee's concerns over the company's 
financial position, and ability to continue operations, that the company was on a 
'sound footing' (Brett, 1994).53 During the period between December 1993 and 
February 18 1994, the share price had fallen from $1 to 70 cents per share. The 
NZSE, seeking to ascertain reasons why this dramatic fall had occurred, questioned 
Fortex's management (Brett, 1994). 
Four days after this event, on February 22nd, the trustee once again asked Fortex 
about its financial condition, and was assured that the company was secure. 
However, the company was not. In late February, the board of directors was 
informed that Fortex expected an interim loss of between $40 million and $50 
million (Brett, 1994). The loss was caused by the third procurement war in four 
years. The rival companies were paying prices well above market returns to maintain 
throughput (MacFie, 1994). 
On March 8th, the trustee was informed of the impending loss. Later that day the 
board of directors appointed an independent accountant, Michael Stiassney, to assess 
the company's financial position (Brett, 1994). Unsurprisingly, the financial market 
reacted unfavourably to the appointment and Fortex's share price fell to 58 cents. 
53 
The trustee, Trustees Executors and Agency Company of New Zealand, represented the company's debenture holders, and 
two principal lenders, the Bank of New Zealand and ANZ Banking Group Limited. 
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The next day the price fell a further 15 cents as one of the company's major 
investors, T. A. Pacific, sold its investment (McEwen, 1994). The company had 
invested $9.7 million in Fortex shares three months earlier, and, according to some 
reports, lost $7 million from the sale (McEwen, 1994). 
Two days later, on March 11, Fortex publicly announced that the company's half 
yearly result would be a $45 to $50 million dollar loss (Brett, 1994). The loss placed 
Fortex in breach of its trust and was attributed to operating losses and stock write-
downs (Brett, 1994).· This was the first public announcement which demonstrated 
the depth ofthe problems Fortex faced. Consequently, on March 16th, the Securities 
Commission announced that it would be investigating whether the stock market had 
been accurately informed as to Fortex's financial position in the last few months 
(Brett, 1994). Also in March, farmers, worried about not receiving payment, 
withheld stock aggravating the company's situation (McEwen, 1994; Birss, 1994a, 
1994c; MacFie, 1994; Hutching, 1994). The farmers required payment guarantees 
which Fortex could not provide (Birss, 1994b ). 
During the company's last week, Seafield union secretary, Peter Binnie reported that 
the employees' morale was low (Birss, 1994c). Speculation and rumour peaked as 
the employees awaited news (Archibald and Topp, 1994). Then, on March 21, it was 
announced that a potential alliance with a Malaysian company, Seremban Securities, 
had failed (Brett, 1994). The same day Silverstream, Seafield and Tauranga closed 
and the company's share-price fell to 13 cents. The trustee placed Fortex into 
receivership two days later, March 23rd 1994. 
After the company entered receivership, the union and employees offered a package 
which would have saved the company $15 million a year if the company was allowed 
to continue (Brett, 1994). However, on March 25 the receiver announced that, with 
debts of $160 million and realisable assets of $90 million, Fortex was too heavily 
indebted to attempt to trade out of receivership (Brett, 1994). 
The company's assets have since been sold. The collapse of the company left 1,800 
employees jobless, and the public, media and politicians wondering how such a high 
profile and seemingly successful company could fail. 
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5. The Post-mortem 
The post-mortem started on the day of Fortex's collapse and is likely to continue for 
a considerable period yet as litigation regarding charges of forgery, false accounting 
and publishing false statements against the former managing director, Graeme 
Thompson continue to run their course. Amongst the reasons given as factors 
contributing to the company's swift collapse were a lack of financial management, 
inflexibility, debt funded expansion (Robb, 1994; Williams, 1994), and creative 
accounting (Brett, 1994). Many of these factors were only evident, and commented 
upon, post-collapse. However, they provide insight into Fortex's failure. 
Fortex's unique labour agreement has also been viewed as a contributing factor to its 
downfall. In an interview, former managing director Graeme Thompson stated that: 
"In the beginning this was our [Fortex 's] greatest strength and was heralded 
by politicians as the catalyst for the introduction of the Employment Contracts 
Act. But in the end we were engulfed in the tide of industrial relations change 
we had precipitated and our labour agreements became our Achilles ' heel" 
(Brett, 1994, p 48). 
Thompson realised this was. a weakness but the agreement could not be changed as 
fast or as radically as management wanted (Brett, 1994). · Further evidence is 
provided by Seafield Union secretary Peter Binnie. Binnie estimated that, when the 
company failed, Fortex's wage costs were 25 percent to 30 percent higher than its 
competitors and the workers' productivity was lower. This wage cost was essentially 
fixed because the workers were guaranteed a minimum number of weeks work per 
year. Therefore, Fortex, unlike its competitors, found it necessary to procure stock 
regardless of the price to utilise its workforce. 
The wage problem was magnified due to the excess capacity that existed within the 
South Island processing companies. The South Island lamb supply has reduced by 
20 percent in the last decade (Williams, 1994). In 1993, due to the severe storms, 
lamb numbers had fallen even lower to 15.5 million. The efforts of the three 
competitors to secure enough stock to fully utilise their plants caused a price war in 
1993. This was not uncommon in the meat industry, with price wars also occurring 
in 1990 and 1991. However, 1993 was different. 
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PPCS, knowing Fortex was committed to purchasing animals to cover its fixed wage 
expense, purchased stock at very inflated prices (The Independent, 1994). Fortex 
followed suit. After a time PPCS pulled out, but in an example of poor management, 
Fortex continued buying animals at inflated prices after PPCS had stopped (The 
Independent, 1994). Lambs which were being purchased for $48 yielded only $40 
worth of meat (Brett, 1994). Being comparatively small and financially weak, Fortex 
was financially crippled by the prices it paid for lambs. The banks took the 
opportunity to close the struggling company to reduce the industry's overcapacity 
problems and protect their larger interests in Fortex's rivals (Topp and Press 
Association, 1994). 
Fortex's rapid expansion has also been criticised because of the amount spent on 
Silverstream and the fellmongeries (MacFie, 1994), and that its expansion was debt 
funded. Fortex's Seafield plant union secretary Peter Binnie asserted, after the 
collapse, that the Fortex's debt funded expansion " ... was getting out of hand" (Brett, 
1994). Similarly Alan Robb, believed that Fortex was always undercapitalised. 
Robb (1994) also calculated that Fortex's operations lost $39.6 million in cash in five 
years. Expansion when the company's operations were not producing a cash surplus 
meant Fortex was forced to borrow to pay its costs. This borrowing considerably 
added to the company's debt burden. Robb also questioned the accuracy of the 
valuation of inventory and assets (Brett, 1994). 
The interim loss Fortex was going to post in 1994 consisted of approximately $30 
million in asset write-downs, most of which was explained as an over-estimation of 
their market value (Brett, 1994). Similarly, $8.7 million was a reversal of a loan 
'mistakenly' miscoded in the accounts as income. At this time the Serious Fraud 
Office began an investigation into the miscoded loan. In recent court hearings, more 
allegations of creative accounting, a deliberate overstatement of assets and 
understatement of liabilities to increase the company's profitability, were made (The 
Press, 1995a; 1995c ). Furthermore, a former employee of the company claimed that 
treating loans as income was a common practice that had occurred for a number of 
years (The Press, 1995b; 1996). 
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Throughout its life, the company's profitability seemed assured because of its value-
added, further-processing emphasis, yet this too has been criticised. The increasing 
size of the company meant that it had to find more markets for its meat. This proved 
to be a problem where the markets did not demand further processed meat (Brett, 
1994). 
In Fortex's case survival was, according to some critics, made more difficult with its 
dual responsibility to the sharemarket and farmers (Brett, 1994). Their competitors 
PPCS and Alliance were farmer-owned cooperatives. As such, their owners received 
their dividend in the form of high prices for their lambs. Fortex had to pay a similar 
price to procure lambs, yet also produce a profit and dividend to satisfy sharemarket 
investors. 
Lastly, the company's management, and in particular founder and former managing 
director Graeme Thompson, were criticised for their role in the collapse (The 
Independent, 1994). Thompson, who now faces court proceedings, was viewed by 
friends and associates as having " ... become too powerfol a figure within Fortex and 
was not challenged by those around him" (Brett, 1994, p 57). They believed that 
"his greatest strengths were as an innovator, an ideas man and a communicator, 
rather than a financial analyst" (Brett, 1994, p 57). If the criticisms are valid 
Fortex, had many of the same weaknesses as its founder. 
6. Conclusion 
Fortex, the recipient of many awards and praise, was an innovator which departed 
from traditional meat industry practices. Its innovations and export-led approach was 
exactly what New Zealand was looking for in a country experiencing a period of 
economic rebuilding. As such it received plaudits from the media and politicians 
alike. Described as " ... the darling of politicians" (Brett, 1994, p 52), Fortex 
changed the face of New Zealand industrial relations with the 1988 collective 
agreement with the Meat Workers Union being regarded as the catalyst for the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991. This agreement was just one ofnumerous positive 
qualities Fortex had and it seemed that the emphasis on innovation, efficiency, 
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expansion and quality, and the hyperbole surrounding the company, had instilled in 
the members of the company, politicians and the public the belief that Fortex was 
infallible. This belief was unfounded, and the most technologically advanced 
meatworks in the world, the adoption of vogue m~agement practices such as TQM, 
and marketing offices throughout the world, could not stop Fortex from failing. 
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1. Introduction 
Within Chapter 2, it was reported that non-managerial employees' opinions on the 
factors which caused a company to fail had seemingly not been utilised in previous 
corporate distress research. Yet assertions by Argenti (1976a), and an analysis of 
Altman's (1983) and McBarnet et al's (1993) research indicated that employees 
could potentially observe the symptoms of distress. However, Argenti (1976a) 
reported that employees could only observe non-financial systems of distress, which 
was anomalous to the observations found in McBamet et al's (1993) work. 
Moreover, Argenti (1976a) also asserted that despite their ability to observe 
symptoms, employees could not determine that an organisation was distressed. 
This chapter documents the results of interview process and reveals that employees 
may be far more perceptive than was previously believed. 
2. Interview Sample Characteristics 
The results displayed in the present and in the two following chapters are 
predominantly derived from 15 semi-structured interviews conducted with former 
employees from Fortex's Seafield plant. 
2.1. Working Experience 
The 15 interviewees shared a combined 92 years employment with F ortex, ranging 
from four to nine years and averaging at just over six. Hence, each employee worked 
at Fortex, (which existed for only ten years), for a considerable period of time. 
Furthermore, 14 of the interviewees were employed by the company prior to its 1990 
public listing. As such, they were employed during the two distinct periods of 
Fortex's life and had the opportunity to observe the company over a period in which 
it changed significantly. Additionally, two employees had worked in other meat 
working companies and were able to compare the other enterprises with Fortex. 
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2.2. Positions Held 
At the time of receivership the employees worked in a range of positions around the 
company, the most common being the slaughterboard (five respondents). Other 
positions included union secretary, (Peter Binnie), and working in the carton room, 
boning room or the packing room. In addition to Mr Binnie, the sample included one 
other union delegate who had held the position for one year. The respondents also 
worked differing shifts, the most common being Levels 1 and 3. 54 The range of work 
positions and shifts represented in the sample covers all of the major functions 
involved in the meat-processing component of the plant. 
2.3. Shareholding 
Of the respondents, 11 indicated that they either held, or were paying instalments on, 
shares purchased through the company's employee share scheme. Two had held 
shares but sold them in 1992. The remaining two individuals stated that they never 
held shares. 
2.4. Summary 
While the sample may be regarded as small, a diversity of employees were 
represented. The range of shifts worked, positions held and experience of the 
employees meant the sample, while not necessarily representative, offered a wide 
range from which employees information could be gleaned. 
3. Employees' Perceptions of Fortex 
Other than the two union delegates, who had more contact with management than the 
other employees,55 the interviewees reported that they perceived the company as 
54 
55 
Level 1 was the Monday to Wednesday day shift which was guaranteed 52 weeks work per year. Level 3, guaranteed 30 
weeks per year, was the complementary day shift which worked Thursday to Saturday. Levels 2, (20 weeks per year), 
and 4, (15 weeks per year), were the night shifts which operated on the same days as Levels 1 and 3, respectively. 
From this contact, the union had formed the opinion that both the plant's and the company's overall management was 
poor. 
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successful, and well-managed. Most indicated pride at working for such a publicly 
and politically well-received company: 
"From a personal point of view I was proud to work at Fortex. We were very 
well paid for what we did We were a happy workforce. I think most people 
were proud to say they worked for Fortex." 
The company was believed to be 'going places' with employees citing market 
leadership, the numerous business and marketing awards, its innovations such as the 
attempt to achieve ISO accreditation, and its intended expansion overseas as 
justification for their pride. 
3.1. Reaction Upon Receivership 
For some of the employees, the pride and impressions engendered from the accolades 
and hyperbole surrounding the organisation contributed to a belief that it could not 
fail. Hence, reactions of shock, disbelief and disappointment were reported when 
receivership was announced: 
"I couldn't really believe that a company that was said to have the great 
initiatives, and doing everything the right way, all of a sudden had gone so far 
down the tubes. We couldn't believe that. Nobody could really believe that. " 
The disbelief was attributed to many factors. For example, in December 1993, when 
the company's management asked the employees for wage concessions and increased 
productivity, they made representations about the size of problem, and that it could 
be rectified. Initially all the employees expected that the concessions they had made, 
such as reducing holiday pay, speeding up the killing chain and working an extra half 
hour per day, would be sufficient to save the company. Many continued to believe 
their sacrifices would save the company right up until the day it failed. 
Due to this misconception, and a fervent belief in the company, eight of the 
employees indicated that they were surprised that Fortex was placed into 
receivership. A typical response: 
"Very surprised As I say we didn't know a thing about it. Although you were 
starting to get an inclination that there was something because there was ... " 
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Conversely, five others responded that they were not surprised when receivership 
was announced:56 
"I wasn't surprised because prior to that, about six months, the signs were 
quite visible and I probably would have been one of the ones that kept on 
saying that it was going to go under. " 
One of those unsurprised was Seafield Union Secretary, Peter Binnie. According to 
him, receivership was the confirmation of an event which was signalled by growing 
uncertainty, particularly in the month prior to the announcement. 
Binnie's identification of growing uncertainty is reflected in the above statements 
from both the employee who was surprised and the employee who was unsurprised at 
the time of Fortex's failure. The first indicated an inclination which was formed 
through the observation of changes in the area in which he or she worked. The 
second indicated signs as far back as six months prior to failure. The common 
ground between the two parties, that there were concerns which were observed or 
ascertained through their jobs, was also reflected amongst the other employees in 
each group. Of the total sample, 14 recognised that the company was distressed prior 
to its failure. 
The difference between the two groups was the extent to which they believed that the 
company was struggling. For example, prior to the collapse, there was a multitude of 
rumours travelling around the company, some of which concerned receivership and 
failure itself. Those unsurprised indicated that rumour formed a substantial part of 
their reasoning. The surprised employees reported that they had heard rumours but 
had not believed them: 57 
56 
57 
"There were rumours going around-it's going to fail-this place is in trouble. 
But I don't really think that the average Joe Bloggs took it seriously enough. 
No, it can't happen to us, it can't happen to us, and that was the way I think 
they looked upon it. " 
Two interviewees did not comment on their reaction. 
A detailed examination of the role grapevine information played in forming the employees perceptions is contained in 
Chapter 9, p 191. 
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The surprised employees knew the company was struggling but thought it would 
survive, the others believed it was going to fail. Hence, the employees who were 
unsurprised perceived that the company's position was worse that those employees 
who were surprised when the company was placed into receivership. 
4. Employees' Concerns and Distress Events 
During the course of each interview, employees were asked to identify any concerns 
they had about the way the company was operating at any stage of its life. 
Consistent with Argenti's (1976a) assertion that employees can observe the non-
financial symptoms of failure, the 14 respondents who were aware that the company 
was distressed reported a range of factors which they found unusual or caused 
concern. Each identified at least one event which concerned them. The employees' 
observations were not restricted to non-financial factors but rather ranged from 
Argenti's (1976a) defects, to symptoms. Table 8.1 summarises the events identified 
by the employees. 
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Table 8.1: Distress Events Observed by Employees in Chronological Order. 
Year Distress Event Number of 
Observations 
1990 Construction of Silverstream 12 
1991 Wastage and Inefficiency 2 
1991 Management Turnover 0* 
1991-94 Autocratic Leadership 1 
1991-94 Plant Management 3 
1991-94 Employee-Management Relations 2 
1991-94 Heavy Infrastructure 2 
1992 Planned Expansion 1 
1992 Snow Storm 2 
1993 Employee Share Issue 1 
1993 Loss 0** 
1993 Stockpiled Inventory 1 
August 1993 Leaked Document 1 
August 1993- Procurement War 3 
September 1993 Union/Management Meeting 2 
December 1993 Employee/Management Meeting 7 
December 1993- Stock Shortage, Short Days and Lower Wages 11 
January 1994- Share Price 7 
January 1994- Increased Rumours 9 
January 1994- Reduced Morale 5 
Feb-March 1994 T. A. Pacific: Change in Major Shareholding 4 
March 1994 Unusual Events (Packing Bags, Bankers) 2 
March 1994 Investigative Accountant 1 
March 1994 Creditors Reclaiming Property 2 
KEY: * The departure of Seafield's plant manager was mentioned in passing by two employees, but was not 
seen as a concern. 
* * The 1993 loss of $4.8 million was not reported as of concern by any of the interviewees. However, 
the interviewees indicated that some of their colleagues were concerned. 
Predictably, the single employee who was unaware that the company was distressed 
observed or heard of no problems or concerns prior to collapse. Furthermore, he 
maintained that the other employees had no obvious concerns over the company's 
future. This assertion was incorrect. One potential explanation for this anomalous 
finding is that this employee may have been an isolate individual. That is, he had 
little informal contact with other employees. 58 However, the ignorance over the 
company's dilemma was not restricted to this individual. A small proportion of 
58 Indeed, this employee will be revealed as one of two isolates in the next chapter, which discusses the findings concerning 
the grapevine's role in distress. 
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employees did not believe the company was struggling, but rather that management 
was intentionally misrepresenting the company's performance in order to reduce the 
workers' pay and conditions. These employees were typified as traditional old-style 
union members who had worked at other meat processing companies. 59 
In total 22 events were reported as a concern. Two others, the departure of the plant 
manager and the 1993 loss, were not. However, management turnover is a symptom 
of distress which the employees observed, and the 1993 loss was viewed as a concern 
by others within the plant. 
By identifying 22 distinct events over a five year time frame, the employees 
demonstrated a level of perception far greater than that proposed in the scant 
literature. As Table 8.1 indicates, most of the employees' observations occurred 
during the last 12 months of Fortex's life. However, there was one notable 
exception, the construction of the Silverstream plant in Mosgiel during 1990. 
4.1. Pre-1994 
4.1.1. Silvers/ream - The Big Project 
Mentioned by 12 people, Silverstream's construction was the first event in Fortex's 
life which caused widespread concern amongst the Seafield workers. An 
interpretation of the reasons offered for such concern revealed two distinct themes. 
The first, and most common, was self-interest. The second was related to the plant's 
economic viability. 
4.1.1.1. Se/finterest 
Nine of the interview subjects indicated that due to its site and size, Silverstream was 
viewed as a potential threat to their jobs and financial security. Its construction was 
59 
The meat industry has traditionally had a strong and vocal union, and was characterised by repetitive management-union 
conflict. However, the employment agreements which Fortex achieved in 1988 signalled a power shift in the relationship 
between processors and the Meat Workers Union. These old-style union members were employees with experience in the 
confrontational approach previously common in the meat industry. Most ofFortex's employees had no experience with 
other companies and therefore had no preconceptions or prejudices against the management of a processing plant. 
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also a catalyst for change, with employees noting that after this period management 
played one plant against another. For instance, one respondent stated that: 
" ... as soon as that Silverstream plant was built that's when things started to 
change and youfelt a bit uneasy about your own job, and maybe you wouldn't 
get a full year 's work. " 
The plant was situated near Southland which produces the largest pool of stock in the 
South Island. Traditionally stock from Southland was transported to the Seafield 
plant in Canterbury for processing. The employees realised that after Silverstream 
was constructed th~re would be little point transporting stock to their plant. 
Therefore, they expected Silverstream to reduce the number of animals they 
processed. 
Despite workers being guaranteed a minimum number of weeks employment per 
year, a shortage of lambs could potentially affect their wages in two ways: 
• Firstly, the minimum number of guaranteed weeks would be exceeded where lamb 
numbers were sufficiently high. 
• Secondly, the employees were also paid on an incentive system. Hence, after a 
prescribed level, their daily wage varied depending on the number of sheep 
processed. Where lamb numbers were short, wages would be substantially 
diminished. 
Initially the workers' fears were allayed when the managmg director, Graeme 
Thompson, stated that there was sufficient stock for two plants, and that Silverstream 
would be operated as the seasonal plant. However, this did not eventuate. 
Silverstream, like Seafield, operated all year around and the employees' 
apprehensions over the new plant were proved correct. Even under normal 
conditions, Silverstream's operations affected Seafield in the 'shoulders of the 
season' where stock was short. In times of widespread stock shortages, such as in 
1993, Seafield's throughput was severely reduced due to Silverstream's proximity to 
the largest supply of lambs. 
The employees also reported that just after construction, stock was regularly 
transferred from Seafield to Silverstream. The inter-plant stock movement was a 
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common topic of conversation amongst the employees. From contact with a relative 
who transported lambs to the plants, one of the respondents' confirmed that animals 
were taken from Seafield to Silverstream. However, he reported that the stock was 
transferred depending upon what each plant was cutting at the time, or that it was 
required to cover occasional shortages each plant experienced. Moreover, the same 
respondent indicated that, while stock was occasionally taken from Seafield to 
Silverstream, the reverse also occurred. No mention of this was made by Seafield's 
employees who only focused on the negative aspect of inter-plant stock movement. 
The lack of speculation or comment about Silverstream to Seafield stock movements 
again indicates that many of the employees' concerns about Silverstream were 
essentially caused by self-interest. 
4.1.1.2. Economic Viability 
Silverstream's construction was regarded by five respondents as a concern at the time 
for three economic reasons.60 Firstly: 
"We couldn't really understand where all the money had come from for 
Silvers/ream and that's what made some of us think. I suppose in the back of 
our mind we thought with the money being spent down there where the hell did 
they get it all from after only being in business a short period of time. " 
According to this employee, his colleagues shared the same concern over the amount 
of money spent on Silverstream and where that money came from. This comment 
was echoed by another employee, who asserted that there was: 
" ... a bit of concern when they built it and the cost at the time from some of the 
workers. I didn't understand quite what was going on because it was still early 
days for me, but some of the chaps that had been there a while were a bit 
concerned about spending that much money that they really didn 't have. They 
felt they didn't have that sort ofmoney to spend" 
These comments are unusual because the company's public listing in 1990 was for 
the explicit purpose of raising the capital necessary to build the Silverstream plant 
(FGAR, 1990). As approximately 80 percent ofthe company's employees were also 
shareholders (FGAR, 1990), they should have been aware that their investment had 
60 
Two of the interviewees indicated that they were concerned about the construction of Silverstream for both reasons. That 
is, the impact on their jobs and the financial implications for the company as a whole. 
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helped fund the expansiOn. Nevertheless, the expense involved in establishing 
Silverstream has been cited post-collapse as a contributing element in Fortex's 
demise (Brett, 1994). 
The second concern was the period of time in which Silverstream was constructed. 
Three employees believed that the expansion involved in constructing Silverstream 
was too rapid, particularly when the size of the investment was considered: 
"Going back a bit I felt the company had grown too fast. I could see that they 
had borrowed a lot of money to build Silverstream." 
Thirdly, a single employee, also concerned over Silverstream at the time of its 
construction, indicated both its cost and timing as the reason. However, in this 
instance a ratiocination was provided. The employee believed that the Silverstream 
expansion was undertaken in an inappropriate period where the existing plant, 
Seafield, was struggling and financial performance was poor: 
"I was a bit concerned when they put money into building Silverstream because 
I actually thought what they had going, the lamb slaughter and deer slaughter 
at Seafield, was more or less just paying its way. " 
While the respondent understood the benefits of having a plant in an area which 
provided the majority of the South Island's sheep, he was concerned about the 
financial demands the expansion placed on a company which was only marginally 
profitable: 
" .. .I could see advantages of having a plant down south, but meeting the 
demands of finance, I couldn't see them doing it. Just off the top of my head I 
think it was something like $40m, I might be wrong there. At I 0 percent 
interest we're looking at $4m in interest payments, but it would have been jar 
more than that. The interest payments alone would have been staggering. It 
doesn't sound like much but when you've got a work force that are all earning 
in the vicinity of $18 to $25 an hour, when you're trying to keep that and buy 
stock and make money at the end, it doesn't stack up well. I had a feeling that 
they might have been biting off a bit more than they could chew. " 
While the figures are not accurate, (Silverstream cost $52 million (FGAR, 1991), $30 
million of which was capital funded (FGAR, 1990)), this employee's concern over 
the company's lack of financial performance when combined with such a large 
project is significant. 
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Silverstream, which more than doubled the company's assets, could be interpreted as 
Argenti's (1976a) 'big project.' After Fortex failed, meat industry analysts reported 
the plant's cost, over-capacity, and processing rigidity meant its construction was 
unwise and instead of contributing to the company's success, was an important 
mistake which led to its demise (Brett, 1994). The fact that the employees perceived 
the importance of analysing the plant's financial impact on the company, which was 
the subject of later criticism, indicates that they may be able to observe not only the 
non-financial symptoms of distress but mistakes which occur much earlier. 
4.1.2. Expansion 
Concern over Fortex's expansionary activities was not restricted to Silverstream, but 
extended to the 'grandiose' proposal that the company build a processing plant in the 
UK: 
"We felt there was a quite a bit of tidying up here before that ever happened It 
seemed for a fledgling company to be overreaching. That must make you 
vulnerable. " 
While only raised by a single employee, this planned expansion was also reported to 
have caused some discontent amongst other employees. These feelings were held 
during 1992, the period in which the investment was first proposed (FGAR, 1992). 
The indication that some employees believed the company was expanding too 
rapidly, a point which is obvious in hindsight but received no external comment at 
the time, again indicates that, as insiders, employees may observe more than just the 
non-financial systems of distress. 
4.1.3. Wastage and Inefficiency 
In September 1991, the employees were threatened with a 10 percent pay reduction. 
In response, Binnie wrote a letter outlining union concerns over inefficiencies and 
wastage in the production process. Within the letter, directed to the plant manager, 
David Hearn, and the managing director, Graeme Thompson, Binnie " ... espoused 
ideas as to why the company wasn't performing and there were many matters that 
should be looked at before they looked at attacking the workers and the wages. " 
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The problems outlined in the letter were estimated to have caused $2 million in lost 
profitability. That is, if the plant worked at 100 percent efficiency, and all production 
was sold, the company's 1991 profit would have increased by $2 million, to $4.89m. 
However, Binnie was surprised at the reaction the letter received: 
"What surprised me, and now with hindsight I can say with a deal of accuracy, 
was Graeme Thompson didn't want to know.... Thompson was just 
disinterested, as if to say yes we have received your letter, we have received 
your complaint,. now go away and don 't say anything about it. " 
Later independent calculations performed by management verified that the 
inefficiencies had potentially reduced the company's profit by $2m. It took another 
two and a half years until the problems were resolved and efficiency neared 100 
percent. 
In a company lauded for its efficiency ( du Chateau and Leggat, 1992), such wastage, 
and the impact on total earnings and cash flows is significant. Inefficient production 
contributes to a company's demise (Scherrer, 1988; Lingard, 1989), and it provides 
partial explanation for the company's poor profits and operating cash flows in the 
1990 and 1991 financial years.61 
The concerns over time wastage and inefficiency prompted the union to design and 
maintain an informal accounting information system. 62 However, like the 
employees' concerns over the construction of the Silverstream plant, the poor 
efficiency was raised where there was likely to be a direct impact on employees' pay 
packets. 
4.1.4. Management Turnover 
Six weeks after Binnie presented his letter, Seafield manager David Hearn left the 
company. Hearn's departure was remarked upon in Fortex's 1991 annual report 
which stated that: 
61 
62 
However, as has been revealed post-collapse, even when the budgeted production levels were achieved, Fortex's high 
fixed wage costs meant that, compared to its rivals, it remained inefficient (Brett, 1994). At its peak, Fortex produced 
13,000 units per week. For the same wage costs its rivals would produce 18,000 units (Brett, 1994). 
The IAIS will be examined separately in Chapter 10, p 225. 
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"Since balance date, David Hearn, General Manager at Seafield, left the 
employment of the company. Tribute must be accorded to the central part he 
played in the development of Seafield and for spearheading the introduction of 
shiftwork at the plant" (1991, p 10). 
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However, the explanation of the departure provided in the annual report was 
inaccurate. Rather than the euphemism 'leaving the company', Hearn had been 
dismissed. The interview candidates indicated that Hearn's departure was not 
amicable. According to one of the employees: 
"I think he [Hearn] was probably sick and tired of what was going on in the 
company and he decided to have a go on his own and he ended up getting 
escorted off the plant. He got locked out in the end. " 
Furthermore, this same employee stated that, in his opinion, Hearn was unhappy with 
the direction the company was going, and the speed with which it was growing, and 
that after his dismissal, the locks to his former office were changed. While only 
being an opinion, it provides a potential explanation for his departure. 
Alternatively, Binnie criticised Hearn's performance in the letter which Thompson 
received. He reported that "[t]he plant needed leadership. That it needed to be a 
huge team effort, and that Dave Hearn, whether he liked it or not, was the captain of 
the team and he had to perform. " Thompson may have taken more notice of the 
letter's content than Binnie thought and dismissed Hearn for poor performance. 
A change in management creates stress within an organisation and contributes to 
failure (Robb, 1986b). The dismissal of an executive member as the result of a 
dispute signifies a management function divided over the company's strategy and 
objective. Because of its sudden nature, a dismissal is a more stressful event than 
other management changes, such as a retirement, which may be planned for in 
advance (Robb, 1986b ). If Hearn was dismissed because of a disagreement between 
himself and other executives, the event would have been likely to cause more distress 
within the company. However, regardless of the cause, the departure of senior 
management is an indicator of distress (Gilson, 1989, 1990; Hambrick and D'Aveni, 
1992). 
160 EMPLOYEES' OBSERVATIONS, INFORMAL INFORMATION AND CORPORATE DISTRESS 
4.1.5. Management 
The union delegates, and in particular union secretary, Peter Binnie, indicated that 
they were critical of plant and head-office management around the period in which 
Hearn was dismissed. 
4.1.5.1. Graeme Thompson -Potential Autocrat 
As reported earlier, Binnie ~as surprised at the reception managing director Graeme 
Thompson gave his letter which outlined production problems. Later in the 
interview, he remarked that: 
"The whole way through Thompson was the kingpin and everyone fell in line 
with what Thompson wanted or said or did. It was always Thompson 's baby. " 
A managing director who fails to listen to advice, such as Binnie's letter, and 
dominates an organisation, which this quote indicates Thompson as being seen to do, 
is one of the crucial elements which underlies many company failures (Argenti, 
1976a; Miller, 1977; Makridakis, 1993). However, even if Thompson had ignored 
the advice, Binnie's observation is only a single instance of an action consistent with 
autocratic leadership. Such an observation does not necessarily imply that 
Thompson ignored advice from his executive colleagues which would be necessary 
before he could be termed an autocrat. However, there were three other indicators 
which may also be attributable to autocratic leadership: 
• Firstly, Thompson was perceived to be a dominant personality with one 
respondent stating: "I certainly would prescribe to the opinion that he would have 
dominated the board. The board would not have dominated him. " 
• Secondly, Hearn's dismissal was reportedly caused by a disagreement over the 
direction and strategy of the company. 
• Thirdly, Hearn's replacement, Ian Graham, was reported to have been "a bit of an 
idiot who wouldn't ask too many questions about the way head-office was running 
things." 
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Hence, Hearn, who was dissatisfied, was replaced by a manager who was perceived 
as ineffective and would not question head-office's, and Thompson's, authority and 
decisions. These three instances support Brett's (1994, p 56) post-collapse report 
that " ... Thompson became too powerful a figure within Fortex and was not 
sufficiently challenged by those around him", and provided early evidence that 
Thompson, so often in the media limelight, may have been an autocratic leader. 
4.1.5.2. Plant Management 
The two union delegates reported a concern about the performance of plant 
management, in particular a 'gulf between local and head-office management. This 
gulf had two components, strategic direction and communication. The differences in 
strategy were rectified with the dismissal of Hearn and the appointment of Ian 
Graham. However, Graham was perceived to be incompetent, spending most of the 
afternoon asleep in his office. 
Despite the a new plant manager, the communications gap remained. According to 
the employees, Graham and other plant management were poorly informed and did 
not seem to be aware of what was happening within the company. During the last six 
months of the company's life plant management were unable to answer many of the 
questions the union and employees raised. To avoid this problem the union dealt 
directly with head-office management in Christchurch. 
The communication gap between head-office and the Seafield plant's management 
was apparent when the company collapsed. Plant management did not seem to be 
any more aware of the severity of Fortex's distress than many employees. Several 
indicated that Graham was as surprised and distressed upon the announcement of 
receivership as themselves, and was heard to say that he did not know the company 
was going to be placed into receivership. 
Earlier Graham had given assurances that the company would not fail. One 
employee made the following statement to support his assertion that Graham was 
incompetent: 
"One of the things I questioned strongly ... the general manager [Ian Graham] 
of the company then came to us at the end and said don 't worry there is no 
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problem. I couldn't believe that, I wasn't the only one that had these questions 
buzzing around, I wasn 't the only one that could see these stockpiles of meat, 
that knew about the high prices being paid, I cannot believe that he did not 
know that company was in trouble. " 
If Graham was incompetent, his ineffectual management o~ the Seafield plant would 
have contributed to the company's demise. However, the above comment also raises 
two other possible scenarios. Firstly, the lack of information plant management 
received is consistent with autocratic leadership and power-hoarding by the senior 
management. Secondly, a reduced supply of information to plant management and 
employees could have been an attempt to hide the severity of the company's 
problems. Often in distress, senior management try to conceal problems (Argenti, 
1977). Hence, the lack of information held by plant management was a significant 
indication of problems within Fortex. 
4.1. 6. Employee/Management Relations 
The employee-management relationship at the plant was reportedly strained by two 
events. Firstly, two employees indicated there was widespread concern that union 
delegates had a tendency to be offered jobs as foremen. From their perspective, this 
placed the company in a superior position in wage negotiations as they had former 
union representatives who 'knew the answers'. Upon leaving their role as delegates, 
these foremen were treated differently by the other employees. 
Secondly, one of the two employees also reported that plant management was 
difficult to deal with, particularly regarding their work and conditions. The 
employment contract under which the employees worked contained provisions 
whereby re-work or less than full speed production could result in wage deductions. 
This particular employee believed that they had wages deducted for trivial reasons. 
Furthermore, he believed management took the workers for granted. However, this 
received no comment from other employees and no mention was made of the 
bonuses made when the employees exceeded expectations. Similarly, union 
delegates did not make any reference to management difficulties in this respect. 
Therefore, despite Robb (1986a) and Lingard (1989) reporting that labour relations 
difficulties contribute to distress, this single observation is likely be insignificant. 
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4.1. 7. Heavy Infrastructure 
From their position inside the company, and because they were also shareholders, 
two employees felt that the company was overburdened with salaried staff: 
"As workers we felt they had far too many salaried staff on plant. We felt they 
had too many in the office. That was from a shareholder's point of view. We 
spoke of that a lot as workers just around the table at smoko. Saying well what 
the hell does he do? He does Fall. There was a lot of that so definitely they 
were over-staffed in the salary point of view. I always personally felt that. " 
For example, one employee reported that Seafield had 13 people in sales whereas the 
new company which subsequently opened at the Seafield site had only one. While 
this is a dramatic example, there are substantial differences between F ortex and the 
new company. Fortex was market driven, producing specialist products, and also 
produced a much larger volume of product. 
A week prior to receivership, Fortex's board of directors was considered too large 
and, like many other facets of the organisation, needed streamlining (McEwen, 
1994). However, in a distress context an inappropriate number of staff appears to be 
unmentioned. It is feasible that an excessive number of employees, who serve no 
function, could contribute to distress through high wage or salary costs. However, 
what would constitute excessive is open to wide interpretation. By itself, 13 people 
in sales is unlikely to contribute significantly to distress unless, like the board of 
directors, the overstaffing was common to the whole company. 
4.1.8. The 1993 Share Issue- Cash Flows, Leverage and Financial Structure 
A single person highlighted the 1993 offer of shares to the employees as the initial 
time in which her concerns originated: 
"Well I was quite suspicious because the share offer, you know, that they 
offered us didn't sound very convincing to me and I happened to mention it to 
the guy Mullens [sic] and I said that they sounded quite desperate selling them 
to me. And I said well its obviously going under, are we in financial difficulty? 
And he said if I thought that don 't buy the them then. So I said I won 't. So I 
didn't." 
She informed her work colleagues of her concerns. However, they disagreed, and 
were not at all concerned over the share issue. They had no reason to be. The share 
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issues had occurred in each of the last three years and were seen as commonplace. 
However, it was the financial controller's, Michael Mullen's, demeanour and not just 
the share issue that raised the concerns. While the 'obviousness' of the company's 
financial position is debatable, and is undoubtedly influenced by hindsight, that this 
interviewee found the attitude of Mullen selling the shares unusual, is worthy of 
further attention. 
The July 1993 share issue, which was to be the last offer made through the employee 
share scheme, occurred near the end ofF ortex' s 1993 financial year. The year which 
finished on August 31, saw Fortex post its worst financial performance, a $4.8 
million loss. Due to the loss, the planned expansion into the United Kingdom was 
postponed. Furthermore, Fortex was in a period of consolidation. Hence, this share 
offer was made in a time where major capital expansion was not planned to be 
undertaken. 
While share offers are made by successful firms, the identification of this as a 
concern at the time, even if by a single individual, is interesting in hindsight. Fortex 
struggled throughout 1993 and was shown by Robb (1994) to have poor cash flows 
and be overleveraged (Brett, 1994). Organisations have a variety of ways to raise 
additional financing. However, where an company is overleveraged debt funding 
may be unavailable (Brigham and Gapenski, 1991). Hence, they may alternatively 
liquidate assets or sell capital stock. As such, selling stock, except where it is utilised 
for long term capital expansion, is often accepted as an indicator of a company which 
is financially unbalanced or struggling. 
4.1.9. The 1993 Loss 
Posited as a financial indicator of distress (Giroux and Wiggins, 1984) the 1993 loss 
of $4.8 million reportedly caused disappointment amongst employees. The 
employees felt they had worked hard during that year, yet their effort was not 
reflected in the company's financial performance. While disappointing, the loss was 
perceived to be small, and consequently was not reported as a concern by any of the 
interviewees. However, two interviewees reported the loss did engender concern 
amongst some oftheir colleagues. 
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4.1.10. Snow Storm 
The 1993 loss was attributed to procurement difficulties caused by a severe snow 
storm which occurred in the 1992 lambing season. Thompson attempted to 
rationalise the effect of the storm away, stating that: 
"The overall effect of this on Fortex will be diminished, however. This is 
because our suppliers are spread throughout the South Island, and lambing 
takes place over a number of weeks. Bad weather only affects a proportion of 
farmers at any one time" (FGAR, 1992, p 10). 
However, the effect was much worse than Thompson predicted. The storm, an 
industry specific natural environmental event which contributes to distress (Milburn 
et al, 1983; Dunn, 1986) affected the suppliers, (itself another industry specific event 
(Milburn et al, 1983)), so severely that Fortex's throughput was reduced by half a 
million lambs (FGAR, 1993). 
The employees were aware that the storm was more severe than Thompson had 
publicly stated. Binnie was a farmer and therefore saw the impact first hand. Most 
of the other employees had relatives or friends who were farmers. Furthermore, 
employees from the plant had also assisted farmers to move stock before, and clean 
up after, the storm. The employees related examples where a farmer had lost all but 
three sheep from a mob of 486. They understood the storm had caused horrific stock 
losses: 
"A lot of the guys .from down there went out and helped the farmers and that. It 
was a big concern because it was going to affect our living, and the big lamb 
loss, well we knew they would have to pay more for the lambs anyway because 
they were scarcer. " 
The storm, which is also a Category C life event (Robb, 1986b), affected Fortex's 
profitability significantly. Fortex was in a poor financial position at the end of the 
1993 financial year. The next year was Fortex's last. The loss sustained in this 
period severely weakened the company to the extent that it could not survive the 
intense competition over lamb procurement in the 1994 season. 
166 EMPLOYEES' OBSERVATIONS, INFORMAL INFORMATION AND CORPORATE DISTRESS 
4.2. 1994: The Year of Collapse 
In general, the employees became concerned as the company entered the 1994 
financial year. From August 1993 until the company's demise eight months later, 12 
of the 22 events which the interviewees found concerning-were reported. These 12 
events accounted for 54 ofthe 81 total observations.63 
The year started with the union receiving information that changes in the employees' 
pay and conditions were being considered. 
4.2.1. Leaked Documents 
In August 1993, Peter Binnie reported that, through informal means, the uniOn 
received leaked information from a document prepared by the board of directors. 
The document outlined 13 points to reduce employees' wages which were necessary 
for the company to become profitable. 
Binnie confronted head-office management with the proposition that the document 
existed. The existence of the document was denied at first. However, within a week 
he was shown a copy of it by a manager. According to Binnie this was the time that 
he began to get concerned. 64 
4.2.2. Union/Management Meeting 
Soon after Binnie received the leaked document, in September 1993, the union 
delegates from the Seafield and Silverstream plants were summoned to a meeting in 
Oamaru. Also present were managing director, Thompson, the general manager of 
group operations, Stuart Macintosh, and the general manager of corporate 
development, Steve Mander. 
63 
The information was presented in Table 8.1, p 152 of this thesis. 
64 
As will be seen later, each individual employee's concerns originated at different points in time. 
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At this meeting, a month after the financial year in which a $4.8 million loss was 
incurred, management indicated that the company had to improve its earnings. To do 
so they requested union assistance to improve the productivity of both plants. This 
was the first official notification of the severity of the company's financial position 
and could be viewed as the presentation of financial symptoms. Together company 
management and union delegates developed an agreement which was would increase 
productivity throughout the plant. 
This meeting confirmed Binnie's concerns which originated with the leaked 
document. After this period the union took more notice of the company's position, 
and began monitoring changes in share prices and shareholdings. 
4.2.3. Management/Employee Meeting 
In December 1993 another meeting was called. Thompson informed the employees 
that the company was struggling. The reason for the struggle was yet another 
procurement war, the third in four years. Due to intense competition Fortex was 
paying between $70 and $100 per lamb.65 However, the problem was said to be 
short-term. Thompson requested the employees' assistance to save money and 
sustain the company through a 'rough period.' 
The joint management-union plan to increase productivity was revealed. The plan 
involved speeding up the processing chain, a reduction in holiday pay and working 
an extra half hour a day without a wages. A small minority of employees wanted to 
reject the proposal believing that the company was using it as a ploy to reduce wages. 
However, a majority vote prevailed. The employees accepted the plan to assist the 
company, but the conflicting opinion between the two groups resulted in decreasing 
morale amongst the workforce. 
Of the seven employees who commented on the December meeting, six indicated 
that it was the point which their worries started. Again self-interest was also evident. 
65 
In the I 990 and I 99 I financial years the average price Fortex paid for lambs was approximately $34. In the subsequent 
two years annual reports no further mention was made ofthe price. 
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The extra production was viewed as a pay cut which was an additional reason why 
the employees were concerned. Despite any concerns, the employees believed that as 
a result of their efforts, the company was going to recover and again be successful: 
"Well we were told we needed to tighten the reign and we had to do some 
things to help the company out. But never any inkling of what finally came out 
in the last few days of Fortex." 
The one interviewee who stated that he was not concerned after the meeting, asserted 
that the agreement "looked good in the media on the employees' and union's part. " 
He also believed that management "knew what they were doing" and the company 
would recover. 
4.2.4. Procurement War 
During the 1994 financial year, Fortex was involved in a fierce procurement war 
which saw unrealistic prices being paid for lambs (Brett, 1994). In some cases the 
prices paid were above that which the processed meat could be sold for (Brett, 1994). 
For example, Brett reported that during the Christmas 1993 period, Fortex and its 
rivals, PPCS and Alliance, purchased lambs for prices in excess of $48, which was 
$8 more than the market would pay for the meat. However, the employees indicated 
that the $48 figure was conservative. 
At the December meeting in 1993, the employees were informed that Fortex was 
purchasing lambs for between $70 and $100. In a period where a lamb would only 
yield $40 of meat, Fortex was purchasing lambs at twice their realisable value. From 
this evidence it is obvious how Fortex incurred the $30 million inventory 
revaluations which were a component of the 1994's predicted $45 to $50 million 
interim loss. 
Three employees reported that they were aware of the inflated prices paid and that 
the procurement war had occurred for the duration ofFortex's last season. They also 
identified that Fortex's major protagonist was PPCS. Fortex had attempted to head 
PPCS off in the market in an attempt to maintain its market share. However, in 
doing so, Fortex's stock buyers resorted to purchasing inferior quality lambs. 
Therefore, as well as purchasing lambs at prices more than double those paid three 
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seasons ago, and twice what the market would pay for them, Fortex was purchasing 
lambs of poorer quality than before. This example indicates the severe effect the 
price war was inflicting upon the company which, at the time, was financially weaker 
than its major procurement rival, PPCS. 
Despite the high prices and lower quality of lambs, the employees were pleased that 
the company attempted to maintain its market share: 
"Oh yes everyone was aware of that [that Fortex was paying considerably 
higher prices than their competitors], everyone was aware of that. But I guess 
on one hand we didn 't mind because we were getting the stock to kill. " 
Hence, the employees interviewed recognised that Fortex was involved in a battle 
with PPCS. However, while competition is an industry specific event which 
contributes to company failure (Sharma and Mahajan, 1980; Makridakis, 1991; 
Greatorex et al, 1994), none of the respondents saw PPCS's actions as threatening the 
company at the time: 
"We knew the company must have been under pressure, but then no-one sort of 
knew what the profitability of lamb was. " 
Post-collapse, a 'conspiracy theory' was expounded whereby PPCS used its superior 
financial position to inflate prices for the specific purpose of harming Fortex (Brett, 
1994; The Independent, 1994). However, the employees only became aware ofthat 
scenario when hearing industry rumours after the collapse. Through such means, 
they also heard that PPCS were produced price schedules containing prices at which 
they had no intention of purchasing lambs. Fortex relied on such schedules and set 
their prices higher, needlessly wasting money. 
4.3. Symptoms of Distress 
4.3.1. Stock Shortage, Short Days and Lower Wages 
PPCS's actions were only one of four reasons which contributed to Fortex's inability. 
to procure sufficient stock in the 1994 financial year. The other three reasons were 
that: 
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1. The stock numbers had not recovered from the effects of the storm in the 1992 
season. 
2. Due to favourable weather the pastures were lush. Therefore, farmers were 
holding onto their lambs longer so they would increase in weight. 
3. In the last two months the farmers became reluctant to send in stock because they 
were concerned that they would not receive any payment. 
4.3.1.1. Short Days 
The employees became aware of the difficulty Fortex was having procuring stock. It 
was December 1993, the peak of the season. In previous years the plant had been 
operating at full capacity. In this year, the amount of lambs processed was reducing 
each week. The employees' days were getting shorter. Short days meant reduced 
wages. One interviewee detailed his rising concern: 
" ... and then toward the finish I got concerned, I even talked toforemans [sic] 
about it. Peak of the season's when other works are at their peak, prior to 
Christmas and just after Christmas when the new season was underway, other 
works were at peak capacity, we were getting short days, short weeks .... Three 
day weeks in the peak of the season-and I said to foremen that there is 
something wrong with this company. It started to get an eerie feeling around 
the whole plant. No trucks coming in, no stock going in, it just got us 
concerned that something was not right. " 
Unsurprisingly, the short days and reduced wages were indicated as a concern by 11 
of the 14 employees who identified concerns of any form. 66 However, they could not 
understand why Fortex was experiencing such trouble purchasing stock when they 
were aware that their competitors were having no such problems: 
"We were getting a bit surprised because the other works started picking up a 
wee bit .... Out of our three days a week we were sort of only doing a day and a 
half, or not even that some days, and they [the PPCS plant Fairton] were sort 
ofgettingfour days a week." 
The information on Fairton's processing came informally from friends and relatives 
who worked at the rival company. Other employees reported that they knew PPCS 
66 
Remembering that one employee had absolutely no concerns prior to the company's failure. 
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was processing more with one stating " ... we couldn't figure it out as to where the 
stock shortage was, you know, because other works were doing okay. " 
The volume of stock steadily decreased. In the last month to six weeks, the shortages 
became so severe that the agreement forged in December 1993, allowing for extra 
production, became ineffective. There was simply not enough stock available. 
During this period the minimum daily quota was impossible to attain. The company 
supplemented the employees wages to make them up to the minimum payment 
levels. 
4.3.1.2. J?art.ners 
The farmers' reluctance to send stock in became more pronounced towards the end of 
the company's trading. They completely stopped providing stock two weeks prior to 
the collapse, requesting guaranteed payment before they would consider re-supplying 
Fortex (Hutching, 1994; MacFie, 1994). These guarantees were not provided. 
Argenti (1976c) reports that suppliers becoming suspicious and restricting delivery is 
a non-financial symptom of distress. 
The earliest media coverage of farmers' concerns was Tuesday March 15, 1994 
(Birss, 1994a). However, five of the employees indicated that they were aware of the 
farmers' reluctance up to two months prior to receivership: 
"Some of the people that actually worked out there at the time were on farms 
or had dealing with farmers. They were letting me know then that they weren 't 
going to send the stock in. They didn't feel that Fortex were going to pay 
them." 
Hence, employees identified this problem through their inside position prior to 
external media coverage. These employees identified two reasons given for the 
farmers reluctance to provide lambs. Firstly, that some of the payments for stock 
were received late: 
"[t]here had been some delays to payment. Because traditionally the meat 
industry pays 14 days later. So whatever happened people had to make a 
judgement that everything was going to be okay in 14 days time for them to get 
their money and obviously they weren't prepared to take that risk. " 
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Secondly, within the last few weeks there was a general feeling in the farming 
community that all was not well with Fortex: 
"I think there may have been a bit of a whisper out in the community before it 
became official because it didn't take long for most farmers to know that they 
shouldn't be sending their stock there." 
4.3.2. Stockpiled Meat 
Fortex's annual reports indicated an increasing inventory value each year. Of the 
company's proposed 1994 interim loss, up to $30 million was due to inventory write-
downs (Brett, 1994). The excessive prices paid for lambs in the early part of the 
1994 financial year undoubtedly contributed to the write-downs. Moreover, court 
proceedings have also revealed that the inventory was purposely miscoded to inflate 
stock levels and profitability (The Press, 1995d). However, not all of the inventory 
consisted of over-valuation. Between 1990 and 1994 there was also an increase in 
the physical volume of inventory held by the company. 
Three interviewees indicated that they were aware of the high inventory levels. One 
had first hand knowledge from his position in the shipping office. The other two 
had heard received information from other employees within the company regarding 
the inventory levels. One of the two who gained information from other employees 
reported that: 
"Some of the guys from the chiller said 'we've got a big lot up at Ashcold ' It 
was .filling up. You know there was always an excuse like the ship was coming 
or something else, an order had been cancelled, and they were trying to find 
new markets. " 
The excuses provided meant those that heard such information were not concerned 
about the levels of stock. Conversely, the one employee who worked in the shipping 
office was surprised at the amount of stock remaining unsold and stated that: 
"We didn't seem to have large quantities of stock going out. We had large 
stockpiles of meat, and I mean stockpiles of meat dating back years. I can't see 
that as being good business. " 
He identified the inventory build up as conflicting with public perception, and, in 
particular, the awards Fortex was winning for its marketing strategies: 
"But to me what they were doing was sending over some pretty prime cuts of 
meat to markets overseas, but other cuts of meat were not going anywhere they 
CASE STUDY: EMPLOYEES AND DISTRESS 
were just sitting in boxes in freezers. It wasn't just lamb either, it was venison 
as well." 
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This respondent also identified that, as well as the inventory level being large and 
increasing in size, much of it was old stock. Some meat remained unsold and 
reached its 'use by date.' Furthermore, it was not uncommon for meat that left 
Seafield to come back a year or two later for re-work in attempt to fmd another 
market for it: 
"It seemed like a bit of a juggling act at times, you know. Sometimes the meat 
would be here then it would go and you would think it would be sold 
somewhere but I think it was just a matter of moving it from A to B, between 
there and to Ashcold or Hornby wherever. I think it was just a matter of 
manoeuvring this stuff around. " 
This interviewee's concerns were reportedly shared by most of the other employees 
in the shipping office, and freezer and chiller areas. These workers repeatedly 
questioned management as to why, if the company had all these markets overseas, 
they had so much in storage. Typical responses were that "[w}e 're making ends 
meet. This will sell eventually. " However, despite reassurances, the observation of 
stock past its use by date and other stock one or two years old, was regarded as a 
concern. In a company which received accolades for its exporting expertise and its 
marketing focus, the inability to sell stock before it reached its use by date would 
have caused even more concern if it had been known by parties external to the 
company. 
In itself, an increased level of inventory is a non-financial indicator of distress 
(Argenti, 1976a). However, in this instance a portion of the stock was also old, at the 
extreme being past its use by date. As such it could constitute Argenti's (1976a) 
outdated product. An outdated product is one which has not changed to meet 
customers needs. Some of Fortex's inventory did not meet market demand and 
therefore remained unsold for years. 
The increasing stock pile has two other implications. Firstly, Fortex's marketing 
strategies, which were geared towards the high quality cut of meat, were neglecting 
the less valuable cuts. Alternatively, its marketing personnel were having trouble 
finding buyers who wanted such cuts. Poor marketing strategies or producing goods 
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for which there is no demand contribute to the failure of any organisation (Scherrer, 
1988; Lingard, 1989). 
Secondly, an increase in inventory levels is often an indicator of a company which is 
overtrading in an attempt to increase in size. In itself an increase in inventory is not 
definitively linked to overtrading (Robertson and Mills, 1991). However, at the same 
time, Fortex was producing very low profits while substantially increasing turnover. 
These three elements in conjunction would seemingly indicate an overtrading 
company. 
4.3.3. Sharemarket Activity 
4.3.3.1. Share Price 
Posited by Argenti (1976a) as a non-financial sign of distress, decreasing share price 
was a factor which was purportedly observed by the distressed company's 
accountants. However, in this case the employees were closely monitoring the share 
price both individually and through updates provided at work by the union. 
For Binnie, monitoring the share price began after the union/management meeting in 
September 1993. The union believed the shares were undervalued and should have 
been priced at somewhere about the $1 to $1.20 range. Hence, when they price 
fluctuated in January and plummeted in February and March, the union became 
concerned and checked the price even more frequently: 
"At one part of it there we [the union] were monitoring the share-price about 
every hour. We were checking on that. We kept the workforce fully informed 
on an hourly basis as to what was happening with the shares. " 
Six other employees mentioned the falling share price as a significant indicator of 
how the company was performing. 
There were several reasons given as to why the share price was monitored so closely. 
One employee asserted that it indicated the company's viability or whether they 
could be open to takeover. Another responded that: 
"We saw the share price as being a pretty useful barometer to those people, 
particularly the institutions, with their ear to the ground. If anything untoward 
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was happening they would be unloading [shares] and that appeared to be what 
they were doing. " 
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Another potential reason why employees monitored shares was that 11 of the 
interviewees held or were paying off shares when the company failed. As such they 
were assessing the decreasing value of their own investment, which for many was 
going to be used for superannuation purposes. By failing to sell their shares, the 
employees seemed unconcerned about their investment. However, there are other 
potential reasons why the investments were not sold: 
• Firstly, those employees who were paying their shares off in instalments had no 
option to sell the shares because until the shares were fully paid they did not 
receive the share scripts. However, they could have requested that their payments 
be stopped. 
• Secondly, it was not worth selling shares in the later months as the price was too 
low. 
• Thirdly, m many cases the shares were for superannuation purposes and not 
intended for sale in the near future anyway. 
• Fourthly, many continued to believe that the company would survive and the 
share price would increase again. 
Within the last few months, the interviewees also reported that they knew of several 
employees who had actually purchased shares, which they held when the company 
failed. Conversely, two individuals who purchased shares during the company's last 
month recognised the severity of the company's position and resold them. One of 
these individuals, an employee, sold his shares based on a rumour. In a somewhat 
unusual action, this employee continued to hold shares which he had purchased 
through the company while selling the additional shares: 
"I also bought some more shares in the last couple of weeks because I thought 
we might be able to get out of the woods, and I bought them at real cheap rate 
and I actually sold them again two days later when I got... I sort of got a little 
bit of information from somebody I maybe shouldn't have and I sold them again 
and didn 't lose anything thank God " 
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Therefore, there is conflicting evidence as to the significance of the share price to 
employees. Those who perceived the company as not going to fail may have held or 
purchased more shares, while others who were more concerned attempted to 
minimise their losses where they could. 
4.3.3.2. T. A. Pacific 
There was one specific share market event which was mentioned by four employees 
as first allaying and thEm contributing to their feeling that the company was in 
trouble. That event was the purchase and subsequent resale by T. A. Pacific of its 
13.92 percent investment. Initially the investment was a signal that the company was 
going to survive: 
"There was concerns but I think optimism sort of overshadowed it, especially 
with that T. A. Pacific business in the wind as well. We thought we had a big 
reprieve." 
Posited by Robb (1986b) as an event which causes distress, in this case the change in 
a major shareholding was a significant indication that the company was already 
severely distressed. When the investment company sold its shares two months later 
it was to provide the employees with their first definite signal that the company was 
failing: 
"When T. A. Pacific, or whatever they were, came on the scene that sort of 
gave us a false picture and by the time that had all unravelled itself the wheels 
had fallen off properly. " 
None of the four employees knew from where they heard the information about T. A. 
Pacific. When questioned one stated that "[s]omebody had told me so it must have 
been a rumour, you know. " 
4.3.4. Morale 
The combined effect of the falling share price, the reduction in T. A. Pacific's 
investment and lower wages due to shortages of lamb, caused employee morale to 
fall. One union delegate, who was in a position to have a contact with a wide variety 
of employees, reported that morale in the last few months was 'shocking': 
"Just the fact that we weren't getting full weeks any more, everyone was 
******off about that at the start, and there were two sides at work. The ones 
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that thought the company could fall over and the side that thought they're just 
having a go at us. It's just lies and anyone who believes them are just gullible 
idiots. So amongst the worliforce there was a lot of angry feeling. One side 
didn't believe the other, so it broke up friendships and workers were arguing 
about what was right and what was wrong. " 
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The other employees were evenly split. Four bel!eved morale decreased over the last 
months. Five asserted that it was the same as normal.67 Those who identified that 
their own morale was lower than normal attributed it to the lower wages which they 
were receiving. Hence, once again morale, a non-financial symptom of distress 
(Argenti, 1976a; Scherrer, 1988), was related to concerns over the employees' jobs. 
In this case, it was the reduced wages and the potential threat that they would lose 
their jobs altogether. Alternatively, another employee branded those with low morale 
pessimists who would always believe the worst case scenario. 
4.3.5. Rumour 
Morale is governed by an organisation's grapevine (Davis, 1953; Arnold, 1983). The 
grapevine communicates information via rumour. At the time morale decreased, nine 
employees indicated that there was a commensurate increase in the level of rumour 
within the company.68 Some of the rumours concerned takeover threats and 
receivership and therefore could be construed as symptoms of distress. 
4.3.6. Unusual Events 
A few weeks prior to failure, bank representatives toured the plant. One employee 
reported this event as unusual: 
"Macintosh [the General Manager of Group Operations] bought some of the 
bank guys through. They just gave the total show away by the look on their 
faces. You just sort of looked at them and you read body language and I just 
myself thought it doesn't look good because this has never happened to us. " 
Similarly, one employee, who worked in the packing room, identified the that there 
was a change in the delivery method and the quantity of packing bags ordered: 
67 
The remaining 4 interviewees did not comment on morale. 
68 
The interrelationship between rumour and morale is examined in detail in Chapter 9, p 199. 
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"I was in the packing area at the time ... boxes of bags were being airmailed 
down instead of bulk orders. Instead of palettes of bags you'd get the odd one 
coming though airfreight. " 
The departure from standard practice was unusual enough to have caused concern 
and provided this employee with more evidence that 'something was wrong.' 
Both examples suggest that unusual events and unexplained departures from standard 
practices, like the situation with the packing bags, are observed by employees. Some 
of these unusual events may be symptoms of distress or indicate distress. For 
example, with the benefit of hindsight, the interviewee concluded the change in 
packing bag delivery occurred because the company was struggling to meet its 
expenses. 
4.3. 7. Appointment of an Investigative Accountant 
The appointment of Michael Stiassney, an Auckland based accountant, on March 12 
1994 to investigate the company's financial position was indicated by the union as an 
event which signalled that the company was in trouble. Through 'keeping their ear to 
the ground,' the union found that Stiassney's report was unfavourable. However, the 
union did not release that information to the employees because "[w]e had to be very 
careful what we said because if we said the wrong thing that could have materially 
affected the sharemarket. " 
4.3.8. Companies Reclaiming Property 
A fortnight prior to the appointment of the receiver, Binnie noted an event which to 
him confirmed that the company was going to fail: 
"I guess for me one of the most telling signals was about a fortnight prior 
when, on the Friday afternoon, I learnt that one of the local carrying 
companies had been instructed to come out to the plant here and uplift all of 
ICI's chemical products that hadn't been paid for. So when that happened well 
I guess I assumed that we were getting too close. " 
This information was spread via the grapevine around the company. For example, 
another employee heard that: 
" ... then you got a whisper that ICI were trying to grab chemicals back. That 
was prior to the actual receivership and I think an oil company came and took 
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some fuel back as well. So they knew, the company knew that it was pending, 
and also these other companies must have known as well. " 
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The reclamation of unpaid goods is a recourse taken by unsecured creditors who 
believe a company will be unable to pay its debts. While not mentioned in previous 
research, it is an obvious symptom of distress. 
4.3.9. Fraud and Creative Accounting 
There were several potentially fraudulent events which were revealed after F ortex 
failed. Such events included loan 'misclassifications', miscoded inventory, and 
superannuation, union fees and medical insurance which, having been deducted form 
the employees' wages, were not forwarded to the appropriate organisations. 
Each interviewee was asked if they had any idea that these activities had occurred. 
One employee reported that: 
"I think before we even closed down this rumour passed around that certain 
loans had been misclassified or whatever, you know things were not done 
properly. " · 
However, this rumour must not have been widespread or, more likely occurred after 
the collapse of the company, because no other respondent indicated it as occurring at 
all. The union secretary, Peter Binnie, stated that "[o]bviously if we had known 
about the superannuation or any of the medical funds or any of that stuff we would 
have jumped on that smartly. " If such a rumour was being spread, the union, the 
employees' advocate and a group which reportedly knew more information than the 
other employees, would have been informed. 
4.4. Summary 
All but one of the 15 Fortex employees interviewed observed one or more events 
which caused them concern. These concerns had counterpart factors, or could be 
linked to factors, proposed in previous corporate distress literature. The factors 
ranged from defects, Thompson as an autocratic leader, mistakes, Silverstream as 
Argenti's (1976a) big project, to a multitude of non-financial symptoms. Therefore, 
employees are not only in a position to identify the symptoms of distress, but also 
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elements which contribute to, or are the initial cause of, distress. However, in this 
case observation did not necessarily correspond with the realisation of the event's 
role in the collapse. 
5. Comparison of Employees' Observations Against 
Argenti's Assertions 
5.1. Observing a Multitude of Non-Financial Symptoms 
Argenti (1976a) submitted that employees were in a position to observe a wide 
variety of non-financial symptoms. He was correct, in this case as the employees 
noticed 10 significant non-financial symptoms ofFortex's distress. Those symptoms 
were the: 
• stockpiled inventory; 
• the leaked document; 
• stock shortages, short days and lower wages; 
• falling share price; 
• increased level of rumours; 
• reduction in morale; 
• reduction in shareholding ofT. A. Pacific; 
• unusual events (change in packing bag delivery method and the appearance at the 
plant ofFortex's bankers); 
• appointment of an independent accountant to assess the company; and 
• creditors reclaiming property. 
However, Argenti (1976a) underestimated the perception of the blue-collar worker . 
. In this case, the employees actively monitored the share price, maintaining a vigilant 
CASE STUDY: EMPLOYEES AND DISTRESS 181 
watch on its fluctuations. While a significant departure from his statement that a 
company's accountants observed a falling share price, this could be partially 
attributed to the employees' dual role as shareholders in the company. However, it 
was just one of a number of differences between Argenti's (1976a) claims, and the 
findings of this case. 
5.2. Diversity of Factors 
While Argenti (1976a) indicated that employees could observe the non-financial 
symptoms, he failed to comment on their ability in other areas. This is a significant 
omission since, while the majority (41 of 81)69 of the employees' concerns were non-
financial symptoms of distress, the employees in this case also observed the financial 
symptoms of distress, such as the loss in the 1993 financial year, and were formally 
told that the company was financially struggling at the Christmas 1993 meeting.70 
The employees were also aware of external environmental factors which influenced 
the company, such as the snow storm and competition. These factors are included 
under Argenti's (1976a) failure to respond to change category. The failure to 
respond to change is one of three defects which occur at the beginning of the distress 
process. It is preceded only by defective management, the most crucial of which is 
the autocratic chief executive. From the employees' observations, the managing 
director, Graeme Thompson, may have been an autocratic leader. Hence, the 
employees potentially observ~d, albeit without recognising they had done so, three 
fundamental defects which cause corporate distress. 
The employees also indicated Silverstream and the company's expansionary goals as 
overly ambitious, both in the financial expense involved and the time in which they 
were planned. Both can be interpreted as Argenti's (1976a) big project. 
69 
The events counted as non-financial symptoms were: the stockpiled inventory; the leaked document; the stock shortage, 
short days, lower days; reduced share prices; increased rumours; reduced morale; T. A. Pacific, unusual events, the 
appointment of an investigative accountant and creditors reclaiming property. 
70 
This event and the union/management meeting were classified as financial symptoms because it was at these meetings that 
Fortex's poor financial position was presented. Note however, that post-collapse the employees recognised that the 
financial problems had been understated at these meetings. 
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Furthermore, the share issue has tenuous links with overleveraging and financing 
problems, and stockpiled inventory is symptomatic of a company which is 
attempting to overtrade and/or suffers from poor marketing. Each example falls 
within Argenti's mistake category which forms an interim step between the origin 
and eventual occurrence of failure. Therefore, employees are in a position to identify 
events which range from defects to the symptoms and the final nose-dive of an 
organisation. However, the employees did not link any of their observations which 
were not symptoms of distress with Fortex's demise at the time the company 
operated. 
5.3. Identification of Distress 
Fourteen of the fifteen employees interviewed recognised that the company was 
distressed. The employees reported that most of their concerns originated either at 
the December 1993 meeting with management (6), or the shortened working days 
and reduced wages (5). They also reported that non-financial symptoms, such as T. 
A. Pacific's withdrawal, creditors reclaiming property, the appointment of an 
investigative accountant, and the falling share price, contributed to their feeling that 
the company was distressed. Argenti (1976a) claimed that employees are not in a 
position to assess the distressed position of an organisation. 
Five employees not only thought the company was distressed but indicated that it 
was so distressed that it would fail. However, as the breakdown of each individual 
employee's concerns displayed in Table 8.2 indicates, there are few differences in the 
observations between those who thought it would fail and those who did not. 
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Table 8.2: Individual Employees' Concerns 
Employee Employee Employee Employee Employee Employee Employee 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Union Delegate X X X ,( X X 
Surprise On Receivers/lip 
./ ,( ./ ,( ,( .; 
Events Observed 
Silverstream 
./ ,( ,( ,( ,( 
Wastage and 
,( Inefficiency 
Management Turnover 
0 
Autocratic Leadership 
Poor Plant Management 
,( ,( 
Employee-Management 
,( ,( Relations 
Heavy Infrastructure 
Planned Expansion 
SnowStorm 
1993 Employee Share 
Issue 
1993 Loss 
Stockpiled Inventory 
Leaked Document 
Procurement War 
./ 
Union/Management 
,( Meeting 
Employee/Management 
./ ,( ,( .; Meeting 
Stock Shortages, Short 
./ ,( ,( .; Days, Lower Wages 
Share Price 
,( ,( ,( 
Increased Rumours 
,( ,( ,( ,( 
Reduced Morale 
,( ,( 
T. A. Pacific 
,( 
Unusual Events 
.; 
Investigative Accountant 
Creditors Reclaiming 
.; Property 
KEY: -1' = yes; X =No; 0 Indicates a report of a potential indicator of distress which was not seen as a 
concern by the employee; ? Indicates where the employee did not comment on their reaction. 
X 
.; 
.; 
.; 
.; 
.; 
.; 
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Table 8.2: Individual Employees' Concerns (cont) 
Employee Employee Employee Employee Employee Employee Employee 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Union Delegate 
X X X X -/ X X 
Surprise On Receivership 
X X X X X ? ? 
Events Observed 
Silverstream 
-/ -/ -/ -/ -/ -/ 
Wastage and 
-/ Inefficiency 
Management Turnover 
0 
Autocratic Leadership 
-/ 
Poor Plant Management 
-/ 
Employee-Management 
Relations 
Heavy Infrastructure 
./ 
Planned Expansion 
-/ 
SnowStorm 
-/ -/ 
1993 Employee Share 
-/ Issue 
1993 Loss 
Stockpiled Inventory 
-/ 
Leaked Document 
-/ 
Procurement War 
-/ -/ 
Union/Management 
-/ Meeting 
Employee/Management 
-/ -/ Meeting 
Stock Shortages, Short 
-/ -/ -/ -/ -/ -/ Days, Lower Wages 
Share Price 
-/ -/ -/ -/ 
Increased Rumours 
-/ -/ -/ -/ -/ 
Reduced Morale 
-/ -/ -/ 
T. A. Pacific 
-/ -/ 
Unusual Events 
-/ 
Investigative Accountant 
-/ 
Creditors Reclaiming 
-/ Property 
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As Table 8.2 indicates, the five employees who reported that they were unsurprised 
observed a higher average number of concerning events (6.2) than the seven who 
were surprised (5.3).71 However, without employee 12 (Peter Binnie's 14 
observations), the comparative averages become, 4.3 for those employees surprised 
upon receivership and 5.3 for the unsurprised employees. Furthermore, without 
Binnie's observation of symptoms, the two groups each observed a nearly identical 
average number of symptoms, 3.5 for those surprised, 3.4 for those unsurprised. 
Therefore, apart from Binnie who observed more problems and had access to more 
information, the differences between the groups cannot be accounted for by their 
observations alone. Instead, the employees' personalities, such as whether they were 
optimists or pessimists, or the extent to which they believed in the company, could 
be the determining factors. Alternatively, the respondents who reported that they 
thought the company was going to fail could have formed those opinions in 
hindsight. 
5.4. Timely Observation 
The initial observation, the construction of Silverstream, occurring five years prior to 
the company's failure, was one of the positive findings ofthis aspect ofthe research. 
The Silverstream development received criticism post-collapse but five of the 
employees were concerned at the time because of its size and cost. 
This is just one of several examples of where employees, due to their position and 
access to informal information, identified events before the media and general public. 
Two other notable examples include the realisation that farmers were reluctant to 
send lambs to the plant six weeks prior to the media coverage of the farmers' 
concerns. The second was the meeting where management informed the employees 
that the company was struggling. The employees also revealed that Fortex was also 
purchasing lambs at prices well above that reported in the media. 
71 
The two interviewees who made no comment regarding their surprise or otherwise when Fortex was placed into 
receivership mentioned 9 and 4 factors each. 
186 EMPLOYEES' OBSERVATIONS, INFORMAL INFORMATION AND CORPORATE DISTRESS 
6. Limitations of Employees' Observations 
6.1. Identification of Distress 
The majority of the employees' observations occurred after the formal announcement 
in December 1993 that the company was struggling. Similarly, the union identified 
more concerns over the way the company was performing after the union 
management meeting. Furthermore, it was only the observations after the formal 
announcement that caused the employees any concern or were attributed to the 
overall position of the company. Without the formal announcement that the 
company was distressed, the employees' observations may have been markedly 
different. For example, they may not have recognised their later observations as 
symptoms, and at the extreme, they may not have ascertained Fortex's distress. 
Prior to these meetings, other distress events, such as the construction of the 
Silverstream and Thompson's leadership style, were not recognised as factors which 
contribute to corporate distress. Moreover, another indicator of distress, Hearn's 
departure, was not mentioned as a concern whatsoever, and was only mentioned in 
passing in reference to another perceived problem. While this is not surprising, as 
the sampled group of employees was not expected to be familiar with the diverse 
nature and multitude of factors in prior research, it did limit the time-frame from 
which they realised the company was distressed to the last three and a half months of 
the company's existence. By this stage, the employees could do little but work 
harder to try to save the company, or sell their shares to reduce their losses. The 
employees had no means to act upon their observation that the company was 
distressed. 
6.2. Linkage Between Self-interest and Observations 
The employees were asked whether they identified any problems over how the 
company was operating and whether factors identified post-collapse as contributing 
to failure were seen as a problem. However, the employees more readily identified 
factors that affected them personally, either through reduced wages or a decreasing 
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share price. Examples include Silverstream, the employee/managment meeting and 
the rapid reduction in the share price in the post-Christmas 1993 period. This is a 
potential limitation since not all factors in distress have a direct impact on 
employees' wages (such as, management problems_, overleveraging, poor accounting 
systems). 
However, this may be an overly cynical analysis of the employees' perceptions, for 
Silverstream was also seen as a concern by several employees due to the expense 
involved and the time when it was constructed. Similarly, the decreasing share price 
was seen as ari indicator of the overall company's performance. Furthermore, the 
employees could only comment on the events they had personally observed or had 
heard about from other employees. Usually personal observation was restricted to 
the areas in which the employees worked. 
6.3. Different Observations 
Not all the employees made the same observations. Only seven of the 22 factors 
identified were supported by more than three interviewees. Six were identified by a 
single interviewee. Notably three of those six observations were made by Union 
Secretary, Peter Binnie. 
One potential explanation for these differences could be that the employees held 
different positions within the company. For example, unlike the employees who 
worked in the shipping office, the employees on the slaughterboard were not 
concerned about the inventory stockpile. Other potential reasons could be 
differences in personality, and the amount of communication with workmates. For 
instance, the union delegates, particularly Binnie, identified more problems or 
concerns than the employees who were not union delegates. The union admitted that 
they were privy to more information, and had considerably more contact with plant 
and head-office management than other employees. 
Due to their positions, employees were not able to comment on the organisation's 
cash flow position or financial management. The differences in observations support 
Argenti's (1976a) assertion that employees are not in a position to observe the overall 
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position of the organisation. However, this problem may be reduced because Argenti 
(1976a) failed to consider the grapevine communication system as a means of 
spreading information around an organisation. 72 
6.4. The Third Party 
Due to their position and ability to observe a wide range of events employees, are a 
valuable source of information for researchers who attempt to document the demise 
of a company after it has collapsed. However, the detection of distress during the 
company's life is far more difficult. 
In this case, the employees did not realise the significance of their observations until 
late in the failure process. Even then, most believed that, while struggling, the 
company would survive. Argenti (1976a) noted that employees will not realise the 
significance of non-financial symptoms. This may have also been the case at Fortex 
if the employees were not officially informed of the company's distress, recalling 
that concerns and awareness were raised after that meeting. 
To combat such a problem, Argenti (1976a) proposed the knowledgeable observer, 
an individual who understood the significance of the non-financial symptoms various 
parties observed. By talking to a variety of people and obtaining information from 
them, the knowledgeable observer could assess the overall distressed position of the 
organisation. 
The knowledgeable observer had the potential to have a role in Fortex. By talking to 
employees over a sustained period of time, ranging from their first concerns in 1990 
through to 1994, a knowledgeable observer may have detected Fortex's distressed 
position, and in particular, the early concerns of employees, concerns the employees 
did not associate with distress. 
72 
See Chapter 9 ofthis thesis for a further examination of this issue. 
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7. Conclusion 
This case indicates that employees and union delegates have the ability to observe 
not only the non-financial symptoms of distress, but events which either indicate, or 
are in themselves, Argenti's (1976a) defects and mistakes. Moreover, employees are 
able to recognise symptoms and use them as a basis for assessing that a company is 
distressed. All but one of the interviewees were aware of the organisation's 
distressed position. , However, with the exception of one person, Binnie, the 
interviewees were not aware of the significance of their earlier observations. Hence, 
while Argenti (1976a) has been found to be incorrect by positing that employees 
cannot determine distress, and that their observations are restricted to non-financial 
symptoms, his assertion that a knowledgeable observer may be required to 
accumulate and interpret employees' observations to detect distress may have proven 
beneficial in this case. Indeed, by talking to employees, the knowledgeable observer 
may have even been able to detect distress before Fortex displayed any visible 
symptoms. 
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1. Introduction 
The secondary objective of this research was to ascertain whether employees' 
observations in a distressed company are influenced by informal information. 
Chapter 3 outlined the characteristics of the grapevine and indicated that some of the 
information it carried corresponded with events reported in prior corporate distress 
research. The grapevine was also potentially interrelated with corporate distress in 
two other ways. Firstly, in a crisis, the grapevine's activity increases. Secondly, the 
grapevine affects an organisation's morale. Morale is a symptom of distress. 
Chapter 8 provided details of the events which Fortex's employees found of concern. 
These events ranged from the defects which cause, to the symptoms which indicate, 
failure. This chapter relates the influence the grapevine had on the employees' 
observations of these events, and documents the characteristics of the Seafield plant's 
grapevine. 
2. Characteristics of the Grapevine 
As a consequence of the method of questioning, the employees were not required to 
comment on the speed, structure, or the accuracy of the grapevine. However, there 
were some indications in the interviewees' responses of how they perceived those 
features. 
2.1. Speed 
The speed of the grapevine was indicated by three interviewees who commented on 
the pace which a rumour could be transmitted around the plant and the local 
community. Firstly, rumours could be created and communicated between differing 
departments and around the plant quickly: 
"Very, very easy to start a rumour in a place like Fortex. You only had to tell 
the tractor driver of such and such and by the time he'd been around to 4 or 5 
departments you could spread a rumour mighty quick. " 
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Interdepartmental communication was also facilitated through contact between 
employees during the course of their jobs, and at lunch and tea breaks. 
Secondly, one interviewee asserted that "[w]ord soon gets around in a small place 
like Ashburton. " The employees received information from, and . communicated 
information to, friends and relatives in the small local community. The community 
took a special interest in Seafield because the community depended on the plant for 
the employment of 800 employees who would spend their wages supporting local 
businesses. The plant also added to the local community through payments to 
farmers for their stock and other suppliers of goods and services. When the company 
was struggling in the Christmas 1993 period, the local community noticed the 
reduction in spending from Fortex's employees. Consequently, speculation in the 
local community increased. 
2.2. Structure of the Grapevine 
2.2.1. Participants 
Through their responses, thirteen interviewees indicated that they participated in the 
grapevine by either acting as liaison individuals or dead-enders, and indicated that 
the grapevine was large, and sourced information from a variety of areas both 
internally and externally to the company. Unfortunately, no distinction could be 
made between individuals who fulfilled each position. 
2.2.2. Isolates 
Two employees (15 percent) within the sample were identified as isolates. Sutton 
and Porter (1968) found that one third of a company's employees function as 
isolates. They defined an isolate as an individual who had heard grapevine 
information less than half of the· time. However, because this research was not 
experimental, it lacked the controlled conditions necessary to determine the 
proportion of information each employee received. Therefore, alternative criteria 
were developed based on interpersonal contact and whether or not they had heard 
rumours. 
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The first individual reported that he did not receive much information at all from his 
fellow workmates. The other considered himself well-informed, but worked in a 
secluded area of the plant. Both employees reported that they heard no rumours at 
any stage during the last few months. During this period each of the other employees 
reported talking amongst themselves about the company's performance, sharing their 
concerns over shortened days, and reduced wages. Furthermore, nine had identified 
that the level of rum our had increased compared to the normal level. 
The apparent lack of rumours contributed to both isolates' surprise when Fortex's 
receivership was announced. One stated that: 
"This is why it was such a shock to the workers themselves. It just absolutely 
floored everybody, you know that was the whole thing. " 
While the reaction of surprise does not necessarily mean that the employees were 
isolates, it does provide some indication, because four of the five employees who 
expected the company to fail indicated that they had heard rumours. Furthermore, 
three of the other employees who indicated surprise stated that they held those 
opinions despite signs and rumours to the contrary. 
The two isolates did not identify with their colleagues' concerns over the company's 
performance. One identified no concerns. The other reported only one, the 
construction of Silverstream. This is also consistent with being an isolate who, by 
lacking contact with other employees, would not have any knowledge of their 
concerns or any problems they had observed. However, an alternative, or 
complementary, reason could be that these two were not very observant or had poor 
memories. For example, the employee who had no concerns at any stage of the 
company's operations stated that ''I'm one of these fellow who can come home and 
forget about everything. " 
2.3. Accuracy 
While recognised as accurate in previous research (Walton, 1961; Davis, 1973), the 
grapevine was characterised as unreliable by several of the employees. They stated 
that it did not take much to start a rumour around the plant. In the extreme, such 
rumours were baseless with " ... people just saying anything they like and starting 
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their own rumours to see how fast it would get around the plant. " As a consequence, 
one respondent, a union delegate, reported that the grapevine was ineffective and 'did 
more harm than good.' 
Even in retrospect this employee placed little value in the rumours which circulated 
the company when it failed, and indicated rumoured takeovers by PPCS, Alliance or 
an Asian company, which did not occur, as evidence of the grapevine's inaccuracy. 
However, for two reasons these rumours are significant. Firstly, they provide an 
indication that some employees were concerned about the company's performance to 
the extent that they considered it a takeover candidate. Davis (1972) reports that 
rumours indicate employees' concerns and apprehensions, and should be 
investigated. Secondly, while as a whole they were incorrect, the rumours may not 
have been entirely baseless. Like the findings of Davis (1953b) on the grapevine's 
accuracy level, these rumours could have been based on actual events, but contained 
a component of distortion. 
There were two events on which such rumours could have been based. Firstly, one 
employee became aware, post-collapse, that Fortex was involved in negotiations with 
the Buttons Kiwi Group for financial assistance and a possible merger. Other 
employees could have been aware of these negotiations at the time they occurred. 73 
Secondly, the 'inaccurate' rumours occurred in the last one to two weeks before 
Fortex failed. In this period, Graeme Thompson was also negotiating with the 
company's banks and, when that failed, a Malaysian company for financial assistance 
(Brett, 1994). These negotiations provide a basis for the rumour of an 'Asian' 
takeover. Both these examples correspond with Simmons' (1985, 1986) and 
Brownell's (1990) findings that grapevine distortion changes a message for the 
worse. In this instance, distortion changed the messages to a takeover rather than a 
merger or financial assistance, and to Fortex's rivals, Alliance and PPCS, and rather 
than the more neutral Buttons Kiwi Group. 
73 
Williams (1996) reports that Graeme Thompson was attempting to organise a merger between Fortex and Huttons Kiwi 
while Fortex was collapsing. Therefore, this employee's report of a potential merger is valid. 
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Caplow (1976) found that where there is an oversupply of information from formal 
sources, the reliance on informal information diminishes. The interviewee who 
reported that the grapevine was inaccurate was a union delegate. The union admitted 
that they had direct contact with head-office management and consequently knew 
more of the company's situation than the other employees. While the information 
that the union received directly from formal sources was sporadic, alid therefore 
unlikely to have been an oversupply, it could have reduced the union's reliance on 
informal sources of information. 
3. Formal Communication 
Under normal conditions Fortex seemed to have an effective formal communication 
system. The employees were frequently informed of the company's successes 
through a company newsletter, and by management at lunch and 'smoko' (tea) 
breaks. Fortex was also the recipient of positive media coverage. In the past, 
information from management was perceived as correct and when reinforced by 
external parties relating the same positive image, the trust of information from the 
formal system was reported to be high. The employees' acceptance of formal 
information indicated their belief in Fortex and trust in its management. 
However, with the exception of the meeting where extra productivity was requested, 
the employees regarded themselves as poorly informed through the formal 
communication channels when the company was distressed. Apart from the initial 
meeting in December 1993 where the company's financial problems were outlined, 
the employees reported only one other instance where information was provided 
from the formal system. 74 
Within the last fortnight before Fortex's failure a meeting was held where the 
employees were informed of 'temporary financing difficulties': 
74 
Post-collapse, the employees realised that the formal information they received was incorrect, understating the severity of 
the crisis Fortex faced. The inaccuracy of the formal information was undoubtedly one of the reasons that the 
interviewees criticised the formal system. However, it did not contribute to the employees' concerns at the time. 
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"Then there was a note put up - there would be a full meeting of all staff, such 
and such time. Ian Graham came around and said we've experienced a bit of a 
seasonal finance problem. We expect to have this ironed out in another couple 
of days. Just hang in there . and you know, don't listen to the rumours and 
things will be fine .... He seemed so convinced of it himself." 
The company was reportedly short of cash and was negotiating with the banks to 
resolve the problem. At this meeting, management advised the employees to ignore 
any speculation and gossip concerning the company, implying that any informal 
information that they received was incorrect. This could arise from management's 
seemingly inherent distrust of the grapevine, which has been noted on several 
occasions (Zaremba, 1989; Nicoll, 1994; Wells and Spinks, 1994). Alternatively, 
plant management could have been trying to reassure the employees that the 
company was secure. 
During distress, the employees posed questions to managers and foremen in an 
attempt to obtain information, but found that neither group knew any more 
information than themselves. Several of the employees reported that their superiors 
seemed to have little information regarding the company's performance, remarking 
in hindsight that the plant manager Ian Graham, and other salaried staff, were as 
surprised as the other employees when receivership was announced. One employee 
reported that: 
"As it turned out I don't think he [Graham] knew any more than we did as far 
as it was. I think the directors kept it away from him too. Because at the time 
of the collapse he was with us that evening and said that he didn 't know 
anything more about the running of the plant than we did. He didn't know they 
were in trouble. " 
Their reports indicate a lack of formal communication from head-office to plant 
management, which resulted in a lack of formal information being passed to the 
employees. Union secretary Peter Binnie concurred, stating that head-office often 
contacted him directly and avoided plant management. Conversely, where the union 
required information, they would talk directly with head-office management. 
The limited formal information and reassurances provided, especially those in the 
Christmas 1993 meeting, contributed to at least six interviewees' opinions that the 
company would not fail. However, the employees' concerns mainly stemmed not 
from a total absence of information from formal sources, but rather from an 
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insufficient volume of information to satiate the employees' demand. In such a 
situation, Walton (1961), Arnold (1983), Booher (1990) and Mishra (1990) assert 
that employees would rely on informal sources to provide the extra information that 
they required. Fortex was no exception. 
3.1. Increased Grapevine Activity 
During the distressed period grapevine activity significantly increased. The 
employees used the grapevine to supplement the meagre information provided from 
formal sources. A range of authorities have asserted that grapevine activity increases 
in times of distress or change (Davis, 1954; Esposito and Rosnow, 1983; Simmons, 
1985; Garnett, 1992). Although these claims make intuitive sense, other than 
Davis's 1954 study, there has been a lack of evidence provided. However, in this 
case the employees reported that these claims had a legitimate basis. 
Within the last three months of Fortex's life, nine of the interviewees indicated an 
increase in the number of rumours flowing around the company. The volume was 
such that one employee claimed that " ... there were so many rumours going around 
that we took them with a grain of salt actually. " The last week in particular was 
identified as a period of intense speculation. One employee noted that "[i}t doesn't 
take much to start rumours around a freezing works though." However, they 
continued, stating that some individuals took the rumours more seriously than others, 
which may have contributed to a lack of surprise or even expectancy that the 
company would fail. 
The unusually high grapevine activity in the .last few months was a result of the 
organisation's distressed position, where employees sought to obtain and share 
information about the company's position and therefore assess their own futures. 
The findings indicate that an especially active grapevine could be an non-financial 
indicator of organisational distress. 
There are several inherent limitations, however, with increased rumour as a non-
financial symptom of distress. 
• Firstly, observation will be difficult unless the person is an organisational insider. 
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• Secondly, it would require the establishment of the 'normal' volume ofrumour in 
that organisation. Therefore, determining the increase in volume accurate in terms 
would be difficult. 
• Thirdly, an increase in the level of speculation about the company's performance 
could only constitute a non-financial indicator of distress when there is 
ineffective, or insufficient volume of, formal communication. Hence, an 
increased volume of rumour would only be a symptom in a company with poor 
formal communication. It must be noted though that other symptoms are not 
universally applicable to all companies (Argenti, 1976a). Therefore, this third 
point may not be a material limitation. 
3.2. Lower Morale 
The hypothesis that an increased level of rumour could be a symptom of distress 
gains more credibility in this case because the increased level of rumour coincided 
with a reduction in morale of the employees. Lower morale has been identified as a 
symptom exhibited by many failing companies (Argenti, 1976a; Scherrer, 1988, 
1989b), and is the domain of the grapevine (Davis, 1953b; Arnold, 1983; Esposito 
and Rosnow, 1983; Mishra, 1990; Garnett, 1992; Simmons, 1986; Hull, 1994; Wells 
and Spinks, 1994). Therefore, any increase in the level of speculation about issues 
which affect employees' jobs could result in reduced morale. 
Five interviewees claimed that morale decreased in the last three months, the same 
period in which rumour increased. According to one this was "[m]ainly because 
nobody knew what was going on. I think there was a definite concern about their 
jobs." Notably both increased rumour and lower morale occurred immediately after 
the December 1993 meeting where the employees were informed of the company's 
financial problems and were requested to make concessions. That event was 
identified as the cause of concern for 6 interviewees and was the first event 
recognised as signalling that the company was distressed. Subsequent observations, 
such as closing the second processing chain, the falling share price, T. A. Pacific's 
withdrawal, and farmers reluctance to send in stock, caused further speculation 
amongst the company employees. 
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These were just some of the events which the employees indicated that they 
discussed, or attempted to discuss, amongst themselves. Many of these events have 
been identified as factors in corporate distress. 
4. Informal Grapevine Communication and Corporate 
Distress Factors 
4.1. Informal Communication and Distress Factors Prior to December 
1993 
4.1.1. Employees 
Three events were reported as subjects of the informal inter-employee 
communication associated with the grapevine. Those events were the construction of 
the Silverstream plant, stock being taken from Seafield to Silverstream, and the large 
number of salaried staff without apparent purpose. The discussions about salaried 
staff occurred at smoko breaks. Communication at these breaks was especially 
prevalent due to the sheer volume of employees congregated in the same place. 
While these three events were the only ones which the employees were reported to 
have speculated about, there were numerous indications that, consistent with prior 
research, the employees discussed their work and the concerns they held amongst 
themselves (Davis, 1969; Esposito and Rosnow, 1983; Simmons, 1985; 1986; 
Mishra, 1990). For instance, the single interviewee who found Mullen's demeanour 
during the 1993 employee share offer unusual, attempted to explain her concerns and 
reasoning to other employees. The other employees disagreed with her opinion and 
did not believe her concerns were justified. The rebuttal was accepted with the 
observer stating " ... everyone's entitled to their opinion and that is all I had " The 
rejection of a factor which, in hindsight only, may have indicated the organisation's 
distressed position is a secondary concern, as this example illustrates that employees 
may attempt to informally communicate their concern to others. This was not an 
isolated example. 
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The employees sampled reported knowledge of other employees' concerns about the 
company's operations. Such concerns included Silverstream's economic viability or 
lack thereof, the company's expansionary policies, and the 1993 financial loss. The 
loss was not identified as a concern by any of the interviewees but several indicated 
that their colleagues could not understand how the loss was incurred, and that the 
loss indicated to them that the company was struggling. 
4.1.2. Union 
The union was the recipient of one notable piece of informal information which other 
employees were not; the leaked documents in August 1993 which outlined proposed 
wage reductions. The proposed wage cut signalled a financially struggling 
organisation which was undertaking measures to improve profitability and 
performance. Consequently, the leaked document could be an observable symptom 
of the company's distress. 
Binnie asserted that the content of the documents came to the union through informal 
means submitting that "[i]t was sort of through a channel of communication through 
employees that we found out this information. " Plant management communicated 
information to a supervisor who discussed its implications with her husband in the 
evening. The following day the husband, who worked on the slaughterboard, passed 
on the information to the union. This informal communication was not reported by 
anyone else and seems restricted to the union. Hence, the union may potentially have 
had access to differing sources of informal information than other employees. 
In this instance, the process does not correspond to typical grapevine communication 
which disseminates information to a wide range of individuals. Instead the 
information was informally communicated to specific individuals and not for general 
broadcast. This could be an example of Davis's (1953b) confidential grapevine 
information. 
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4.2. Informal Information and Distress Factors After December 1993 
The employees indicated the December 1993 meeting with management as the time 
that most of their concerns were raised. The meeting preceded a period of increased 
grapevine activity. 
4.2.1. Employees 
After the meeting the employees overheard several pieces of information from the 
grapevine which were symptomatic of the company's distress. 
4.2.1.1. Tlte Venison Market and Processing Chain 
During the Christmas 1993 holiday period the world venison market slumped. Prices 
fell dramatically. During that period a North Island venison marketing company 
collapsed. When the employees returned, post-Christmas, for the new season, the 
second venison shift was closed. According to one employee " ... that's when the 
rumours started about things aren't looking too good for the company. The last 
couple of months those sorts of rumours started coming out. " Hence, the collapsed 
venison market, and the closure of the second Seafield chain were the subject of 
grapevine communication. 
4.2.1.2. Stock Shortage, Sltort Days and Price War 
The stock shortage was observable from the employees' inside position, and was 
evidenced through shorter days and reduced kills. The shortened working days were 
a subject of speculation and bewilderment: 
"We were wondering why we were on the three day system with four shifts 
when there wasn't enough stock to keep us going.... We were always talking 
about these things and how we were having short days, but there was never 
anything done about it. " 
However, their assessment of the problem was not restricted to observation from 
their inside position and formal information. The employees assessed the severity of 
the situation through informal contacts external to the plant. Through information 
obtained from employees of the rival PPCS Fairton plant, Fortex's employees 
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became aware that the stock shortage was restricted only to Fortex. The other plants 
were operating at full capacity. 
"Mainly a lot of rumours because.... Well rumours like whose got which chain 
going and when they're going to stop. Not their kill! because nobody was 
supposed to know that at all, but mainly how much work they've got per week. 
A three day week, a four day week, a full week or how many chains are not 
going. Then we got wind of this there was a price war on." 
Formal communication reported that the short days were due to intense competition 
between the processing companies and farmers holding stock back so that their lambs 
could get more cover (weight). However, the employees were also aware of an 
alternative reason for the shortages. Through informal contacts with farmers, they 
found that the shortages also stemmed from a reluctance to send lambs to F ortex. 
The farmers did not believe Fortex had the capability to pay for the stock. 
This example illustrates the employees' ability to obtain information about an 
organisation not provided through formal communication channels. The employees 
used this information to provide an alternative explanation of an event which 
indicated the firm's .distress. While gained from external sources, this information 
was disseminated through the internal grapevine to other employees within the 
organisation. Seven interviewees indicated an awareness of either the farmers' 
reluctance to send stock and/or that PPCS was not having stock shortages. 
The external information was provided by friends and relatives who worked at the 
rival processing plant or who were farmers. Several of the employees who worked at 
the plant were also farmers themselves. Therefore, the employees gained 
information through first-hand knowledge. This information was also spread within 
the organisation via the grapevine. 
4.2.1.3. Stockpile 
Two employees indicated that information about the stockpiles at Ashcold and 
Seafield was passed to them from other employees ofthe company. They intimated 
that this information was also common knowledge to other employees. However, it 
was not identified as a concern because management reassured them that nothing was 
amiss. 
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4.2.1.4. Sltares 
One individual reported that they sold shares based on statement which a friend 
overheard a foreman make: 
"Even when they went right down low, what were they about 11 cents or 
something, I bought something like 9000 shares at that stage. Me and a mate 
did the same. And then he heard, through the grapevine, overheard one of his 
foreman talking that things were getting pretty bad and he contacted me and 
we sold our shares. We come out with a very minor profit out of it, but we were 
still at that stage hoping the place would come right. " 
Another noted that a prominent local businessman had told her that they had sold 
shares a week prior to receivership. The businessman, who had purchased the shares 
only a few days earlier, was adamant that the company was going to close on the 
Friday of the next week. The erratic behaviour of the share price was also the topic 
of speculation and the cause of employee concerns which were communicated via the 
grapevine. 
4.2.1.5. T. A. Pacific 
Initially, T. A. Pacific's investment caused employee uncertainty, possibly because it 
was seen as the start of a potential takeover. One employee stated that "[i]t wasn't 
really until T. A. Pacific that it [the company's position] really got to be a main topic 
of conversation. " Uncertainty was replaced by optimism with the investment being 
seen as a sign of confidence in the company. However, the investment company's 
subsequent rapid disposal of the investment made only two months earlier was 
viewed as a signal of the organisation's distress. 
Four of the interviewees reported that they, and most other employees, were aware of 
T. A. Pacific's reduction in shareholding, but none were unaware of where the 
information had come from. One credited such information to the grapevine stating 
that "[s ]omebody had told me so it must have been a rumour, you know. " If the 
information was carried by the grapevine, this is another example of employees being 
informed via the grapevine of events which signal an organisation's distress. 
However, the attribution of such information to rumour may not necessarily be 
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accurate since the grapevine is often incorrectly cited as the source of information 
when in fact it was obtained from another source (Walton, 1961). 
4.2.1.6. ICI reclaiming chemicals 
This event was observed directly by Binnie and was reported as a 'whisper' going 
around the company by another. 
4.2.1. 7. Receivers/tip and Takeovers 
In the last few weeks ofFortex's operations, rumours of takeovers by PPCS, Alliance 
or an Asian company were circulating the company. Within the final week, some 
employees had heard speculation that the company was to be placed into 
receivership. Whether this was based on knowledge gleaned from an authoritative 
source, or was a result of employees guessing at the outcome based on their own 
observations, is unclear. 
4.2.1.8. Fraud 
A single employee reported that during the last fortnight there were rumours of fraud. 
Firstly, that "Graeme Thompson's been caught with his fingers in the till" and 
secondly that "{i} think before we even closed down this rumour passed around that 
certain loans had been misclassijied or whatever, you know things were not done 
properly. " However, as no other employees commented on this, and the union was 
unaware of fraud or any murmurs concerning fraudulent activities, this claim is 
dubious. It could be a case where post-collapse information was mistaken as 
occurring at an earlier point. 
4.2.2. Union 
4.2.2.1. Lost Venison Contract 
During the post-Christmas 1993 period, the union was informed of an event, which 
according to Robb (1986a) causes distress-the loss of an existing agency. An 
unnamed individual from head-office unofficially informed the union that the $17 
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million venison contract which Fortex was negotiating in 1992 (FGAR, 1992) was 
unsigned when the market collapsed. The German party withdrew its offer. Fortex 
was left holding a stockpile of venison which in a depressed market was overvalued 
and difficult to sell. The unsigned contract purportedly contributed to the $4 million 
1993 annual loss. 
The union did not pass on this information, which was otherwise restricted to a few 
head-office personnel, to the plant's employees, reasoning that "if the company is in 
a bit of trouble this could only make it worse. " 
4.2.2.2. Stiassney's Unfavourable Report 
The appointment of the investigative accountant, Stiassney, was the subject of 
speculation. The concerns raised by his appointment were accentuated when the 
union found through informal managerial contact that Stiassney' s assessment of the 
organisation was unfavourable. Again this information was kept within the union for 
fear of affecting the sharemarket and causing panic amongst the employees. 
A summary of the distress factors which caused, or were the subject of, grapevine 
communication are presented in Table 9 .1. 
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Table 9.1: Summary of Distress Events Carried on the Grapevine 
Pre December 1993 Post December 1994 
Union Leaked Document Lost Venison Contract 
Stiassney's Unfavourable Report 
Employees Silverstream' s Venison Market Collapse and 
Construction Closed Venison Processing Chain 
StockTransferto Stock Shortage, Short Days and 
Silverstream Lower Wages 
Overburdened with Stockpiled Inventory 
Salaried Staff 
Shares 
T. A. Pacific 
Creditors Reclaim Property 
Rumours of Takeovers, 
Receivership and Fraud 
Potential Grapevine Expansionary Policies 
Communication 
1993 Loss 
Attempted Interpersonal 1993 Employee Share 
Communication Issue 
Table 9.1 indicates that the grapevine carried an array of information detailing events 
symptomatic of corporate distress. The majority ofthe examples occurred in the last 
few months, a period in which speculation was reported to be higher than normal. 
Notably there was no gossip or rumour regarding financial symptoms of distress. All 
the information revolved around making sense of the issues which directly affected 
the employees' jobs. The concerning messages were all non-financial in nature, 
indicating that the employees were not in a position to assess the financial position of 
the organisation, and that no financial information was passed to them via informal 
means. The findings support the proposition that the grapevine can carry information 
which indicates corporate distress. However, in this case while rumours were heard 
many individuals did not take them seriously, but rather classified them as rum our 
and therefore inaccurate. 
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5. Internal and External Locale and Participants 
Davis (1953) and Zaremba (1988) state that the structure of the grapevine IS 
influenced by a number of factors. Two of those ~actors are different social circles 
and the physical layout of buildings and offices. Hence, contact from employee A to 
employee B would be more likely to occur where B is a close friend or work 
colleague of, or participated in the same hobbies and past-times as, A. This was 
found to be the case at the Seafield plant. 
Friendship meant even confidential information was passed from the union to an 
individual employee who was a close friend of the delegate. Similarly, through 
contact with external parties such as relatives and friends, information about farmers 
and competitors were obtained. 
The employees and union alike indicated a diverse range of sources where the 
informal information, which was eventually disseminated by the grapevine, 
originated. Undoubtedly, formal communication was the origin of some of this 
information. However, it remained largely uncredited in this respect. However, the 
evidence indicates that the employees undeniably used informal information, 
particularly from sources external to the organisation, to determine that the company 
was distresse~. Figure 9.1 displays the variety of internal and external grapevine 
sources and participants which the employees and unions observed: 
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Figure 9.1: Grapevine Sources and Participants 
EXTERNAL 
SOURCES 
NON-PERSONAL 
EXTERNAL SOURCES 
INTERNAL 
SOURCES 
*Note that the table does not take into consideration any differences in the volume of 
KEY: information received from, and communicated to, grapevine sources and partipants. 
_ ...,. Employee's information sources and grapevine participants 
--!> The Union's information sources and grapevine participants 
5.1. Employees' Internal Informal Information Sources 
5.1.1. Colleagues 
Consistent with other research, Fortex's employees conversed with their colleagues 
in order to allay concerns and obtain information. This network of communication 
extended across differing sites in the plant with the employees in different 
departments indicating a common knowledge of events which affected themselves 
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and the organisation. For instance, one employee when questioned about rumours 
reported: 
"They just come from around here I suppose. Just a bit of discussion here and 
there. The group I sat in, you know, we always talked about it. There was a 
group of us from different departments. Well like d bunch of old women the 
gossip goes on. All/ike to know what's going on and these bits come up." 
Simmons (1985) reported that liaison individuals were most likely to be staff 
members as they can cross departmental boundaries and spread information. The 
boundary spanning characteristic of the liaison individuals was apparent in references 
made to communication patterns ofFortex's grapevine. Tractor drivers were referred 
to in a liaison role: "[y]ou only had to tell the tractor driver of such and such and by 
the time he'd been around to four or five departments you could spread a rumour 
mighty quick." However, it was at luncheon and tea or 'smoko' breaks that the 
employees had the most opportunity to communicate with employees from various 
departments. At these intervals any current issues or rumours would be discussed. 
According to one interviewee: 
"[i]f anybody had had an inkling of anything substantial at all, hell the smoko 
room's where it flies. You get 60 odd people in there at lunch-time and the 
rumours flow pretty quick. " · 
One example of inter-floor communication was the employees' knowledge of the 
stockpiled meat. The information was reported to originate :fiom employees who 
worked in the chiller. The individual who related this information worked in the 
venison floor. Within the last few days, rumours of receivership circulated the 
organisation. When commenting on these rumours the interviewees indicated that 
they received information from individuals in their own and different floors. For 
instance, another employee who worked in the venison chain overheard this rumour 
from slaughterboard workers. 
5.1.2. Foremen and Managerial Staff 
The internal informal sources of information were not restricted to discussion with 
their fellow work-mates. Several interviewees indicated informal communication 
with managerial staff and foremen as a source of information when the company was 
distressed. 
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Informal contact with management was limited. The only employee who had direct 
contact with management stated that: "J had a few mates in management. I sort of 
was privy to a lot of information that the ordinary workers didn't have. " However, 
this information did not prevent the employee and the manager from being surprised 
when the company failed. Instead the information gained from management was 
limited because the information plant management received themselves was limited. 
While the foremen who were ex-union delegates were viewed with contempt, a few 
others were included in the grapevine, with four interviewees reporting discussing 
their concerns and other job related issues with them, and receiving confidential 
information. The first reported " .. .foremen through management. They'd hear 
something through the management that wasn't told to us.... We got along good 
with our particular foreman in our room. " 
The second employee elucidated this point: 
"There was always somebody who knew something or picked it up along the 
line from their department or their foreman that, you know, just sort of 
enlightened us that that wasn't quite the truth type of thing. Some of 
information that we got on that sort of thing which helped us form opinions 
was... I was very friendly with one of the foreman in our department and they 
went to a lot of these meetings, and they let a bit of stuff slip here and there. " 
Unfortunately this respondent could not recall any examples of information being 
received from this friendly foreman. 
Ofthe two others, one reported that their foreman " ... was very good and open to talk 
about it [Fortex's position]." The other discussed a feeling that the company was in 
more trouble than had been revealed with his foreman: 
I think it was something that I read in the paper about they'd lost markets 
overseas for some reason, they hadn 't been marketing the product properly, 
and I just said to this foreman this day that there 's something not right here. 
They're not selling the meat. They're in trouble. And he says "if what you say 
I 
is right then we are in big trouble. " 
Overall however, these examples were isolated. Little information was informally 
passed to the employees from their superiors. Any information was passed due to 
friendship. Furthermore, as the preceding employee's observation indicates, the 
foremen, and with hindsight plant managers, had little more information than the 
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employees themselves. Hence, any information received from managers and 
foremen was limited as neither managers nor foremen were privy to information 
which revealed the 'true' nature ofFortex's distressed position. 
5.1.3. Union 
Other than the daily, even hourly, presentation of share prices to the employees, 
informing the employees of their efficiency levels, and that the company was in 
trouble, the union provided little information to the employees. Yet two interviewees 
believed they gained a considerable volume of information from the union. Only one 
of these assertions was justified. A single employee, who was a close personal friend 
of one of the delegates, was the recipient of more information from the union than 
any of the other individuals. This employee was considerably more informed of 
events which preceded the company's collapse, reporting the joint-second highest 
number of concerns (9). 
The other interviewees contended that little information was forthcoming. Despite 
that, and a knowledge and acceptance that the union were not telling them 
everything, the interviewees acknowledged that they maintained a good partnership 
with the union: 
"They knew more than we did of course, and they told us the company was in 
trouble. They didn't realise, I don't think, that it was in as serious trouble as it 
was either. But Peter and his delegates were telling us that this company is in 
trouble and we were going to have to help them if we were going to keep our 
jobs." 
The fact that this stance was not questioned indicates a trust in their elected 
representatives. The union themselves admitted that they held information which 
was not passed on to the employees and others due to the potential effect it would 
have on morale and the stockmarket. While they did not know the actual extent of 
the company's financial difficulties, they realised that spreading information may 
harm the company, precipitating its early failure. 
While it seems that grapevine information was predominantly received from 
colleague or floor employees, this should have been expected. In the typical course 
of a day's work an employee will have more contact with their peers than managers 
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or a single supervisor. Hence, there will be more potential for communication 
between employees. However, by providing information which was often 
subsequently communicated amongst the employees, the managers, foremen and the 
union were effectively liaison individuals. The participation of these individuals 
could have partially contributed to the employees' identification of factors which 
contributed to Fortex's distress. 
5.2. Employees' External Informal Information Sources 
While internal participants in Fortex's grapevine were not numerous, there was a vast 
number of external participants in Fortex's, making the grapevine active beyond the 
organisational boundary. 
5.2.1. Local Community 
When the company was struggling in the Christmas 1993 period, the local 
community, especially retailers, noticed the reduction in spending from employees. 
Consequently, speculation in the local community increased. 
Identities in the local community were referred to as 'sources of information' about 
the company. These individuals proffered their own opinions to two of the 
employees interviewed. The first, a veterinarian, purportedly stated that Fortex had 
made limited profits in good times and questioned their ability to continue in a period 
of adversity. This statement was made in conversation approximately three months 
prior to failure. The second was a prominent local businessman who sold his shares 
a week prior to the failure. At that stage he was adamant that the company was going 
to be placed into receivership. A week later it was. 
Another external source was information from a bank manager which was received 
second-hand by an employee from a friend who had participated in the 
conversation. 75 The example of friendship being a factor in informal communication 
is not an isolated one. Employees also received information from, and 
75 
This example is detailed in the section regarding friends and relatives which follows, p 215. 
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communicated information to, friends and relatives in the local community. Such 
communication provides a rationale for the statement that "[w]ord soon gets around 
in a small place like Ashburton. " Rumours in the local community were given by 
one individual as part of the reason that they believed the company was going to fail. 
5.2.2. Friends and Relatives 
The importance of information from relatives and friends cannot be underestimated. 
Through family contacts the employees found a variety of information. For instance, 
in the largely rural Ashburton community, most people either were themselves, or 
knew persons who were, farmers. Either directly or through contact with friends and 
family knew farmers, details such as slow payments or in extreme cases payments 
not being made at all, reached the employees: 
"A lot of farmers, we are all related to farmers or have got farms of our own, 
stock agents. It was a bit of feeling around, you know. Well Joe Bloggs down 
the road has never been paid for his lambs. Little things like that. We thought 
there must be something going on. " 
Similarly, information that the farmers were withholding stock because of such 
issues were also received by the employees via contact with relatives and friends. 
These events in tum became widely known throughout the workforce. 
Friends of two interviewees were identified as important sources of information in 
two respects: 
• During the last three months, a period in which rumours increased, one individual 
had friends ringing him saying that " ... they'd heard through such and such a 
person that Fortex was going to be put into receivership and this was a few days 
before it actually did and that came through a friend whose bank manager had 
told him that. " The bank manager believed that the company was to be placed into 
receivership a week later. Based on this opinion, both the employee and friend 
sold their investment in Fortex.76 
76 
This employee recognised his actions as of dubious legality stating, "[l]hat's almost classed as insider trading." 
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• The employees' concern over working short days was accentuated when, through 
friendship with employees at the rival Fairton plant, they discovered that they 
were working a full week without suffering shortages. 
Hence, through informal contact with relations and friends, a few employees within 
the company received information from a bank manager, farmers, and rival 
employees. Despite such informal contact not necessarily being part of the 
grapevine, other employees, without the same external contacts, reported that they 
were aware of both the farmers' concerns and Fairton's operations. 
5.2.3. Farmers 
Six of the interviewees mentioned knowledge of farmers' reluctance to send stock. 
Two had, either through friendship with the farmers themselves or through friends 
who knew farmers, found that they were not sending in stock through fear of not 
receiving payment. The remaining four indicated that the knew of such information 
through rumours which were travelling around the plant: 
"Some of the people that actually worked out there at the time were on farms 
or had dealing with farmers. They were letting me know then that they weren't 
going to send the stock in. They didn't feel that Fortex were going to pay 
them." 
One employee postulated that the widespread reluctance to send in lambs was due to 
a rumour which was circulating around the local farming community: 
"But I think there may have been a bit of a whisper out in the community before 
it became official because it didn't take long for most farmers to know that they 
shouldn't be sending their stock there." 
5.2.4. Inter-company Information and the Industry Grapevine 
The bonds of friendship and kinship were evident in the information reportedly 
received from rival companies. More individuals asserted that they knew of 
competitors' production levels than the two who had direct contact with PPCS's 
employees. Any knowledge of competitors' production indicates some form of 
information transfer between the meat processing companies. However, a number of 
employees remarked that they knew what their rival companies were processing 
CASE STUDY: THE GRAPEVINE 217 
without indicating informal contact with friends and relatives within the opposition's 
plant. Post-collapse there were also rumours concerning PPCS's role in Fortex's 
downfall. 
These examples indicate two things: 
• Firstly, that infonnal communication occurred between employees who had access 
to infonnation from other companies and those who did not. When explaining 
how information from other companies was obtained, other employees within the 
company were also given as a source, with one employee stating that: 
"One of the guys came from Oamaru some from Islington, others from other 
places. So that's how we got to know a lot of people and got to know a lot 
about competition through that. " 
• Secondly, there was a form of industry grapevine which the employees continued 
to have access to after their own company had collapsed. 
The second point IS further supported with evidence that inter-company 
communication was a two way process. While Fortex's employees gained 
information from their rivals, their competitors also seemed to know of Fortex's 
distressed position. Rumours of Fortex's strife were reportedly spread by PPCS 
employees. Where PPCS's employees gained the infonnation to ascertain that 
Fortex was in trouble in unclear. One respondent submitted that they had " ... heard 
different things from the union and employees from other companies such as Fairton. 
The Fairton employees said they had heard Fortex was in trouble, but it was more 
hearsay than anything else. " Without any reason for their opinions, the Fortex 
employees attributed the statements to inter-company rivalry. 
While there is evidence of inter-company infonnation similar to that proposed by 
MacDonald (1992a; 1992b) and individuals acting in the role of a gatekeeper, there 
are some notable differences. Within Fortex, this gatekeeper role was undertaken on 
an unofficial basis. That is, the employees who received the information were not 
officially appointed as gatekeepers, but filled the role through their personal 
relationship with the other company's employees. However, they did transmit the 
218 EMPLOYEES' OBSERVATIONS, INFORMAL INFORMATION AND CORPORATE DISTRESS 
information to others inside their own organisation, thereby fulfilling the 
gatekeeper's role. 
5.2.5. Non-personal Information Sources 
As an aside, it is interesting to note that one interviewee's concerns were exacerbated 
by a newspaper article. This finding provides support to Hull's (1994) assertion that 
employees could glean external grapevine information from newspapers, magazines 
and television. 
5.3. Union Delegates' Information Sources 
When directly asked where the union obtained most of its information, Binnie 
responded that: 
I guess as a generality I guess people or human beings from all walks trusted 
the union more than they trusted the company. So that was salaried staff the 
lot. And we didn't... we weren't doing anything special. We hoped we were 
being effective. And it [information] just seemed to come our way. 
Most information was gained from internal sources, both formal and informal. 
The union was the recipient and instigator of formal communication. Often 
communicating directly to head-office, circumventing the formal channels. They 
acknowledged their privileged position, admitting that they were the recipients of 
substantially more formal communication than any other group on the plant, 
including plant management. 
One example was the joint board of controllers meeting in Oamaru during September 
1993 when Thompson and Mcintosh outlined the company's financial woes. 
Unfortunately no other examples of formal communication were provided. 
However, both delegates were adamant that such communication had occurred, 
reporting that head-office management would approach the union for assistance 
because the employees would more readily accept requests for extra production from 
the union rather than from management. 
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Despite being a reservoir of information, the union declined to disseminate their 
knowledge to other employees. In this respect they were acting as dead-enders, 
individuals who do not send but only receive information from the grapevine. This 
approach was undertaken to limit the effect. on the company's position, both with 
regard to farmers and suppliers, and to the sharemarket. By spreading such 
information they were worried that those groups would act adversely, which would 
only worsen the company's position. 
There are notable differences, however, between the union's action and that of a 
typical dead-ender, such as the conscious choice not to communicate selected 
information to the employees. The selectivity shown conforms to Davis's (1953a) 
identification of a form of confidential grapevine information whereby information 
may not be passed to those not meant to receive it. In this instance, the employees 
and particularly the general public and the stock market were parties to which this 
information was not to be disseminated. 
Reliance on formal information would presumably indicate a decreased reliance on 
informal information sources. Nevertheless, the union was the recipient of internal 
and external informal information. Generally, Binnie reported that information was 
gained from 'keeping their ear to the ground', commenting that it was: 
" ... surprising at times you would get iriformation sometimes when you least 
expected it. People would confide in you. Sometimes people that you didn't 
expect normally would " 
5.3.1. Internal Information 
The predominant source of information was the employees who communicated their 
fears, concerns, and rumours to the union. They also reported having informal 
contact with supervisors and some salaried plant staff. Upon hearing rumours or 
concerns, the union would investigate to discover the cause, and whether there was 
any underlying truth. The information from employees offers a potential explanation 
as to how the union knew of the employees' concerns over such events as the falling 
share price, T. A. Pacific, and the stock shortage and price war, all of which have 
been identified as symptoms ofFortex's decline. 
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Table 9.1 77 indicated that the union was the recipient of three pieces of informal 
information which were not reported by any other employees. All of this information 
originated at a managerial level. Only one, the leaked document, was delivered to 
the union by a non-managerial employee; the other two were obtained informally 
from head-office. Binnie indicated that this was not uncommon, stating that "[w]e 
had various spots where we could pose a question. Its rather remarkable what you 
can pick up without trying too hard at times. " 
The union also acted as a source but refrained from providing all the information 
they knew for fear of worsening the company's position with respect to farmers, 
suppliers, and the sharemarket. However, as indicated earlier, the unions policy of 
restricting the information they provided was circumvented when, as a result of 
friendship, one delegate communicated information to an employee. Whether this 
information was any more detailed than the information the union passed to other 
employees is impossible to ascertain. ·Nevertheless, the employee believed that 
through the informal contact, he was in a privileged position and had more 
knowledge than the other employees. This employee seemed more knowledgeable 
than his colleagues. 
5.3.2. External Information 
Regarding external information, Binnie reported that the union never sourced a lot. 
However, he did provide some examples: 
"You would sometimes get onto something where farmers might have picked up 
something from the board of directors and then it would start doing the rounds 
and you could start backtracking .... You could start and ask some subtle 
questions, or some blind questions, or an opposite question and you might find 
out what you wanted. " 
'Doing the rounds' was undefined but common usage would indicate that the 
information was transmitted amongst farmers and the community as a rumour, or in a 
grapevine communication format. 
77 
Table 9.1 was presented on p 208 of this thesis. 
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Again farmers were mentioned as a valuable source. Binnie himself was a farmer, 
which would explain where such information came from. The interesting point is 
that farmers could potentially have contact with the company directors, a statement 
which would seem anomalous for most other co.mpanies where the directors would 
be most unlikely to have direct contact with any suppliers. However, several of the 
directors had farms themselves, and in the tight local community, employees 
indicated that it was not uncommon to have informal contact with the senior officers 
outside the company. 
Other sources mentioned included information from rival companies and banks both 
within Ashburton and in Christchurch. Close to the failure, Binnie reported a 
conversation with the Christchurch rural branch head of one of New Zealand's 
leading banks. The conversation, instigated by the banker who was a friend of 
Binnie's, preceded Fortex's receivership and concerned potential retaliatory action 
from employees against the bank. Concerned that the employees would withdraw 
funds and undertake other action, the bank manager sought to protect his own 
company. In doing so he showed Binnie that the company was close to failure. 
5.4. Summary 
Through a variety of means ranging from friends and relatives, ·to industry rumours 
and information from individuals in the local community, Fortex's employees, both 
union and non-union, gained a considerable volume and diversity of informal 
information. This finding is consistent with previous research which reported 
grapevine participants can be external to the company (Davis, 1969). The variety of 
sources provided information which contributed to the employees' observations of 
problems and their detection of distress. 
6. Implications 
The case suggests that the grapevine may carry information which indicates 
symptoms of a failing company. Fortex's employees identified grapevine 
information and rumour as contributing to their opinion that the company was 
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distressed. Therefore, it is one of the information sources which McBarnet et al 
(1993) reported that employees use to ascertain problems.78 
If employees can use grapevine information to determine distress, then an external 
party may also do the same. This external party could be Argenti's (1976a) 
knowledgeable observer, an external auditor, or even an external grapevine 
participant. However, the extent to which the knowledgeable observer and external 
auditor could use grapevine information in this respect would depend on the 
employees' willingness to communicate information. 
Moreover, increased grapevine activity in itself may be symptomatic of distress. The 
grapevine communicates rumour. At the same time that rumour increased, morale 
decreased. Morale is the domain of the grapevine and is a symptom of distress. 
Therefore, increased grapevine activity may be a further symptom of distress. 
7. Limitations 
The findings have several potentially limiting factors. Firstly, not all of the 
interviewees' reports of rumour may be attributable to the .grapevine. Employees 
often believe that they receive more information from the grapevine than they 
actually do (Walton, 1961). 
Secondly, not all of the informal information is necessarily grapevine information. 
Some of information gained from friendship with a union member, businessman or 
relatives, may remain confidential. For instance, a dead-ender may hear information 
from such a source but not transmit it to other employees. However, in many 
instances information from personal relationships with farmers, friends and other 
employees within the plant was then conveyed via the grapevine. 
Thirdly, grapevine information depends on initial observation. For example, the 
rumours of a large stockpile of inventory at Ashcold originated with employees at the 
78 · 1 McBarnet et al (1993) continued by stating that the observation of these problems often prompted a call for financta 
information which allowed the detection of creative accounting. However, this did not occur in the Fortex case. 
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storage facility. The grapevine may not cover all the employees within the company 
and therefore some information, such as financial information, may not be 
transmitted. Nevertheless, interdepartmental, and inter-organisational communication 
can make employees aware of problems that they have not directly observed. 
Fourthly, not all people have access to the grapevine. Employees do not necessarily 
always receive grapevine information. Therefore, few employees will be aware of all 
of the concerns of the other employees. 
8. Conclusion 
Fortex's grapevine was large, reaching 13 of the 15 employees interviewed and a 
variety of parties outside of the organisation. Its activity increased after the 
employees were informed that the company was financially struggling. During this 
period, the employees reported that via the grapevine they discussed many of the 
concerns which were identified in Chapter 8 as defects, mistakes and symptoms of 
distress. This information contributed to their belief that the company was 
distressed. Therefore, third parties and managers should take notice of grapevine 
information as it carries information which can indicate problems which cause 
corporate distress. 
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1. Introduction 
Chapter 4 outlined the characteristics of IAISs found the in previous research. The 
review provided background information to ascertain whether the IAIS was an 
informal source from which employees gained information, and whether that 
information contributed to their opinion that Fortex was, or was not, distressed. 
During the review three other potential interrelationships between an IAIS and 
distress were also proposed: 
• Firstly, that an IAIS in itself indicates distress. 
• Secondly, that employees or an external party could use the information from the 
IAIS to verify the accuracy of formal accounting information. A comparison 
could reveal a defective accounting system or fraud and creative accounting. 
• Thirdly, that an IAIS could be constructed in response to weaknesses within the 
organisation. 
This chapter documents Seafield's IAIS and analyses the potential interrelationships 
between the system, employees' observations and opinions, and corporate distress. 
2. Fortex's IAIS 
The IAIS operated in three areas, the lamb cutting floor, venison cutting floor and the 
slaughterboard, and was maintained by two union delegates and one management 
representative. 
2.1. Why was the IAIS Introduced? 
In 1991 Fortex achieved a $2.89m profit (FGAR, 1991).79 Although reported as 
'satisfactory' in the annual report, Fortex's management were privately disappointed 
79 Fortex's financial year ended on August 31. 
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with the company's financial performance. Therefore, in September, in an attempt to 
increase profitability, they proposed a 1 0 percent wage reduction. U nsurprisingly, 
the union did not believe that such a measure was necessary. Seafield Union 
Secretary Peter Binnie, recognising that the further processing was Fortex's value-
added activity, responded that if management sought improved profits, it should first 
target inefficiencies and wastage in the production process. 
Through his position, Binnie assessed that approximately one third of the productive 
time in the lamb and venison further processing rooms was being wasted. This 
equated to $2 million in lost earnings potential each year, a figure which was 
reportedly verified by Fortex's management. Binnie detailed these inefficiencies and 
time wastage in a letter which was presented to plant and head office management. 
A meeting was convened with managing director Graeme Thompson present. 
To Binnie, Thompson seemed uninterested with hearing these problems. However, 
some notice must have been taken because the threatened wage reductions were not 
enforced. Instead the union and employees undertook measures to increase the 
company's productivity and efficiency. The IAIS was constructed to provide a daily 
efficiency check which would identify where production did not meet budgeted 
levels. 
2.1.1. Dual Purposes 
According to Binnie, "[t]he sole purpose of the thing [the IAJS] was to get 
productivity right up to where we wanted it to be, and maintain it there as well. " 
However, there must be doubt over this claim. The production problems were only 
identified after a wage reduction was threatened. The wage reductions were not 
imposed because the union promised to increase production levels. Hence, the 
increased production and IAIS were effectively a trade-off which protected the 
employees' wages. 
The introduction of the IAIS also had a secondary monetary benefit. Fortex's 
employees were paid on an standard hourly rate plus an incentive. If production was 
not maximised they would not receive their highest possible wage: 
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" ... efficiency meant so much. It meant all the potential productivity for the 
company and it meant all the potential wages for the people .... So if we weren't 
getting our full incentive we needed to know why we were not getting it, and the 
reasons we wouldn't be getting it was because the room wasn't performing at 
the levels it should have been. " 
229 
The management of production through the IAIS increased productivity and 
therefore had the side-effect of increasing the wage every employee received. Hence, 
the IAIS benefited the company through increased production, and the employees by 
not reducing their standard hourly rate and assuring that they received their 
maximum incentive. 
2.2. The Data Maintained in the System 
The informal accounting information was entered on computer generated 
spreadsheets. Two typical spreadsheets from Seafield's IAIS are presented in 
Exhibits 10.1 and 10.2.80 
At the start of each day the production requirements were entered into the 
spreadsheet. Each different type of cut required seven pieces of data. These areas 
were: 
• Number of carcases to cut or tally; 
• Number of carcases paid for; 
• Degree of difficulty of the cut-as some cuts were more difficult than others, they 
were assigned a difficulty level based on the standard time it should take to 
perform them; 
• Manning on the main line; 
• Manning in the nichiro boning room; 
• Tally speed-a belt ran through the room conveying the meat past the employees. 
The speed of the belt differed according to the difficulty of the cuts; and 
80 .. 
Exhibits 10.1 and 10.2 are set out on pages 231 and 232. 
230 EMPLOYEES' OBSERVATIONS, INFORMAL INFORMATION AND CORPORATE DISTRESS 
• Tally time-the budgeted time required to process a specific cut. Measured in 
minutes a 'tally time' is calculated by dividing the number of carcases by the tally 
speed. 
To calculate the daily efficiency measure, an employee recorded the exact time cut 
changes took place in a notebook. At the end of each day these times were 
transposed into the spreadsheet in the 'start time' and 'finish time' rows. The cut 
change times allowed the calculation of the actual production time worked per cut. 
The differential between the actual production time worked and the budgeted or 
'tally' time indicated the time gained or lost.81 For example, in Exhibit 10.1, of the 
ten tallies processed during the day, six were performed slower than was budgeted, 
three were faster, and in one case (the last tally) the production time worked equalled 
the tally time. Overall 31 minutes production were lost during the day. Notably, 
only the three negative variances over two minutes were subject to any scrutiny. The 
union ignored small negative and any positive variances which resulted from 
performance which was near to, or exceeded, expectations. 
The efficiency of the cutting rooms was also assessed by determining the amount of 
time lost making cut changes, performing rework and miscellaneous time losses. 
Each of the three variables were contained within the spreadsheet, together with an 
area for written comments on the days performance, including any problems which 
had occurred. 
81 
As the system developed the net minutes gained or lost were divided by the total minutes in a day to display daily 
efficiency as a percentage operating capacity. 
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2.2.1. Daily Operations 
At the end of each day the performance of the slaughter board and cutting floors was 
examined to see if it fell within the expected parameters: 
"If it wasn't within the parameters that we expected we had what we called a 
focus meeting every day and we'd go over that and we'd say well what 
happened here and we would investigate it. " 
During the enquiry the supervisor in charge of the cutting room would be questioned 
as to why the variance arose. If a reasonable explanation was not supplied, the 
supervisor would be reprimanded and told to perform. Similarly, if the problem 
originated with the chain employees they would also be reprimanded. Thus, 
personnel were managed and informally evaluated on the performance reported by 
the IAIS. This evaluation was assisted with comparisons of the informal records to 
the formal records. 
2.2.2. Comparison to the Formal System 
Production information was kept by the organisation's management accounting 
system. Periodically the formal and informal records were compared. The 
comparison showed that the records were approximately the same. However, like the 
findings of Clancy and Collins (1979), Binnie believed that the informal system was 
slightly more accurate. Supervisors provided the information in the formal system. 
Experience showed that they often made errors which they tried to hide by 'juggling' 
times and giving incorrect times for cut changes. The informal system identified 
where the information foremen provided was false or inaccurate. 
2.3. The Effect of the IAIS 
Described as a "daily audit sheet", the IAIS, allowed the union to "account for every 
minute of the day. " According to Binnie: 
"We could tell at a glance exactly how the room had performed, exactly what 
the productivity for the day had been, the lot. " 
By the time of the collapse, wastage had been reduced the extent that both cutting 
rooms were operating at their budgeted efficiency levels. Furthermore, according to 
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the IAIS, the slaughterboard was running at 83 percent productivity when the system 
was introduced. By the time Fortex failed, the slaughterboard was also constantly 
performing at 1 00 percent efficiency. 
3. Discussion 
3.1. General Research 
Fortex's IAIS exhibited two characteristics prevalent in earlier research. Firstly, it 
was perceived to be more accurate than the formal AIS (Clancy and Collins, 1979). 
Secondly, it maintained information on production efficiency (Lal and Donaldson, 
1988). 
Modestly described by Binnie as "simple but effective" the IAIS which maintained 
information on the Seafield plant's cutting rooms and slaughter board, was more 
complex than most found in previous research. Hopwood (1973) reports a scale of 
IAISs which ranged from regular notes to a level of complexity similar to that of a 
formal system. Curiously, the IAIS. which operated at the Seafield plant had both 
features. Hand recorded notes were inputted into a computer-generated spreadsheets. 
Later the information was entirely maintained on a computer system and by the time 
the company collapsed, the size and complexity was such that the IAIS resembled 
part of any organisation's management accounting system. The evolution from 
rudimentary daily note-taking to the structured, complex system exhibited by the 
Seafield plant had when it closed, is not mentioned in prior research. One potential 
explanation could be that prior researchers observed the systems at a single point in 
time rather than over a period of time. 
Fortex's IAIS was introduced for the dual reasons evident in Myers' (1970) research. 
The system benefited both the company and the employees themselves. The 
company's efficiency was seen as crucial for the continuing existence of the 
company and therefore the continuance of their employment. Furthermore, the 
employees were paid incentives for high production. The IAIS, which assisted 
efficient production, helped maximise the employees' incentive payments. Hence, in 
its secondary purpose, the Seafield plant's IAIS was similar to the system Lupton 
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(1963) found where a group of employees used an IAIS to manipulate their incentive 
wage scheme. However, in the present case the financial benefits were not the result 
of any manipulation, but represented a genuine attempt to improve the organisation's 
performance. 
Like Lupton's (1963) research, Fortex's IAIS was operated by a group of people. 
However, rather than a group of employees, Fortex's IAIS relied on a collaboration 
between union delegates, employees, and management. This collaboration is unusual 
in three respects: 
• Firstly, most previous research has indicated that systems are maintained by 
managerial employees. 
• Secondly, except for Lupton's (1963) findings, IAISs were maintained by one 
person for use by that person. 
• Thirdly, while Davis and Olson (1985) assert that IAISs may receive official 
sanction, managerial participation an IAIS is anomalous to previous research. 
Managerial participation indicates that the system was not strictly informal, but 
operated as an adjunct to the organisation's internal accounting mechanism. 
However, because the formal system also maintained production information, the 
IAIS cannot be adjudged an official part of the formal system. This too is 
unusual. Coincidentally, the only comparable findings are those of Lal and 
Donaldson (1988) whose research was also conducted within New Zealand 
organisations. 
3.2. New Zealand Specific Research 
Lal and Donaldson (1988) reported two cases where IAISs effectively replaced part 
of the formal system. As indicated above, the records maintained by the IAIS were 
also kept by the formal system. The IAIS also provided information not produced by 
the formal system. 
At a glance these characteristics would indicate that the IAIS either duplicated or 
supplemented/complemented the formal system. However, the IAIS was self-
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contained and did not rely solely on transcribing information from the formal system. 
Therefore, it did not duplicate the formal system. Moreover, because foremen and 
workers were also evaluated and managed according to the information produced by 
the system, it is evident that Seafield's IAIS was used for more than just to provide 
additional information. Instead, the IAIS effectively replaced the formal system for 
daily operational purposes. It is notable that systems which replace the formal 
accounting system have only been found in New Zealand based research. 
With one exception, Lal and Donaldson (1988) found that most of the IAIS 
maintained were small, unstructured and infrequently used. Only one manager 
referred to his system frequently. Fortex's IAIS was large, structured and updated 
every day. Furthermore, whereas Lal and Donaldson's (1988) managers each 
indicated one reason why the system was maintained,82 the dual nature of Fortex's 
IAIS precludes singular categorisation. 
While primarily concerned with improving efficiency, the system also checked the 
accuracy of the formal system and helped the union and employees manage their jobs 
better. Furthermore, the IAIS could also be viewed as a defense mechanism in that 
its development meant the plant's workers did not receive a wage reduction. Each of 
the above factors were mentioned by Lal and Donaldson (1988) as causes for 
different systems.83 However, due to its size and complexity, the IAIS fulfilled each 
of these roles. 
The size and complexity meant the IAIS displayed many of the characteristics found 
in Lal and Donaldson's (1988) research. However, in combination, the 
characteristics also made the IAIS dissimilar to any of the individual systems 
mentioned in any prior research. 
82 
One manager provided two reasons. 
83 
Exhibit 4.2, p 45 of this thesis, set out the causes ofiAISs found by La! and Donaldson (1988). 
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. 3.3. Summary 
Seafield' s IAIS was unique in many respects. Its complexity parallelled that of a 
formal system, it received official sanctioning and managerial participation, was 
maintained by more than one person and replaced information from the formal 
system for daily operational purposes. However, it can be established that the IAIS 
functioned differently from the roles the formal accounting system is purported to 
perform in a crisis. They were internalised and hence did not scan the external 
environment for crises. Furthermore, they focused on one specific area of the 
organisation's performance, namely production. 
These findings are unsurprising as the systems identified by previous researchers also 
held the same characteristics. The potential limitations were acknowledged in 
Chapter 4. 84 However, the focus was to identify whether, as it was earlier proposed, 
such systems may provide information about a specific area of performance that may 
alert the employees to a problem which threatened the organisation. In this case the 
reverse may have occurred. 
4. Employees and Informal Accounting Information 
The employees in the lamb and venison cutting floors and slaughterboard unit were 
aware that the IAIS existed and that it was beneficial for both themselves and the 
company. One acknowledged that they were rewarded for their performance and the 
IAIS was a means to maximise their incentives. However, he or she reported that the 
primary purpose of the system was to maximise the company's profit. 
While the interviewees recognised the benefits provided by the IAIS, no more than 
six had dire·ct access to the information it contained. These six consisted of the 
management representative, Binnie, another union delegate, and three employees, 
one for each floor, who recorded cut change times. However, the employees were 
provided with information from the IAIS, which detailed their performance and 
84 
See Chapter 4, p 49 of this thesis for the limitations. 
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production problems, in the focus meetings and during other meetings which 
occurred in 'smoko' breaks. From this information they believed they were well 
informed as to their own work performance: 
"They [the union delegates] would go over to the management and would 
discuss why we were stopped so long and what ever happened to the saw 
breakdown and did we have a power cut etcetera like that. So we were well 
informed The union and the company both worked together like that. " 
The information that the employees received at these meetings was not identified as 
one of the sources of information which the employees used to ascertain that the 
company was distressed. Instead it fulfilled the opposite role. The information from 
the IAIS contributed to the belief that the company was, and would continue to be, 
successful. 
The employees associated their job performance with the company's performance. 
That is, the employees correctly perceived that by improving their own performance, 
they were assisting the overall the performance of the company. The information 
from the IAIS confirmed that the employees were gradually becoming more efficient. 
Therefore, the performance of the company was also expected to improve. It is here 
that the limited scope of the IAIS could have further affected the employees' 
perceptions. 
Efficient production and processing was just one of three important elements (the 
other two being the procurement of lambs and marketing), required for Fortex to be 
successful (FGAR, 1990). The IAIS solely concerned processing (a facet of the 
organisation which seemed to be performing well), and did not have the capability to 
assess the organisation's overall performance. For instance, the limited scope ofthe 
IAIS provided no means to ascertain that Fortex was struggling to sell all of its 
production. 
The employees reported that their opinions of the company's performance were 
reinforced by the information supplied by Fortex's management. Fortex's 
management would often attend the 'smoko' meetings and inform the employees of 
the company's success overseas, particularly its marketing achievements. Plant 
management were also quick to allay the concerns of those who had overheard 
rumours of a large stockpile. For the most part these reassurances were accepted. 
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Furthermore, a newsletter was produced which also informed the employees about 
the company's operations and invariably its successes. 
4.1. Conclusion 
Within Chapter 4, several propositions concerning IAISs and distress were discussed, 
the first of which (that employees may use information from IAIS to detect distress), 
has not been supported in this instance. Instead the opposite was found. The 
information the employees received from the IAIS showed that their own 
performance was excellent. When reinforced by information on the company's 
successes, it is unsurprising that, even in the last few months, many believed the 
company would not fail. However, while this proposition has been rejected, 
supporting evidence was found for the other potential interrelationships between 
IAISs and distress which were posited in Chapter 4. 
5. Other Relationships Between IAIS and Distress 
5.1. Indicating Company Weaknesses 
Based on previous research this researcher proposed that an IAIS may be established 
in response to a weakness or problem which contributes to distress. 
In this case the IAIS was established in response to inefficient production. The 
problem was severe, costing the company $2 million in annual potential earnings. 
Peter Binnie maintained that the inefficiencies threatened the company's survival 
stating " ... no company can survive like that. " Prior distress research has found that 
production problems and inefficiencies could cause a company to become 
incompetitive and fail (Bruno et al, 1987; Lingard, 1989; Scherrer, 1988). Therefore, 
this case indicates that an IAIS may be developed in an attempt to remedy a problem 
or weakness that contributes to corporate distress or the eventual failure of a 
company. 
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5.2. Comparing the Informal and Formal AIS 
The author also proposed that a comparison of informal and formal systems may 
detect differences in the formal systems records which could be investigated. 
Discrepancies could arise from fraud or creative accounting, or from an inadequate 
formal accounting system. These factors have been identified by Argenti (1977, 
1979b) as issues contributing to a company's collapse.85 
According to Binnie, the system "operated as a daily audit sheet." Information 
from the informal system was compared to the formal system, and therefore provided 
a check on the formal system's accuracy. In this case the systems produced 
approximately the same figures. Consequently, the comparison did not reveal any 
areas of creative accounting or fraud, other than the simple mistakes and time 
manipulations performed by the supervisors. However, consistent with the prior 
research of Clancy and Collins (1979), the informal system was perceived as slightly 
more accurate than the formal system. Hence, any differences identified were 
attributed to errors in the formal system. 
By verifying the accuracy of the formal records, Fortex's IAIS effectively operated 
as an internal auditing mechanism. In companies with a weak internal audit function, 
such a system could be a valuable source for an external auditor seeking to verify the 
accuracy of a company's formal system. 
5.3. Indicating Weaknesses in the Formal AIS 
It was proposed that an IAIS in itself indicates a weakness within a formal 
accounting system, for if the formal system provided the data employees require, it is 
unlikely that employees would operate an informal system. Such a weakness could 
be a defect which is an important factor noted in the failure of many companies 
(Argenti, 1977, 1979b). 
85 
According to Argenti (1977, 1979b), a poor accounting function is a defect which occurs earliest in the collapse process, 
while creative accounting is an observable symptom of a distressed company. 
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The Seafield plant's IAIS was constructed after the realisation of the cutting floors 
inefficiencies. Prior to Binnie's letter which detailed the wastage and inefficiency, 
management seemed unaware of these problems. Binnie claimed that this lack of 
awareness was a result of an inadequate accounting system which had not identified 
that production was severely inefficient. Forensic accountant David Osborne of the 
Serious Fraud Office provided support for this claim with his post-collapse 
examination revealing that Fortex's formal accounting system was not very 
sophisticated (The Press, 1995a). Moreover, the IAIS supplanted the formal system 
and was used to manage and evaluate employees' performance. 
However, not all the evidence indicates that the formal system was defective. The 
formal accounting system recorded the times for cut changes and each day's 
production requirements. Secondly, after the IAIS was established, a comparison 
between the two systems only revealed slight discrepancies. 
The conflicting evidence raises two alternative scenarios relating to the period prior 
to the development of the IAIS: 
• Firstly, that the formal AIS was defective and did not provide evidence of the 
severely inefficient production at the Seafield plant. 
• Secondly, that the formal AIS was not defective and that management were aware 
that production was severely inefficient but had undertaken no means to remedy 
the problem. 
Hence, while inconclusive, this case indicates that an IAIS could potentially be 
constructed in response to a defective formal accounting system, an event which 
could contribute to a company's demise. Therefore,. the observation of an IAIS could 
help identify a distressed company. 
6. Conclusion 
In this case the employees received information from the IAIS. Instead of 
contributing to their concerns or perceptions that Fortex was distressed, the 
information reinforced the opinion that the company was performing well and would 
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not fail. However, that does not necessarily mean that IAISs do not have a role in a 
distress situation. The case indicates that IAISs can be constructed in response to 
weakness, in this case severely inefficient production, which could cause a company 
to fail and that the construction of any IAIS may indicate a defective formal 
accounting system which is also a determining factor in a company's failure 
(Argenti, 1977, 1979b). 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter concludes this thesis. The chapter begins by providing a brief overview 
of the study's objectives, method and results. Then, the limitations of the research 
and the implications the results raise are discussed. Lastly, several ideas for future 
research are offered and the thesis is summarised. 
2. Conclusion 
This exploratory research had two objectives. The first was to establish whether 
employees can observe the non-fmancial, or indeed any signs that a company is 
distressed, and whether these observations contribute to an employees' perceptions of 
distress. The second was to examine the extent to which two sources of informal 
information, an IAIS and the grapevine, contributed to employees' observations of 
concerns and problems. 
Previous distress research has apparently not utilised non-managerial employees as a 
source of information regarding a company's collapse. However, employees are in 
an ideal position to observe the symptoms of distress. A review of previous research 
into employees' observations revealed an anomaly between Argenti's (1976a) and 
McBamet et al' s (1993) findings which required clarification. An examination of 
grapevine and IAIS literature revealed that both systems could potentially contribute 
to an employee's perceptions of distress. From the literature other interrelationships 
between distress, an IAIS, and the grapevine were also proposed. 
The research was conducted as a single case study. The subject was Fortex Group 
Limited, a failed South Island meat-processing company. Information was 
predominantly gleaned from semi-structured interviews with 15 former employees of 
F ortex' s Seafield plant. The research revealed several findings inconsistent with the 
prior research and raised several areas for future examination. 
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2.1. Employees and Corporate Distress 
Consistent with Argenti's (1976a) claim, ·the employees interviewed observed the 
non-financial symptoms of failure. In several instances their observations occurred 
weeks before the symptoms became public knowledge. This was just one example 
where, due to their inside position, the employees proved far more perceptive than 
they are often given credit. Their perceptiveness provided preliminary evidence 
which challenged and extended Argenti's (1976a) assertion that employees can only 
observe some of the symptoms of corporate distress: 
• Firstly, the employees' observations extended to financial symptoms and other 
non-financial symptoms which Argenti (1976a) reported that employees were 
unable to observe. 
• Secondly, the employees' concerns were not restricted to the period immediately 
prior to collapse but they also extended to include the defects which cause, and the 
mistakes which contribute to, failure. While these defects and mistakes were 
reported as concerning at the time they occurred, they were not recognised as 
contributing to the company's distress. Nevertheless, just by observing these 
events and factors and finding them concerning, the employees proved more 
perceptive than Argenti (1976a) would lead us to believe. 
• Thirdly, 14 of the interviewees recognised that the company was distressed, an 
opinion which was formed based on the symptoms the company displayed. 
Argenti (1976a) proposed that employees could not identify that a company was 
distressed. 
• Fourthly, five interviewees believed that Fortex was so distressed that it could fail. 
2.2. The Grapevine 
While the employees' detection of distress was undoubtedly influenced by 
information received from formal sources, and from direct observation, they 
indicated that rumour, or grapevine information, was also a valuable source of 
information used to assess their surroundings. The grapevine's activity increased in 
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the three months prior to Fortex's failure and as such, could constitute a symptom of 
failure. Moreover, in this period the employees reported discussing their own, and 
hearing other employees' and external parties', concerns via the grapevine. Many of 
these concerns were symptoms of the company's _distress. Hence, the grapevine 
contributed to the employees' perception that the company was distressed. 
2.3. The Informal Accounting Information System 
The detailed examination of a somewhat unusual informal accounting information 
system added to an area of scant prior literature. The proposition that the employees 
may obtain information from an IAIS which contributes to their observation of 
factors of distress was rejected in this case. Instead, the limited volume of 
information the employees received from the IAIS highlighted their successes, rather 
than indicating problems. However, a number of other implications were raised: 
• Firstly, IAIS's may be constructed in response to a problem. In this case the 
problem was the severely inefficient processing operations in which one third of 
all productive time was wasted. Such problems may contribute to a company's 
distress. 
• Secondly, an IAIS can replace information from the formal system. Therefore, in 
itself, an IAIS may indicate inadequacies in a company's formal accounting 
system which is a defect which may lead to failure (Argenti, 1976a). 
• Thirdly, information from informal and formal AIS's may be compared. These 
measures may be used in an internal audit role, or could be used by an external 
party to verify the accuracy of information from the formal system. This could be 
a particularly valuable practice for an external auditor.86 
86 
The researcher is unaware if external auditors undertake such comparisons. This may be an area requiring future research. 
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3. Limitations 
The case study method adopted in this research was critiqued in Chapter 6. Included 
within that chapter were the techniques undertaken to reduce any potential effect of 
the method's limitations. Nevertheless, any conclusions drawn from this research 
have to be interpreted with respect to the following limiting factors: 
• Interviewer bias; 
• Response error; 
• Interviewee recollection difficulties; 
• Hindsight bias; 
• Accuracy of evidence; 
• Sample constraints and selection bias; and 
• Generalisability. 
3.1. Interviewer Bias 
Just as the presence of an interviewer can potentially alter the responses given by an 
individual (Emory and Cooper, 1991), simply by asking questions, a level of bias 
may be introduced into research. A professionally trained interviewer is unlikely to 
introduce as much bias as an individual who is untrained or inexperienced 
(Richardson, Dohrenwend and Klein, 1965). The interviews were conducted by the 
researcher who, while not professionally trained, has previous interview experience, 
including experience where the questioning technique introduced bias. Hence, aware 
of the ease in which bias can be introduced, as much care as practicable was taken 
during the interview process. However, some risk of interviewer bias remains. 
3.2. Response Error 
Despite any attempts by the interviewer the potential for bias (particularly response 
error) to occur remains. When viewed in a critical manner, the responses of several 
employees were identified as incorrect and were ignored. For example, one 
interviewee asserted that they had read a report prior to Fortex's failure. This 
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'report' was strikingly similar to Brett's (1994) article which was written well after 
the collapse. Another respondent seemed to be answering some questions in a 
manner which was thought to please the interviewer. Clearly having no evidence 
upon which to base the claims, these responses w~re also discarded. However, less 
obvious examples of response error may have gone undetected leaving only a critical 
interpretation of the interviewees responses as a recourse to remove error. 
A component of response error occurs when interview participants forget information 
(Simon and Burnstein, 1985; Beed and Stimson, 1985). In this case the natural 
process of forgetting warrants separate examination. 
3.3. Interviewee Recollection Difficulties 
A considerable period of time had passed between the collapse of the company and 
the point when the employees were interviewed. Over a period of time, the ability of 
a person to recollect events accurately diminishes (Hunter, 1957). The interviewees 
were requested to remember information and events which occurred as early as five 
years prior to the collapse. The time span involved meant that employees 
occasionally lacked many examples to substantiate their assertions. These 
difficulties gave rise to statements like "I forget. It was such a long time ago " and 
"It's really hard to try and remember way back then because a lot of things you 
really don 't want to remember. " 
Recollection difficulties were particularly apparent with respect to the grapevine, 
where a few employees acknowledged hearing a multitude of rumours, but were 
unable to provide more than one example. Fortunately, this problem was restricted 
to only a few individuals and only arose occasionally. Evidence was forthcoming 
from the other interviewees. Furthermore, if anything, such memory difficulties 
potentially indicate the importance of the concerns held over events such as the 
development of Silverstream, that they remembered with reasonable clarity up to five 
years later. 
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3.4. Hindsight Bias 
Hindsight bias refers to the tendency of individuals with knowledge of an outcome, 
to alter the perception of an event so that their ability to predict an event ex-post is 
greater than their ability ex-ante (Lowe and Reekers, 1994). In hindsight the 
majority of the employees recognised the inevitability of Fortex's collapse, an 
opinion which was only held by 5 employees in the interview group prior to its 
failure. For instance, one employee reported the following: 
"I would say that if 90 percent of the staff sat back now and looked at it they 
would say that company was definitely going down.... If I went out and tried to 
tell that to other staff I think I would have got laughed out. Everyone had the 
idea that things were going pretty good " 
Many effects of hindsight on the employees perceptions of the company were 
obvious. The majority of hindsight-influenced responses where phrased using the 
term 'in hindsight.' This information was discarded and not analysed as part of the 
preceding chapters. However, it is probable that other responses were not so 
obviously influenced. One further example could be the employees' perception of 
whether the company was going to fail and their reaction of surprise or otherwise, 
where both groups observed a nearly identical number and type of distress factors. 
Similarly, events may have been attributed more significance in Fortex's downfall 
ex-post than they were ex-ante. Such bias could account for the diversity of opinion 
displayed in the employees' responses. 
Any overt influence of hindsight was reduced by asking when the employees noted 
events. Primarily, whether events were noted before or after the company's collapse. 
However, the effect of hindsight bias cannot be wholly negated and must not be lost 
sight of when interpreting the conclusions. Furthermore, hindsight bias is not solely 
in the domain of the interviewees' responses, but it is also applicable to the analysis 
performed by the researcher. 
As Buchman (1985) noted bankruptcy prediction can be influenced by hindsight. 
The analysis the company's collapse from the employees' perspective was performed 
retrospectively. Therefore, the events identified in Chapter 8 which seemed to 
conform to those proposed in Chapter 5, Observable Factors in Corporate Distress, 
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are less likely to have been identified had the analysis occurred prior to failure. 
However, such an influence does not make the findings worthless. Furthermore, it 
must be remembered that the original opinions provided were the employees own, 
detailing those events which caused them concern. This researcher has only 
compared those concerns with factors proposed in prior distress research. While 
potentially introducing a further aspect of hindsight bias, such an interpretation and 
comparison does not negate the worth of the findings, and is a method used by other 
researchers who have retrospectively analysed a company's failure. 
3.5. Accuracy of Evidence 
As has already been noted hindsight bias, interviewer biases, response error and 
recollection difficulties are all potential limitations on the conclusions drawn from 
this research. The nature of the research required employees to recall information 
which was mostly based on their own, and others, opinions and feelings. 
Furthermore, the spoken nature of grapevine information means that, except for 
comparisons with responses from other individuals, there were few mechanisms to 
verify the accuracy of the responses. Such problems impinge on the accuracy of the 
mostly anecdotal evidence obtained through interviews. 
The observation count of the concerns the employees held reveals a large disparity in 
observations between differing events.87 Several events have fewer than three 
interviewees remarking on an event's importance. Such low observations, 
particularly where there was only a single observation, may indicate an event which 
the interviewees identified as an issue of importance influenced by the effect of 
hindsight, or to be incorrect information. In such a case, the other interviewees, by 
not mentioning such factors, would be placing the factors in the 'correct' context that 
they were not a concern to them. 
Unfortunately, an interpretation of the events identified relatively few of the 
employees interviewed is not so clear-cut. For instance, the employees who did not 
87 
The reader is referred to Table 8.1: Distress Events Observed by Employees in Chronological Order, which is set out on p 
152 of this thesis. 
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identify the concerns could have understated their observation or the level of concern 
the event inflicted upon them. Furthermore, it has been established that the 
information proffered by the individual employees differed by their physical (such as 
working in differing departments and/or differing shifts) and hierarchical (union vs 
non-union information) positions within the organisation, and whether they had 
access to informal grapevine information. 
Moreover, other non-quantifiable characteristics, such as the perceptiveness or mind-
set of the individual employees, could have influenced their opinions. For instance, 
the people who reportedly believed the company was troubled prior to the collapse 
were branded 'pessimists' by one individual. Yet it could be that these 'pessimistic' 
individuals were privy to more information or were more perceptive than the 
individual categorising them as such. 
Due to this array of mitigating factors, the concerns identified by only a few 
interviewees were included in the analysis of the information results and discussion. 
All factors were critically examined to reduce the effects of any bias. However, 
some of the lesser mentioned concerns, such as the 1993 share· issue to employees 
and the 1993 loss, must be viewed with suspicion. For this reason, the fmdings can 
not be conclusive but only indicative of the role informal information plays in 
distressed organisations. 
3.6. Sample Constraints and Bias 
Only 15 individuals participated in the research. One other former employee was 
willing to be interviewed but was unavailable when contact was attempted. This 
individual was a union representative and had considerable experience within Fortex. 
However, the union was adequately represented through two of the three delegates 
being interviewed. 
The former Fortex employees who constituted the sample were selected by one 
individual, Peter Binnie. Binnie also participated as an interview candidate. While 
being a practical approach, whereby Binnie identified people who would be willing 
to participate, this procedure may have introduced a form of self-selection bias. 
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Furthermore, Binnie may have chosen personal friends or individuals having more 
knowledge of events contributing to Fortex's demise. This point is especially 
relevant since the union was privy to more information, both formal and informal, 
than other employees. 
However, with the diversity of responses provided by the interviewees, (a potential 
limitation elsewhere), and the fact that the sample included two individuals who were 
obvious isolates, this would indicate that the bias introduced through Binnie's 
selection of participants was negligible. The responses would have been anomalous 
if all 14 indicated an equal knowledge of the problems which beset the company, or a 
knowledge approaching Binnie's when he held a privileged position. 
3. 7. Generalisability 
The sample is small considering the size of the organisation. With the findings 
arising from only a small number of individuals from one plant, they cannot be 
empirically generalised to other divisions of the organisation or to other companies. 
Generalisability is further affected by the nature of the subject company. Fortex is 
most unlikely to be representative when compared to other company failures, and to 
companies in general. The media attention, prolific growth rate, and belief and 
hyperbole surrounding the company is uncommon. These factors and the sudden 
demise of the organisation would indicate a Type 2 failure trajectory, a category 
which only approximately 10 percent offailures exhibit (Argenti, 1976a). 
However, as was noted in Chapter 6, Research Method, empirical generalisations 
were not the object of this exploratory research. Instead, the findings of case study 
research can be analytically generalised (Mitchell, 1983; Yin, 1989; Scapens, 1990). 
Hence, the findings of this case may well equally apply to employees of other 
distressed organisations. 
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3.8. Summary 
Each of the limitations must be considered when consideration of the results of this 
research is made. However, despite the limiting effects, this study has raised several 
implications and opportunities for future research. 
4. Implications 
During the interviews, Binnie submitted that "I think workers are generally far more 
perceptive than what the employers give them credit for being. " The research 
supported this claim. The findings regarding employees' observations, the grapevine 
and an IAIS have both practical and research oriented applications. 
The employees' perceptiveness and insider knowledge means that they could prove 
to be a valuable source of information for a researcher seeking to examine a 
company's collapse. Employees may provide a perspective not provided through 
interviewing managers and accountants, who may focus predominantly on the 
financial issues which promote failure. 
Employees may also provide information which could be used to assess whether an 
organisation is distressed before it fails. Similarly, the grapevine (if it could be 
accessed), and an IAIS (which provides information complementary to the formal 
accounting reports), may also be used by external parties to assess an organisation's 
viability. These external parties could include bankers, financial analysts, secured 
lenders, and auditors. However, apart from auditors who have the statutory right to 
enter a company's premises, many external parties may not have access to a 
company's employees. Furthermore, a third party's ability to detect distress will 
depend of the willingness of the employees to communicate information to them. 
Research needs to undertaken to establish the viability of assessing distress through 
obtaining information from employees. This is the first and most important 
recommendation for future research. 
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5. Recommendations for Future Research 
Being exploratory and an analysis of a single case, the conclusions drawn from this 
research are not final. Therefore, the potential interr~lationships between employees' 
observations, informal information and corporate distress raised and examined during 
this research require subsequent re-examination in the context of other failed 
companies. Research of this form may be undertaken in distinct parts as each 
individual of the components; employees observations in distress, the grapevine and 
IAIS's, have not been the subject of a significant level of prior research. In 
particular, employees' perceptions and observations require further examination. 
Employees observations offer a potential source for the early detection of distress. 
However, such perceptions require examination in a variety of organisations. Two 
obvious criteria for organisations where further research should be conducted are: 
• Firstly, where employees were not informed through formal channels that the 
company was distressed; and 
• Secondly, companies that received little media attention reporting the reasons for 
failure. Therefore, limiting the effect of hindsight bias. This second objective 
may also be achieved by studying a company immediately after its failure, before 
excessive media coverage occurs. 
By conducting further research of this form in such organisations, employees' 
observations, (and whether they are aware of distress before failure), may gain more 
support or be challenged. 
The employees' observations within the company differed markedly. Numerous 
reasons were proposed including different physical and hierarchical positions, 
isolation from interpersonal communication, and personal characteristics such as 
individuals being optimists or pessimists. However, these reasons are unlikely to be 
definitive. Other factors may influence employees' observations and perceptions. 
An understanding of the factors and the interrelationship between factors may allow 
the determination of the individuals who would offer the most information for 
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distress detection. Furthermore, an examination and comparison of other employee 
groups, such as foremen or supervisors, management other than senior management, 
and salaried staff, may reveal that each observes different factors. 88 This 
examination may reveal which of these groups is (are) most likely to detect distress, 
therefore indicating which group(s) could provide the most fruitful information to a 
third party who attempts to detect distress. 
The findings of this case raise implications for employees who trade shares based on 
their observations. If they are aware of the organisation's distress before the general 
public and choose to sell shares, employees in this position may breach the insider 
trading laws set forth in the Securities Amendment Act 1988. The legislation seems 
to include non-managerial employees within its scope. However, a detailed analysis 
of this issue was outside the scope of this research and is left for other researchers to 
develop. 
With respect to the grapevine, an inquiry should be conducted into the relationship 
between morale and grapevine information in distressed companies. Morale is 
considered a good indicator that an organisation is distressed. This and previous 
research indicates that the two areas are interdependent, but research has not 
established how this interdependence occurs. 
In this study the volume of rumour from the grapevine increased as failure 
approached. Therefore, in itself, grapevine activity in distressed and non-distressed 
organisations requires further examination. A comparison between grapevine 
activity in an organisation before and during distress would be ideal. However, this 
would require foresight to predict which organisation will become distressed, a task 
which is theoretically and practically difficult to perform. These examinations would 
provide detail on a potentially significant indicator of corporate distress. 
Several employees acted as 'gatekeepers' within the company's grapevine, supplying 
external information to their colleagues. This role of employees has not received any 
88 
It is accepted that executive management are likely to be aware that their company is distressed. Therefore, they are not 
considered as a group which requires examination. 
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comment in prior research, and therefore research is required to determine if this 
finding was anomalous to Fortex or occurs in other organisation's grapevines. 
This study indicated that grapevine information influenced employees' perceptions 
and observations of distress. However, it was impossible to establish the volume of 
information which originated from the grapevine as opposed to formal 
communication. Future researchers may attempt to delineate the proportion of 
information which contributes to employees' opinions. This research would be 
invaluable to ascertain the significance of grapevine information in distress rather 
than merely whether it is used or not. 
In themselves, IAISs require substantially more research. As the informal 
counterpart of formal systems they are often viewed with contempt by the designers 
of the formal systems (Clancy and Collins, 1979). However, this and previous 
research indicates that they are not only useful, but they do not undermine the formal 
system. Therefore, it is surprising that more research has not been undertaken in this 
area to establish the legitimacy ofiAISs and their usefulness for managerial decision 
making. 
A detailed investigation into the reasons for IAIS maintenance in New Zealand 
companies is recommended. Both Lal and Donaldson's (1988) paper and this study 
have found that an IAIS may replace parts of the organisation's formal accounting 
system. International research has found no instances where this occurs, which may 
indicate that this is a New Zealand specific phenomenon. 
The findings regarding the IAIS would seemingly indicate that informal information 
may be of worth to auditors as a source of evidence for the verification of 
information from the formal accounting system. As far as the author is aware, there 
is no previous study which has examined whether auditors use IAISs or are even 
aware of their potential significance. 
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6. Summary 
Despite its limitations, this research challenged and extended previous beliefs 
regarding employees' observations in a distressed company, and provided 
preliminary links between the grapevine, IAISs and distress. Through these means 
this research increases the body of knowledge concerning corporate distress. 
Moreover, the research, by compiling, analysing and summarising literature in each 
of the areas examined, provides a basis from which further research can be easily 
undertaken. 
The findings, while requiring consideration in the light of the study's limitations, 
potentially identified alternative sources of information to assist the early detection 
of distress. This was the most important of the many areas recommended for future 
research because the early detection of distress allows more time for a turnaround, 
therefore avoiding the social and fiscal effects failure has on individuals and society. 
However, because this research was exploratory the findings and implications require 
re-examination. Nevertheless, if this thesis engenders further research into the 
usefulness of informal information and employees' observations for the early 
detection of corporate distress, even if future research reaches conclusions contrary to 
those found in this case, its overall objective of promoting research in these areas will 
have been fulfilled. 
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Postscript 
Subsequent to this study's completion, the court. proceedings against Graeme 
Thompson, the founder and managing director, and Michael Mullen, Fortex's general 
manager of finance and company secretary, concluded. After initially pleading his 
innocence on 16 charges of :fraud, Thompson was found guilty on March 7, 1996, of 
12 charges regarding the false recording of loans and the signing of false annual 
reports (MacFie, 1996). Thompson received a six and a half year jail term (New 
Zealand Press Association, 1996). Earlier, Mullen admitted to seven counts of fraud 
and was jailed for four years (The Press, 1996). 
The court proceedings revealed that creative accounting occurred as early as 1988, 
when loans were first entered as income (MacFie, 1996). However, the majority of 
the fraudulent activity occurred between May 1991 and October 1993. During this 
period Thompson, Mullen and several other salaried staff booked overseas loans 
from four banks (Indosuez, Akivbanken, Hongkong Bank and Citibank (Williams, 
1996)) as income (MacFie, 1996). Moreover, Mullen authorised others to fabricate 
stock valuations and create false sales invoices. 
The fraudulent activities undertaken resulted in a significantly improved financial 
position being depicted in the 1991, 1992 and 1993 financial years. If accurate 
accounts had been published 1991 they would have revealed that Fortex produced a 
loss of $4.4 million instead of a $2.8 million profit. Similarly, in 1992 a loss of 
$5,000 would have been incurred instead of $9.2 million profit, and 1993 would have 
seen a $10.4 million loss instead of a $4.8 million loss (MacFie, 1996). 
The employees interviewed in this study were unaware of the fraudulent activities 
until after the Fortex's collapse. Nevertheless, evidence produced during the court 
proceedings provides support for this research. 
Firstly, Thompson was reported to be charismatic, self-confident and a great leader 
(Williams, 1996). His fraudulent actions remained unchallenged by Mullen and the 
six other salaried staff who participated in classifying loans as revenue. These 
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attributes are consistent with an autocratic leader. Moreover, testimony from Mullen 
provides more evidence ofThompson's dominance stating " ... that Thompson pushed 
the discussion on the company's financial position to the back of the board agenda 
because he believed there was too much 'nit-picking"' (MacFie, 1996, p 4). Hence, 
from the court proceedings, the employee's concern over Thompson's leadership 
style receive further justification. 
Secondly, the trial . again raised media attention towards Fortex's demise. 
Silverstream's cost (MacFie, 1996; Williams, 1996), Fortex's expansionary policies 
(MacFie, 1996), and intense competition and procurement wars caused by reduced 
lamb numbers and the snow storm (MacFie, 1996), were identified as contributing 
elements to Fortex's demise. The employees in this case observed each of these 
issues and found them concerning. 
Fortex's saga may not have ended. Both Thompson and Mullen are likely to appeal 
their sentences, and the receiver and liquidators are presently considering whether it 
is feasible to undertake a civil action against Fortex's directors and executives to 
recover money lost by the company's creditors (Williams, 1996). Hence, even now, 
March 13 1996, nearly two years after Fortex was placed into receivership, the 
repercussions which arose from Fortex's failure continue. 
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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 279 
Appendix 1: Interview Questions 
The questions I am about to ask you concern two areas. Firstly, is to ascertain 
whether you observed any concerns or problems within Fortex prior to its collapse. 
Secondly, is to determine from where you gained the information which led to these 
observations or concerns. Anything you say is strictly confidential. Your name will 
not be mentioned in the research. However, I do wish to record the interview so that 
I can remember what was said more easily. Is that a problem? 
Introductory Questions 
How long were you employed at Fortex? 
What position did you hold? 
What did your job entail? 
Were you also union representative? 
Prior to working at Fortex had you been employed by any other meat-working 
companies? 
How did Fortex compare with these other companies? 
Were you a shareholder? 
Why did/didn't you choose to invest in Fortex? 
General Questions 
Ql. What was your reaction when Fortex was placed into receivership? Were 
you surprised? 
Q2. Did you see any problems, hear rumours or have any concerns about the 
company's future before it collapsed? 
How did you form these views? 
Were they commonly held by other employees? Why? 
Where did you obtain the information about these events from? 
Did the number of rumours increase as the receivership got closer? 
Did the content of the rumours change? 
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Q3. Do you believe that what you saw from inside the company was consistent 
with its publicly image of being successful, profitable and well-managed? 
In what respect was it the same? 
In what respect did it differ? 
How much of your view today might be due to hindsight? 
Q4. Where within the company did you get most of your information from? 
Were there any external sources? 
For example you indicated you were concerned about ??????where did you 
obtain the information from? 
QS. Some events have unfolded after the collapse such as an overvaluation of 
inventory and the misclassification of loans. Did you have any idea at the 
time? 
Union Specific Questions 
Q6. You indicated, in the earlier interviews, that the union kept work sheets 
and monitored some parts of the company. What information did you 
collect? 
Why was that information collected? 
How was it collected? 
Who had access to it? 
What use was made of it? 
Did the company collect this information itself? 
Did you have access to the official reports in these areas? 
How did your figures compare to the official figures? 
Q7. To what extent were you a source of information for the staff at Seafleld? 
